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Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs), like other government accountability mechanisms, 
promise increased control, improved performance, and appropriate behavior from governmental 
actors.  OIGs do so by monitoring governmental programs and operations and providing their 
findings to legislative or executive decision makers and/or the public, who may act on the OIGs’ 
findings and recommendations.  OIGs have enjoyed a particular popularity in the United States 
in the last 40 years.  In 1974, neither federal, state, nor local governments had adopted a single 
civilian OIG; however, at the end of 2013, there were 73 federal OIGs, 109 state OIGs, 47 local 
OIGs, and three multijurisdictional OIGs.  Yet we know very little about why these OIGs are 
spreading, how they are designed, and what happens upon implementation.  This dissertation 
advances a three-part thesis, supported by quantitative and qualitative data.  First, OIGs are 
spreading from jurisdiction to jurisdiction because they are seen as the answer to the perceived 
problem of government accountability, defined very broadly.  The idea of an OIG has become 
institutionalized, embodying the ideal of accountability.  Second, although powerful political 
elites embrace this concept of an OIG, they push back against the potential implications of an 
OIG having too much independence or power by adopting design changes that sometimes leave 
an OIG in a weakened form.  In other words, although the symbol of increased accountability is 
desirable, actual accountability often is suspect.  Third, during implementation, those being 
overseen by the OIG often take steps to avoid or limit the OIG’s oversight.  In response, OIG 
personnel act in strategic ways to protect their agencies and the mission of accountability.  As a 
result, OIGs become what I call “politicized bureaucracies,” agencies that must engage in 
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IG: VA Investigations Expanded to 26 Facilities 
“The number of VA facilities under investigation after complaints about falsified 
records and treatment delays has more than doubled in recent days, the Office of 
Inspector General at the Veterans Affairs Department said late Tuesday.  A 
spokeswoman for the IG's office said 26 facilities were being investigated 
nationwide. Acting Inspector General Richard Griffin told a Senate committee last 
week that at least 10 new allegations about manipulated waiting times and other 
problems had surfaced since reports of problems at the Phoenix VA hospital came 
to light last month. (Daley, Associated Press News Service, May 21, 2014). 
 
Street Finds LSU Hospital Overpayments 
“Erroneous billing caused the unnecessary expenditure of nearly $85,000 in public 
funds at LSU’s Interim Public Hospital in New Orleans, the state’s inspector 
general said Friday.  Inspector General Stephen Street reported on the findings of 
an investigation launched as a result of a complaint to his office.  The billings 
related to the purchase of wound vacs from Kinetic Concepts Inc., or KCI. Wound 
vacs are devices used to assist in the healing of open wounds.  Most of the problem 
billing – $64,317 – was associated with invoices billed to patient ‘Missing in 
Action’” (Shuler, The Baton Rouge Advocate, May 16, 2014). 
 
FK High School - Teacher Removed in School Fraud Investigation: 
Probe in Granada Hills of Alleged Form Irregularities 
“Los Angeles Unified’s inspector general has opened an investigation into 
allegations of fraud, forgery and theft at John F. Kennedy High School in Granada 
Hills, district officials said. A teacher at the center of those allegations, Leslie 
Garcia, was removed from the school, Los Angeles Unified District Spokesman 
Thomas Waldman confirmed Wednesday. A student at the school, Gabriella 
Orellana, said Garcia was last seen at the school a day after she and other students 
were questioned last week about forms they are required to fill out to verify 
attendance at an after-school program. “She (an investigator) showed me the sign-
in sheets and I told her they’re not my signatures and I wasn’t there,” Orellana 
said of questions she answered during an interview with an investigator last 
week” (Himes, Daily News of Los Angeles, May 8, 2014). 
 
Offices of Inspectors General make headlines across the country. As the examples above 
illustrate, these offices are energetic engines of accountability at all levels of government in the 
United States. Yet offices of inspector general (hereinafter “OIGs”) are a relatively new 
phenomenon. Virtually none existed before 1976, but now two-thirds of the states and many 





from?  In what ways do they contribute to accountability, and what are the limitations of their 
contribution? This dissertation will address these questions. After a brief introduction of the topic 
I will reframe these questions in light of the theories that will guide my analysis.  
An OIG is a bureaucratic unit dedicated to government accountability. OIGs typically are 
set up to oversee a particular government agency (or, sometimes, several agencies). Commonly 
OIGs are independent of the agencies they are charged with overseeing, so that their oversight is 
not controlled by the agency being overseen. (As we shall see, state and local OIGs vary 
considerably in this degree of independence.)  An OIG provides accountability by monitoring the 
agency or agencies under its jurisdiction and producing reports about agency programs and 
operations, identifying problems, and making recommendations for fixing these problems.  An 
OIG’s jurisdiction usually extends beyond monitoring the actions of public employees to include 
the actions of public contractors and beneficiaries of public programs.  Monitoring and reporting 
come in the form of audits and/or investigations.  Often audits and investigations are initiated in 
response to complaints about the agency or agencies that the OIG oversees, but most OIGs also 
investigate or audit issues that are deemed problematic according to their discretion. Although 
OIGs commonly have broad powers of investigation and audit, they typically have no authority 
to prosecute criminal behavior or to require changes in the agency being overseen. Put simply, 
their authority is limited to monitoring and reporting. If changes are to occur in response to 
problems identified by the OIG, others—the governor, legislature, mayor, or some other 
official—must order them. 
OIGs have proliferated across the country.  Since the creation of the first modern civilian 
OIG on the federal level in 1976, OIGs have been established across the country and throughout 





executive and legislative branches.  Further, 31 states have established at least one OIG in an 
agency or for the state as a whole. Many large cities, such as Newark, New Orleans, Chicago and 
Albuquerque, and counties, including Miami-Dade County, Florida; Cuyahoga County, Ohio; 
and Montgomery County, Maryland, have also followed suit.  OIGs can also be found in school 
districts and sheriff’s offices.  Although these OIGs are not identical in structure, each of these 
jurisdictions has purposely established an office headed by an individual with the title of 
“Inspector General,” giving it a mission to pursue government accountability by collecting 
information about the actions of government employees or the use of governmental funds.   
The first  modern civilian OIG was established by Congress in 1976 to oversee the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW);1 however, it is worth noting that this OIG 
was preceded by in 1959 by an “Inspector General and Comptroller” for the International 
Cooperation Administration2 which might be considered the prototype of the modern OIG (Light 
1993).  The Inspector General and Comptroller unit performed and coordinated audits of the 
agency and reported its findings to Congress.  Yet, the Inspector General and Comptroller was 
generally considered a failure due to politicization and apathy and was abolished in the mid-
1970s (Light 1993).  The HEW OIG, on the other hand, spawned a system of federal OIGs, as it 
was followed by a second OIG in the Department of Energy in 1977, and by the passage of the 
IG Act of 1978, which placed OIGs in 12 agencies, including HEW and Energy.  Here, Congress 
                                                          
1 Congress divided HEW into the Departments of Education and of Health and Human Services 
in 1979. 
2 This agency no longer exists.  Its responsibilities are now handled by United States Agency for 





combined preexisting audit and investigation units into a single independent office and directed 
them to pursue issues of economy and efficiency, fraud and abuse. 
Figure 1.1 below shows the growth of the number of OIGs on the federal level since 1978 
(data collected by author through a review of federal OIG statutes and websites, and telephone 
inquiries).3  This figure shows a sharp increase in the number of OIGs in the year 1978 with the 
passage of the IG Act, and in the year 1988 with the passage of amendments to the IG Act, 
which created 33 new OIGs for regulatory agencies.  After 1988, the number of federal OIGs has 
increased steadily and, since 2005, at an accelerated rate.   
 
  
                                                          
3 Representatives from four federal agencies, all in the field of intelligence, declined to provide 





FIGURE 1.1  
 
 
At the same time that the number of OIGs was growing on the federal level, states and 
local governments, too, began to create OIGs.  Figure 1.2 shows the growth of state and local 
OIGs since 1975.  I collected these data through an extensive review of government websites and 
state and local statutes, as well as through an electronic and telephone survey, the methods of 
which are described more fully below in the methodology section.  I am confident that my 
research was able to identify all state and local OIGs in existence at the end of 2013 that either 
had an internet presence or were referred to in on-line public government documents or news 































Figure 1.2 shows a large jump in the number of state OIGs in 1994, which is attributable 
to the enactment of the Florida OIG Act, which placed an OIG in every state agency.  The 
average annual growth rate for local OIGs over the period of 1975 to 2013 was 10.6%.  The 
average annual growth rate for state OIGs for the same time period was 16.6%.  Today, there are 
109 state level OIGs, 47 local OIGs, and 3 multi-jurisdictional OIGs.  The total number of local 
and state OIGs, 159, is more than twice the number of civilian OIGs on the federal level.4  
                                                          
4 Data on the dates of creation were not available for seven OIGs.  The three multi-jurisdictional 





























In the past decades OIGs have spread widely across most regions of the country.  As of 
the end of 2013, 31 states had at least one OIG.  The following map, Figure 1.3, shows where 
OIGs have been adopted and the number in each state (data collected by author).  Although the 
map does not distinguish whether an OIG in a state is located on the state or local level of 
government, it shows clearly that New York, Illinois, and Florida are the leaders in OIG 
adoption.  In addition, some regions, the upper northwest, the south-central, and the upper north 







FIGURE 1.3   
 
As OIGs have spread across the nation, they have evolved from the original federal 
model and, as this dissertation will demonstrate, a generally accepted model, or archetype, of an 
OIG has emerged.  The key components of the archetype have gained a wide consensus among 
inspector general practitioners, thereby illustrating a phenomenon of what scholars refer to as 
“institutionalization.”  In the words of Philip Selznick, a practice has become institutionalized 
when it comes to take on “value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand,” meaning 





grew from, but has grown beyond, the original OIG concept introduced on the federal level.  Its 
key components are: a statutory basis for the OIG agency, independence from the entity that the 
OIG oversees, and legal authority to pursue both investigations and audit. These components 
give the OIG autonomy to investigate and report, free from fear of censorship by the agency 
being overseen. This dissertation will demonstrate the vibrancy and widespread adoption of this 
archetype of the OIG.    
This dissertation will also show that some jurisdictions adopt deviations from the 
archetypal model. Despite the endorsement of an OIG archetype, state and local OIGs often 
deviate from this model.  For example, a key element of the archetype is to have authority to 
conduct both audits (that examine issues of effectiveness and efficiency) and investigations (that 
look into allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse).  This dual authority has been endorsed by the 
Association of Inspectors General and is part of an archetypal OIG; having the power of both 
investigations and audits is viewed as essential to a robust OIG.  Nonetheless, on the state and 
local levels, while some OIGs perform both audits and investigations, a significant number of 
OIGs perform only investigations, and a few perform only audits.  These deviations reflect a 
deliberate decision to remove significant powers from an OIG. 
For example, OIGs vary in their independence from the entities they oversee.  
Independence helps OIGs produce unbiased reports, as opposed to reports that might be 
manipulated for political reasons.  On the federal level, OIGs’ independence is protected in that 
an inspector general (IG) is appointed based on his or her professional qualifications and not 
according to political affiliation (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §3).  Additionally, many IGs are 





appointed and confirmed, the IG has full authority to manage his or her staff and decide which 
audits and investigations to pursue without independence (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §6).   
The archetypical OIG has these and other protections to its independence; yet, state and 
local OIGs may have more or less independence than the federal OIGs.    For example, the OIG 
for the Cook County, Illinois, Clerk of the Circuit Court, has much less independence than 
federal OIGs in that this IG is hired by the Clerk and can be fired at will (Confidential Personal 
Communication, 2013).  Further, the IG reports to and is supervised by the Clerk.  In contrast, 
the Palm Beach County OIG has greater independence.  In this county, the IG is not selected by 
any county official but by a committee made up of the local state attorney, the local public 
defender, and the private citizens who make up the County’s Commission on Ethics (Palm Beach 
County, Florida, Office of Inspector General 2009-049 §2-423.4).  Like the federal IGs, this IG 
must meet specified professional qualifications (Palm Beach County, Florida, Office of Inspector 
General Ordinance 2009-049 §2-423.4), but unlike the federal IGs who can be removed by the 
president for any reason at any time, only with notice to Congress (IG Act of 1978, as amended, 
§3), the Palm Beach IG is appointed for a four-year term and can be removed only for cause 
(Palm Beach County Office of Inspector General Ordinance 2009-049 §2-430).  In these ways 
the County’s ordinance provides more protection of an IG’s independence than the federal 
statutes.  
 OIGs also vary in the legal authority they are granted.  On the federal level, OIG staff are 
granted law enforcement power when approved by the Department of Justice (IG Act of 1978, as 
amended, §6) and can issue subpoenas for documents (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §6).   These 
statutory powers help the OIG staff pursue the information they need for thorough investigations 





Massachusetts OIG lacks law enforcement authority, but it can subpoena documents and, 
through a specific statutory mechanism, individuals to provide testimony (Massachusetts Office 
of Inspector General Act of 1980, §15).  The Virginia OIG has authority to subpoena both 
documents and testimony, and it has blanket law enforcement authority for all its investigators 
(Virginia Office of the State Inspector General Act, §2.2-311).  
This dissertation aims to increase our understanding of state and local OIGs. It applies 
theories of neo-institutionalism, policy diffusion and reinvention, agenda setting, and 
accountability, which are described in more detail below.  Using these theoretical lenses, this 
study addresses the following three research questions: 
• Why are OIGs spreading so rapidly among states and localities—or some states and 
localities? As we shall see, neo-institutional theories help explain the appeal of the OIG 
idea and its widespread diffusion. In brief, the OIG has emerged as a key model for how 
to address the perceived problem of bureaucratic accountability, and the power of this 
model propels its adoption in many places. 
• Why do these OIGs vary so substantially in design? As we shall see, theories of policy 
reinvention, especially those attuned to cross-cutting political pressures in different 
jurisdictions, help explain why the specific form of the OIG is so different from place to 
place. In brief, powerful political elites sometimes push back against giving an OIG too 
much independence or power, producing design changes that sometimes leave an OIG in 
a weakened form. 
• What are the implications of this variation in design for state and local OIGs as a 
mechanism of accountability? As we shall see, theories of bureaucratic politics help to 





their legitimacy for professional analysis so as to overcome the weaknesses of their 
offices’ design.  Although built-in design features sometimes deeply weaken an OIG, OIG 
officials’ ongoing efforts to give life to this mechanism of accountability even in the face of great 
difficulty provide further evidence of the symbolic power of the OIG idea. 
Past Studies of Offices of Inspector General 
Despite the widespread adoption of OIGs on all levels of government, to date there is 
very little scholarship on OIGs.  The scholarship that exists focuses solely on federal OIGs and 
the implications of the passage of the federal IG Act of 1978, as amended.  None of these studies 
examines the spread of the OIG concept across states and localities, nor do they address the 
changes in design that are found in these OIGs. 
The foundational piece is Paul Light’s Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and 
the Search for Accountability (1993).  In this book, Light reviewed the passage of the IG Act of 
1978, including early organizational precursors, the passage of the 1988 IG Act amendments, 
and implementation of the Act through 1992.  Light questioned Congress’ investment in OIGs as 
an effective mechanism to pursue accountability and improve agency operations. This was not 
the fault of the OIGs themselves, he wrote, but instead was a product of the many statutory and 
political incentives that push these agencies to focus on narrow issues of legal or procedural 
compliance rather than on more complex issues of performance.  For instance, one pressure 
comes from statutory provisions that require federal OIGs to report on numbers of audits and 
investigations, dollars saved, and number of cases referred for prosecution.  Another reason may 
have arisen from the fact that many IGs at that time were law enforcement professionals and 
were predisposed to examine compliance issues.  Light observed that compliance work products 
are simpler, take less time, and add to statistical accomplishments, but have little impact on 





useful as a method of political control of the executive than an accountability mechanism.  He 
suggested that Congress adopted OIGs in order to help Congress better monitor federal agencies 
by providing a method by which it could receive more information about these agencies than it 
had in the past.  OIGs were better positioned to perform this role than to improve executive 
performance.   
Light’s (1993) work on OIGs is important in that it provided the first scholarly look at an 
expansive system of federal oversight.  His review of the IG Act’s legislative history as well as 
the implementation of the Act by IGs appointed by Presidents Carter and Reagan provides a 
detailed picture into the complex oversight relationship between Congress and the executive 
agencies. Still, Light’s research neither directly addresses the multitude of state and local OIGs 
that have sprung up around the country nor speaks to the spread of the OIG concept.     
Katherine Newcomer (1994, 1998) followed Light’s work with a comparison of program 
evaluation (PE) offices, which are units dedicated to performance evaluation, and OIGs.  She 
surveyed PE and OIG staff twice within a four year period.  The findings from her first survey 
echoed Light’s conclusions in that she found that staff focus more on compliance audits and 
investigations than examining program performance.  In 1994, she stated: “Both the (OIG) 
auditors and the (program) evaluators tend to focus on program process, rather than impacts” 
(Newcomer 1994, p. 152). In contrast, Newcomer’s (1998) survey of the same organizations four 
years later found that declining budgets and the passage of the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 had put pressures on OIGs, which altered their activities. The 
GPRA was a major federal statute that placed a greater emphasis on administrative outcomes 
than processes. Newcomer found that in this new statutory context many federal OIGs were 





(1993) conclusions, she found that although OIGs still focused on the old issues of compliance 
with rules prohibiting fraud and abuse, many were also focusing on improving their agencies’ 
performance.   
Newcomer’s work responds to Light’s (1993) critique of OIGs and their pursuit of 
compliance over performance and provides interesting insight into the evolution of federal OIGs.  
Nevertheless, Newcomer, like Light, only examines federal OIGs within the federal statutory 
scheme.  She does not address the institutionalization of OIGs in state and local jurisdictions.   
The most recent published study on OIGs is a book by Carmen Apaza (2011), who 
provides a direct response to the criticisms Light (1993) levied against OIGs. Based on an in-
depth case study of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) OIG, she demonstrates that at 
least this Department’s OIG does not simply pursue easier, compliance-based audits and 
investigations, but rather regularly takes on more substantive performance-related issues.  One 
example is a study of the agency’s system of contract administration and its vulnerabilities to 
fraud and corruption in times of emergency, such as occurred following Hurricane Katrina.  The 
OIG identified inadequate acquisition, planning, and coordination with other agencies, as well as 
the agency’s insufficient acquisition personnel, which resulted in inefficient spending and poor 
performance, in this case responding to the disaster. The OIG also then recommended how to 
improve these processes so that Department of Homeland Security would better respond to 
disasters in the future.  Based on this case study, and acknowledging that each federal OIG has a 
different context due to its “hosting agency,” Apaza rejects Light’s (1993) critique of federal 
OIGs as focused only on compliance.  
Apaza’s work provides an insider’s view into the DHS OIG, and an interesting picture of 





on whether it is typical, it cannot be generalized to other OIGs.  As Apaza acknowledges, other 
federal OIGs may not be comparable even though they operate under the same statutory regime.  
State and local OIGs, each of which has its own unique base of authority among other variations, 
are even further removed from the DHS OIG.  Thus, Apaza’s observations, while valuable, are 
limited to one context and to Light’s (1993) critique of the federal OIG system. 
In sum, the few scholars who have examined OIGs have not examined the spread of the 
OIG concept to states and localities, the variations of the OIG design that can be found therein, 
and the implications for these OIGs as accountability mechanisms.  These things are the focus of 
this dissertation.  
My Thesis: The Power of the “Office of Inspector General” Idea 
This dissertation advances a three-part thesis regarding the spread of OIGs across state 
and local governments.  First, the concept of an “office of inspector general,” as an independent 
agency charged with overseeing a bureaucracy’s fraud, waste, abuse, effectiveness, and 
efficiency, has gained widespread appeal. This appeal is based ultimately on the growing 
demand for government accountability. Government accountability has become a constant 
concern, or even an “obsession” (Dubnick & O’Brien, 2011) of elected officials, citizens and 
public managers alike.  Accountability mechanisms promise increased control, improved 
performance, and appropriate behavior from governmental actors through a formal account-
giving that provides an opportunity for decision makers to assess and determine appropriate 
consequences for those governmental actors (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2011; Bovens, 2007).  
Accountability also is thought of as helping to sustain the values of integrity, democratic 





The demand for accountability is not enough to explain the spread of OIGs, however, as 
this is a specific institutional mechanism with a particular design. The key characteristics of this 
design are independence from the agency being overseen and appropriate authority to pursue the 
information it needs to make a thorough examination.  Thus, the origin and appeal of this 
particular mechanism must also be explained. I find that when confronted with a scandal 
involving waste, fraud, or abuse in the bureaucracy, elected officials have widely come to think 
of an OIG as an appropriate institutional solution. The attractiveness of this idea, when 
conceived in a jurisdiction, is best understood as an instance of what scholars call the 
“institutionalization” of a common model. In fact, there is wide consensus among inspector 
general practitioners about the key elements of this common model or archetype.  
The second element of my thesis is that while state and local elected officials find the 
general idea of an OIG appealing, some are leery of the consequences of having an office that 
has all of the institutional characteristics of independence and oversight that the common model 
demands. As a consequence, in many places the OIG as designed has been modified in key ways 
that reduce its effective independence and powers of oversight.  As policy diffusion and 
diffusion scholars would suggest, local and state policy makers exert their political power to 
reduce the policy uncertainties related to the adoption of an OIG, which results in large variation 
in state and local OIGs.  These design variations have not developed progressively, as would be 
expected if jurisdictions were learning about the policy implications of an OIG from other 
jurisdictions.  Instead, jurisdictions’ unique characteristics and needs, coupled with concerns 
about the potential exposure of embarrassing acts lead to the customization of OIG’s structure, 





Third, once adopted, the officials in these offices and the agencies they oversee engage in 
a sometimes tense contest over the implementation of oversight. The agencies overseen by OIGs 
chafe under this oversight and seek ways to avoid or limit it.  As a result, many OIGs experience 
significant pushback by political actors and those who are overseen by the OIG, in particular in 
the early stages of implementation, which can threaten the ability of an OIG to do the job it was 
intended to do.  In response, and providing another indication of the normative power of the 
institutional model of the OIG, OIG personnel act in ways that protect the institutional role of the 
OIG in the accountability process.  They pursue two primary goals that sometimes conflict: to 
position their offices as helpful consultants, rather than as threatening “junk yard dogs;” and to 
maintain their independence from those they monitor in order to safeguard their impartial 
position.  To do this, Inspectors General (IGs) and their staffs navigate a very political 
environment in order to pursue government accountability.  These efforts are made even though, 
as the accountability literature indicates, an OIG was originally conceived to have a limited and 
early role in the accountability process.   
The common thread in each of these stages, the conceptualization phase, the design phase 
and the implementation phase, is the strength of the norm of accountability.  “Norm” in this 
context does not mean “typical,” but rather refers to an ideal or aspirational standard.  The norm 
of accountability, i.e., the desire to achieve accountability in government, drives the adoption of 
an OIG in the first place.  The norm of accountability becomes embodied in an OIG, even though 
the resulting designs vary from place to place.  Yet these OIGs are not merely symbols of 
accountability or institutional shells.  Rather, despite efforts to narrow the OIG’s ability to 
perform its role in supporting the accountability process, OIG staff pursue the norm of 





precisely because there has developed a shared body of knowledge about how best to design 
these institutions. 
The power of the OIG idea, and battles over its implementation, are best understood 
through the lenses of neo-institutional theory and theories of policy diffusion and reinvention, to 
which I now turn.  
Conceptualizing accountability: The neo-institutional model of an office of inspector 
general.  OIGs are an expression of the growing desire to institutionalize “accountability.” 
Accountability, as the term will be used here, is “a social ‘mechanism,’ . . . an institutional 
relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum” (Bovens et al., 
2008, p. 227).  To be held to account primarily means to be answerable for one’s actions 
(Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).  Government accountability is, therefore, a method by which a 
governmental actor will be made answerable for his or her actions.  As will be discussed here, an 
OIG is an organization that monitors and reports on governmental actors to a forum, which is an 
entity separate and independent from the OIG. This forum may be the head of the agency that the 
OIG oversees, the chief political executive of the jurisdiction, the legislature, prosecutors, or the 
public. 
Government accountability is a central concept in Western democracies.  A foundational 
element of democracy is the periodic election, whereby the public can hold elected officials 
directly accountable for their actions. Employees in the executive branch are not subject to such 
elections by design.  These employees are sheltered from reelection concerns, which in theory, 
allows them to do their jobs professionally, in light of expert knowledge and without fear of 
direct political reprisal (but cf. Stone, 1988).  Still, democratic ideals demand that even these 





control.  An early debate on how best to ensure accountability for bureaucratic professionals can 
be seen in the writings of Finer (1939, 1941) and Friedrich (1940).  Finer (1939, 1941) argues 
that bureaucracies should be held accountable through finely-detailed legislation and legislative 
oversight, whereas Friedrich (1940) suggests professional standards and peer review within the 
bureaucracy are more effective.    
While the expectation of accountability has great power, it finds expression in a wide 
variety of institutional mechanisms. Multiple types of accountability mechanisms, including 
Finer’s (1939, 1941) legislative oversight and Friedrich’s (1940) professional standards, can and 
do exist concurrently.  Romzek and Dubnick (1987) explain how public employees come to be 
subject to a variety of accountability mechanisms.  Such mechanisms are borne by the 
expectations of entities with which the employee has a relationship.  For example, professional 
expectations for the individual’s occupation and position are developed by peers and are imposed 
through occupational standards or licensure.  Hierarchical expectations for the individual are 
developed by the employees’ superiors in the agency and may be enforced through performance 
review and other hierarchical controls.  Legal expectations are found in formalized directives, 
such as statutes or constitutional provisions.  Finally, political expectations arise from the 
opinions of political representatives of the public about the role of the public employee, which 
are communicated through letters or phone calls from legislators or in legislative hearings.   
Koppell (2005) augments Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) categories of expectations by adding a 
fifth set of expectations that arise directly from a public employee’s relationship with the public: 
transparency, which may be supported by open meetings laws and the like.   
The OIG concept is a particular way of institutionalizing accountability. It is as old as the 





concern for accountability. The first OIG was adopted in 1777, when General George 
Washington asked Congress to create an inspector general position to provide oversight of the 
revolutionary army’s training, discipline and treatment of soldiers (U.S. Army OIG, n.d.).  After 
that initial OIG adoption, OIGs were limited to the military context until the fourth quarter of the 
20th Century.  Although there were a few experiments with OIG-like oversight in the civilian 
context prior to 1976, such as the “Inspector General and Comptroller” for the International 
Cooperation Administration, the passage of the IG Act of 1978, ushered in a veritable federal 
OIG boom.  Today, there are 73 OIGs on the federal level, and recently, Senator Claire 
McCaskill (MO-D) announced she would be drafting a bill to place OIGs in 41 small federal 
agencies that are not presently subject to this oversight (Moore, 2014).  The OIG concept did not 
remain solely in the federal government, but as summarized above, this institutional model has 
spread widely among states and localities. 
The attractiveness of the OIG idea is best understood as an instance of what scholars call 
the “institutionalization” of a common model or archetype. In fact, as chapter three will show, 
there is wide consensus among inspector general practitioners about the key elements of this 
archetype. The theory of neo-institutionalism helps explain this phenomenon.  This body of 
theory, also known as “new institutionalism” (March and Olsen, 1989), developed out of 
sociological organizational studies.  It was built on an earlier body of scholarship, or 
“institutionalism,” that examined individual organizations’ development of and response to 
institutions, which were defined as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 1995, p. 33). The older 





environment. These scholars treated institutions as an efficient reaction to the task at hand and to 
threats from the environment.   
Neo-institutionalism shares with the older institutionalism an understanding of 
institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures” (Scott, 1995, p. 33) but looks 
beyond a single organization to help to explain why many organizations in similar fields develop 
common structures and ways of doing things. The core idea is that individual organizations 
respond not only to local conditions but also to broader field-level ideas and norms. March and 
Olsen (1995) call these norms “logics of appropriateness.”  In their description, logics of 
appropriateness guide individuals and organizations in how to do things, not by maximizing 
utility, but by acting in the right or “appropriate” way. These logics become institutionalized in 
rules and organizational structures. Studies informed by this theory also observe that in 
responding to broader ideas and norms, individual organizations are often acting in ways that are 
inefficient or unresponsive to local conditions (Edelman et al., 1999; Scott, 1987, 1995; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Thus, institutions often “reflect the myths of their institutional 
environments instead of the demands of their work activities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341).   
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that organizations adopt similar structures and 
processes for coercive, mimetic and normative reasons.  Coercive reasons arise from formal and 
informal pressures from external organizations or society; mimetic reasons originate from 
following the model of other organizations in response to uncertainty; and normative reasons are 
created through professionalization and ideals about how things should be done.  Adaptations in 
response to these forces are shaped by a desire for societal or market acceptance and legitimacy 
(Scott, 1987, 1995; Edelman et al., 1999).  “Isomorphism,” the process by which organizations 





than efficiency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Thus, neo-institutional theorists consider 
organizational behaviors and structures to be “determined not by the considerations of technical 
efficiency but by the need and desire to comply with widely accepted beliefs, rules, and norms” 
(Meyer, 2006, p. 52). 
To be sure, Edelman, et al. (1999) point out that the early development of a new 
institution usually begins with a need to address an initial problem to which the external 
environment has demanded a solution. For example, the demand for greater accountability may 
put pressure on organizations to adapt new forms of responsiveness to this ideal.  Periodic peaks 
in external pressure result in a process of “punctuated equilibrium” (True et al., 1999), as 
generally institutions are quite stable and resist change.  When solutions are demanded, low-cost 
choices are often favored.  After a new solution has been more broadly endorsed by the field, 
that solution becomes replicated by many organizations over time.  Through this dissemination, 
the chosen solution alters from a practical, efficient solution to the initial pressure to one that has 
merely become accepted as the legitimate way to address the problem (Edelman et al., 1999).  In 
other words, after the initial problem is addressed, the resulting norms are spread from 
organization to organization ultimately for reasons other than addressing the original problem.  
Some studies have shown that public organizations are more susceptible to isomorphic pressures 
than private organizations (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004) and that external forces, such as 
legislatures, are a stronger force for isomorphism than internal discretion of professionals 
(Ashworth et al., 2009).   
The spread of OIGs can be explained to a large extent by neo-institutional theory.  The 
initial impetus for creation of the first OIGs seems to have been to address a perceived practical 





1978 was to address perceived deficiencies in auditing and investigations units coupled with a 
growing demand for information about federal agencies associated with the expansion of 
Congressional committees and Congressional staff that was occurring at the same time (Light, 
1933).  Yet, over time, the OIG has come to be less a response to a clear immediate need than a 
widely-accepted and legitimate way to address the perceived need for greater accountability.  For 
example, it is somewhat ironic that Congress decided to create an OIG to oversee the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), itself an agency with a mission to aid Congress in 
ensuring the accountability of other government agencies. Likewise, Congress created an OIG 
over the Capital Police, an agency directly accountable to Congress. As the GAO and the Capitol 
Police are Congressional agencies, there are no barriers between them and Congress as there 
might between Congress and executive agencies.  To learn about their activities, Congress only 
has to ask.  These examples illustrate how the OIG concept has taken on a life of its own.  It 
represents the ostensibly appropriate way to provide accountability over a governmental unit.  
Subsequent adoptions of OIGs are mimetic.  Jurisdictions have other multiple methods to 
increase monitoring, gain information about bureaucracies, and improve accountability and 
performance. For example, legislative auditing could be increased to boost monitoring.  
Transparency laws could be strengthened to improve the availability of information about 
bureaucracies.  Increased funding to the programs could help improve performance (Light, 
1993).  Yet jurisdictions choose to implement a new office to perform such a role and they call 
the new office an OIG.   
Thus, I will argue that a key force driving the widespread adoption of OIGs at the state 
and local levels is the perceived legitimacy of this form of accountability and the normative 





assisting the OIG concept to land squarely on the political and policy agenda (Kingdon, 1995).  
As I will show, many jurisdictions have come to copy the federal government’s OIG model.  In 
some jurisdictions, the imposition of an OIG is coercive when a legislative body imposes OIG 
oversight on an executive agency or the executive branch.  In others, the adoption of an OIG is 
purely normative, as an agency chooses to impose OIG oversight on itself.  In both cases, OIGs 
are viewed as a superior way to do business.  The reasons for adopting an OIG and the 
conditions in a state that predict the adoption of an OIG are detailed in chapter two (focusing on 
the initial decision to adopt an OIG).  Data gathered for this dissertation suggest that a stronger 
reason for adopting OIGs than an immediate, concrete need for an office dedicated to monitoring 
is appearing to legitimately pursue government accountability.   
Still, while neo-institutionalism is useful in explaining institutional similarities across 
organizations, it is less useful in explaining localized or regional variations in a common 
institutional form (Levy, 2006). This variation is a key element of the state and local OIG 
phenomenon.  As is detailed in chapter three (focusing on variations in the design of OIGs), state 
and local OIGs vary a great deal.  Variations on a common model are better addressed by 
theories developed in the literature on policy diffusion and reinvention.   
Designing accountability: Policy diffusion and reinvention of offices of inspectors 
general.  While elected officials find appealing the normative idea of an OIG, some are leery of 
the consequences of having an office that has all of the institutional characteristics of 
independence and oversight that the common model demands. As a consequence, in many places 
the OIG has been modified in key ways that reduce its effective independence and powers of 
oversight.  As policy diffusion and diffusion scholars would suggest, local and state policy 





OIG.  In doing so they tweak or even fundamentally alter the design of the common model when 
adopting an OIG for their own jurisdiction. This results in large variation in the design of state 
and local OIGs.  These design variations have not developed in an orderly fashion, either 
increasing or decreasing in strength, which would be expected if diffusion is shaped by a process 
of learning and improvement. Instead, as chapter three will show, variations in the design of 
OIGs seem related less to learning from one another than to differences in jurisdictions’ 
characteristics, needs, and, especially, to concerns about giving this unit too much power. 
Because variations in the design of OIGs seem driven by intra-jurisdictional battles over 
how much power to give this agency, I have not found particularly useful the dominant learning-
focused theory of policy diffusion (Volden, 2006; Moynihan, 2008; Shipan & Volden, 2012) 
This theory suggests that jurisdictions learn from each other’s experiences, and this learning 
leads to progressive improvements in policies over time as they spread from place to place.  
Thus, policies do not remain static as they spread from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but rather 
change incrementally. 
This learning-focused theory is based on a bounded rationality decision making process 
(see, e.g., Shipan & Volden, 2012). Bounded rationality describes decision making that is 
practically but not perfectly rational in terms of an individual or group weighing all the possible 
options and choosing the one that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs.  People are limited in 
their ability to collect all the information necessary for fully rational decision making (Simon, 
1964).  As a consequence, decision makers use experientially-based shortcuts, or heuristics, in 
their analysis to help them make decisions that are as rational as practically possible. 
In the case of policy diffusion, three types of learning heuristics are commonly used, 





heuristic encourages decision makers to overestimate the value of available information when 
that information is “particularly striking, vivid or memorable” (Weyland, 2007).  The 
representative heuristic induces decision makers to overestimate the extent to which sample 
information represents true population samples.  The anchoring heuristic limits decision makers’ 
analyses of how a particular policy should be modified for local conditions, because the decision 
becomes overly reliant on the original model.   
Sources of heuristic information include decision makers’ networks (Moynihan, 2008; 
Balla, 2001), the electorate (Pacheco, 2012), and political entrepreneurs (Mintrom, 1997).  
Another important factor in the use of heuristics is the extent to which a legislature is 
professionalized and has access to research staff, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
(Boushey, 2010).  Jurisdictions with more professionalized legislature and staff have the 
resources to do more analysis on the implications of policy implementation, while others must 
rely more on heuristics (Boushey, 2010).  Decision makers are also often influenced by the 
policy decisions of neighboring jurisdictions, and this results in geographic clusters of policy 
adopters (Walker, 1969).   
Even though the use of heuristics can be considered in a negative light, because it 
undercuts fully rational decision making, an alternative view suggests that in the case of policy 
diffusion, heuristics can help in organizational learning.   Incremental learning can occur from 
evaluating the successes or failures of other jurisdictions’ policy implementation.  This 
evaluation reduces information costs and uncertainty about policy outcomes and allows for 
jurisdictions to steadily improve the policy (Glick & Hays, 1991).    Thus, regional policy leaders 
have also been shown to have higher than typical influence in diffusion patterns as decision 





Theories of bounded rationality, in the context of policy diffusion, may help to explain 
not only why adoptions of policies take similar forms across jurisdictions but also why the 
particular form or structure may change over time, as jurisdictions learn from earlier adopters 
(Glick & Hays, 1991).  In other words, the dependent variable of incremental variation in a 
policy may be explained by the independent variable of bounded rationality and learning.   
Nonetheless, theories of bounded rationality do not help explain changes in policy that 
are not progressive in nature and cannot be attributable to learning, as in the case of variations in 
the design of OIGs.  In those cases, diffusion scholars have developed the concept of policy 
reinvention.  
Reinvention, or as Karch (2007) prefers “customization,” is a term developed by policy 
diffusion scholars to address policy variations in policies adopted across jurisdictions that did not 
seem to be explained by neo-institutionalism or learning.  These policy changes may appear to be 
ad hoc, but reinvention suggests that state-specific or locally-specific concerns or conditions 
produce systematic variations (Rogers, 2003).  Local conditions such as a state’s political, 
economic and social characteristics or interstate competition (Berry & Berry, 1990), liability 
threats (Epp, 2009), and pressure from interest groups or other organized constituencies (Daley 
& Garand, 2005; Jun & Weare, 2011) have been found to influence variations in shared policies 
from place to place.  If the policy is motivated by political considerations, then the shape of the 
policy is likely to reflect the interests of those in political power (Jun & Weare, 2011).  
These theories of policy diffusion and reinvention help explain why the design of OIGs 
varies from place to place.  As chapter three shows in more detail, state and local OIGs vary 
from the original federal model as well as among themselves.  Many of these variations are quite 





For example, a state or local OIG may not be given the authority it needs to collect the 
information required for an audit or investigation or it may lack the independence from the 
entities it oversees to ensure that its reports are not influenced by those entities.  Yet, these 
structural variations do not appear to be developing in a clear line representing progressive 
strengthening (or weakening) of OIGs as theories of bounded rationality would suggest.  Instead, 
as reinvention studies have shown in other contexts, policy makers in different jurisdictions 
reinvent the OIG design in ways that respond to local pressures, political and otherwise, such as 
desires of those in political power or the perceived need to not offend preexisting bureaucratic 
units.  The particular local forces that influence OIG design are explored in chapter three. 
 Implementing accountability: Bureaucratic politics and offices of inspectors 
general.  Once an OIG is adopted, the officials in these offices and the agencies they oversee 
engage in an ongoing, sometimes tense contest over the terms of oversight. This struggle over 
implementation is the subject of chapter four.  Descriptive theories of government accountability 
and theories of bureaucratic politics help to explain the character of these struggles.       
These tensions are activated and heightened by a design feature that is inherent in the 
very concept of an OIG. This is the fact that an OIG has authority only to gather and provide 
information—but not to take any kind of corrective action on the basis of this information. To 
put this key point in the context of accountability generally, consider Bovens’ (2007) summary 
of the nature of accountability as a process: “accountability is a relationship between an actor 
and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgement (sic), and the actor may face consequences” 
(Bovens, 2007, p. 450).  Behn (2001) added that the forum must have the authority to impose 





It is apparent that the role of an OIG is limited to the beginning of this accountability 
process. The role of the OIG, while not insignificant, is limited to collecting and analyzing 
information, whether through audits or other investigations, and then reporting the information to 
the forum. It is the role of the broader forum—whether this be the CEO of the agency in 
question, the mayor, the legislature, or the governor, to decide what to do with this information: 
whether to issue a sanction or some other consequence.  For example, when the OIG for the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey announced it would investigate alleged abuses of 
government power related to the lane closures on the George Washington Bridge (Zernike & 
Rashbaum, 2013), its job was not to ask the governor or his staff to defend their actions or to 
sanction them.  Instead, the role was to provide reliable, objective information upon which the 
Port Authority, the New Jersey legislature, or the public can act.  These other bodies receive the 
OIG’s information, and they, not the OIG, determine what consequences, whether punitive or 
not, shall fall on the individuals involved.  An OIG can recommend consequences, but these 
recommendations are non-binding. 
The implications for the OIG that arise from this early and limited role in the 
accountability process are significant.  First, the quality of information produced by an OIG is 
very important.  To fulfill the OIG’s role, the information it provides must be objective, accurate, 
and reliable, because the entire accountability process on which this information rests depends on 
its validity and reliability.  Similar concerns about the quality of information and its minimal 
impact on accountability arise in extensive systems of transparency where the data are too 
complicated for the public to understand (Pollitt, 2011).  Second, regardless of how accurate and 
objective the information provided by the OIG may be, an OIG’s role in the accountability 





of Bovens (2007), “a forum,” to review and act upon the information.  For both of these reasons, 
an OIG simultaneously holds both a crucial and a relatively minor role in achieving government 
accountability.   
Chapter four of this dissertation shows that this tension between an OIG’s role in 
accountability and the concerns of those being overseen results in a powerful dynamic.  Those 
who are subject to the information-gathering and reporting fear the consequences, and this leads 
them to push back against oversight in both the design and implementation phases of the OIG.  
OIG staff are strongly dedicated to their mission of accountability, and this results in their 
committed efforts to ensure they produce quality and useful work products which will have 
relevance in the accountability process. This dynamic is expanded upon in chapters three and 
four, addressing the design and implementation of state and local OIGs. 
My analysis of this dynamic draws on theories of bureaucratic politics (see, e.g., Allison, 
1971; Carpenter, 2001) that posit that bureaucratic agencies are powerfully shaped in practice by 
the strategies and actions of key bureaucratic leaders and their external opponents and allies.  
Likewise, the design of an OIG and how it proceeds to do its job are affected negatively by 
opponents who wish to reduce potential threats that arise from OIG work.  As a result, OIGs, and 
in particular, IGs are required to negotiate a politicized environment and develop allies to 
support its role and its work. 
  The common thread in each of these stages, the conceptualization phase, the design 
phase and the implementation phase, is the strength of the norm of accountability.  This norm 
drives the adoption of an OIG in the first place.  The norm of accountability becomes embodied 
in an OIG, even though the resulting designs vary from place to place.  Yet these OIGs are not 





OIG’s ability to perform its role in supporting the accountability process, OIG staff pursue the 
norm of accountability by striving to improve their OIG’s ability to perform its role.  This is 
possible precisely because there is a shared body of knowledge about how best to design these 
institutions. 
Possible alternative explanations.  In sum, the thesis of this dissertation is that the 
normative ideal of accountability and the institutionalized model of an “Office of Inspector 
General” have driven the widespread adoption of OIGs. The particular designs of these agencies 
vary considerably, however, and this variation is best understood as shaped by a local politics of 
contention over whether to have independent accountability, and how much of it to have. 
Supporters of the OIG model strive to adopt and implement agencies that have all of the key 
characteristics of the OIG archetype. Opponents try to chip away at key elements of 
independence or investigatory authority. At the implementation stage, OIG leaders and staff 
prove to be especially committed to the OIG model and seek to carry out independent 
oversight—even when the design of their agency limits their independence or authority or in the 
face of opposition from those who are being overseen. This, too, indicates the power of the 
normative ideal of OIG accountability. Simply put, my interpretation of Offices of Inspector 
General focuses on ideas: a model of an “ideal” OIG that is shared among professional networks, 
which has as its sole goal to contribute to government accountability. 
To lend greater support for my thesis, I will consider several possible alternative 
explanations for the spread, design, and bureaucratic politics of OIGs at the state and local level. 
The first is that OIGs are simply a functional response to problems of bureaucratic corruption. If 
this is so, we might expect OIGs to be most prevalent in jurisdictions with histories of recurrent 





year after year would be more likely to have one or more OIGs whereas states with fewer 
numbers of convictions over time would be less likely to have even one OIG.   
 The second possible alternative explanation is that OIGs are a particular element of the 
growth of state and local administration generally. Administrative bureaucracy has expanded 
considerably in some states and localities since the 1960s. OIGs are undoubtedly administrative 
agencies. Perhaps the adoption of OIGs is simply part of the expansion of administrative 
capacity in some states and localities. If this is so, we might expect OIGs to be most prevalent in 
jurisdictions that have invested more heavily in administrative bureaucracy generally, and to be 
less prevalent in areas that have not done so. 
 Third, it is possible that OIGs are a political project, either of Democrats or Republicans.  
Perhaps OIGs are seen as a tool that one party may use to impose heightened scrutiny on the 
other party’s administration. If this were the case, we would expect OIGs to be found in states 
that experience high levels of partisan competition, while states with a single party dominance 
would not be as likely to have an OIG within their borders.  
 Ultimately, as will be demonstrated in chapter two, none of these explanations seems 
satisfactory, lending further support for my thesis. OIGs are adopted in places known for 
corruption, but also in places known for “good government;” in fact, the rate of OIG adoption 
decreases a moderate amount when public corruption convictions per 1000 state full time 
equivalent (FTE) employees over time decreases.  OIGs are adopted in places that have invested 
heavily in administrative capacity but also in places that have not. OIGs are adopted in places 
with high levels of partisan competition, but also in places with a single party dominating. 
Across all of these different settings, what motivates adoption of OIGs, what inspires fights over 





accountability as embodied in an OIG: an independent agency with the authority to investigate 
and audit, demand documentation, and report any findings. 
Methodology 
This study employs a mixed methods approach, using both quantitative and qualitative 
data to inform the conclusions.  The preliminary step was to identify existing state and local 
OIGs, as this data had not yet been compiled by any source.  The OIGs were identified through a 
series of database and internet searches, including Lexis Nexis (looking for any state statute or 
regulation that mentioned an IG), state websites (such Kansas.gov), Google and Bing (searching 
for the name of the state and the term “inspector general” in the same document), and the 
membership lists of the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers, and Treasurers, 
and of the Association of Inspectors General.   For each OIG, an e-mail address was obtained. 
It should be noted that each office included in the data set used the term “inspector 
general” in some way, but not all offices are officially titled Office of Inspector General. For 
example, in the data set, there is an Inspector General’s Office, an Office of Inspector General 
Services, an Office of Legislative Inspector General, an Office of the Independent Inspector 
General, and the like.  For the purposes of this paper, each of these offices is referred to as an 
OIG and the head of the OIG as an IG.5 
                                                          
5 It should be emphasized that OIGs are not the only units on the state and local levels that 
perform oversight akin to that provided by OIGs.  Units such as legislative auditors or city 
auditors perform similar functions.  Thus, it should not be concluded that states and cities 





My search for OIGs yielded a universe of 159 of these units, including 109 (69%) at the 
state level, 47 (29%) OIGs at the local level, and three (2%) multijurisdictional OIGs. I then 
sought to obtain a variety of information from each of these OIGs through a combination of an 
on-line survey, using Qualtrics electronic survey software, and follow-up telephone interviews, 
and a review of OIG websites.  In the online survey, I asked a number of questions about the 
offices’ formation, activities, and evolution. A total of 59 OIGs responded to the survey, for an 
overall 37% response rate, comprising 42 (71% of 59) responses from state-level OIGs 
(including the OIG for Washington D.C.), 16 (27% of 59) responses from local-level OIGs, and 
one (2% of 59) multijurisdictional OIG.   I then supplemented the data obtained via the online 
survey with website reviews and telephone calls to the OIGs that had not responded to the 
survey.  In these telephone calls I did not try to obtain all of the information addressed via the 
survey because the people I was able to talk with by telephone were not in a position to address 
the full range of the survey questions. Instead, I used the telephone survey and website review to 
gather basic facts about these OIGs, such as the date of their creation and their key design 
features.  This resulted in basic information for 91 OIGs, when combined with the 55 full survey 
respondents, yielded data from 150 OIGs, or 94% of the universe.  This includes 103 (69% of 
150) state OIGs (including the OIG for the Washington D.C.), 44 (29% of 150) local OIGs, and 
three (2% of 150) multijurisdictional OIGs.     
In addition to the data obtained from the online survey, follow-up telephone interviews, 
and website reviews, I conducted  semi-structured interviews, both in person and on the phone, 
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of 35 IGs,  two deputy IGs, and one general counsel to an agency subject to OIG oversight.  
These interviews were conducted in eight states: Colorado, Florida, Illinois Indiana, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Virginia.  The states were selected to maximize variation on key 
variables, as follows: 
 Corruption:  I examined two indicators of corruption.  The first was the average 
annual number of federal public corruption convictions for the state from 2002-
2011.  These data are generally available from the Department of Justice’s 
Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) and are published annually in 
statutorily required reports to Congress.  To normalize these, I divided the 
average number of convictions by the number of state and local full time 
equivalent (FTE) employees from the year 2011.  Minnesota ranked the lowest of 
the states at fifth, while Louisiana rated the highest at 49th.  The other states fell 
in between these two outliers.  The second indicator of corruption I examined 
was a numerical equivalent of Standard and Poor’s state bond ratings averaged 
from 2001-2012.  S&P Bond ratings have been found to correlate with corruption 
convictions (Butler et al., 2009), but take into account many other factors related 
to the assessment of state government, including the institutional framework, 
economy, management, budgetary flexibility, budgetary performance, liquidity, 
and debt and contingent liabilities (Standard and Poor’s  Rating Services, 2013).  
These data taken from a report published by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Stateline 





eighth, and Louisiana, 49th, with the other states falling in between.  Both of these 
indicators of corruption and the states’ rankings can be found in Appendix A. 
 Size of government:  I examined two indicators of the size of a state’s 
government: state and local FTE per 1000 of state population for the year 2010 
and the size of state and local payroll by $100 per 1000 state population for the 
same year.  These data were taken from the US Census’s Census of Governments 
(2010a, 2010b).  On the first measure, of the states in the sample, Florida had the 
lowest ranking in terms of FTE per population, ranking sixth of all states.  
Louisiana had the highest ranking, 42nd of all states.  On the second measure, of 
the states in the sample, Florida also had the lowest ranking in terms of payroll 
per population, ranking fourth.  Massachusetts ranked the highest at 36th.  On 
each of these measures, the other states fell in between.  These rankings can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 Political culture:  To identify variation on a state’s political culture, I relied 
primarily on the Ranney index of partisan dominance of each state’s governing 
institutions. This index measures the extent to which either party controls the 
legislature and governorship of each state (Ranney, 1976). The Ranney index 
usefully distinguishes states that are dominated by the Democrats from those 
dominated by the Republicans, as well as those in which control of different 
branches of state government is divided between the two parties or flips back and 
forth from election to election. Selecting states from each of these general 
categories allows me to see whether patterns of adoption of OIGs, conflict over 





with dominance of state government by one or the other party or with close party 
competition. I also used a classic measure developed by Sharkansky (1969) and 
augmented by Baker (1990), which measures political culture as conceived by 
Elazar (1966).  Elazar (1966) suggested that states’ political culture fall on a 9 
point continuum of political culture ranging from Moralist to Individualist to 
Traditionalist.  Elazar (1966) suggested, and Sharkansky (1969) and Baker 
(1990) confirmed, that Moralist states tend to have citizens who prefer 
government intervention into policy problems, whereas Traditionalist states tend 
to disapprove of such intervention, preferring to rely on political elites to solve 
problems.  Although this measure is dated and has been criticized (Baker 1990), I 
found it a useful indicator of variation.  On this measure, of the states in the 
sample, Minnesota ranked first, as the most Moralist state, while Louisiana 
ranked 41st, on the Traditionalist side of the continuum.  This ranking can be 
found in Appendix C.  
 OIG characteristics: In addition, the key independent variables listed above, I also 
chose states according to what one might consider dependent variables.  States 
varied on the number of OIGs in the state, the levels of government that had 
adopted OIGs, and the dates of OIG adoption.  Colorado and Minnesota both had 
one state agency OIG within its borders, but Colorado’s was created in 1999 
(Colorado Revised Statutes §17-1-103.8 (2013)), while Minnesota’s was created 
in 2011 (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011).  Indiana and 
Massachusetts likewise has one OIG, but these states’ OIGs oversaw the entire 





General Act of 1980 (2013), Indiana Inspector General Act of 2005 (2013)).  
Massachusetts’ OIG was the first statewide OIG, created in 1980 (Massachusetts 
Office of Inspector General, 2014), and Indiana’s OIG was adopted in 2005 
(Indiana Inspector General Act of 2005 (2013)).  Virginia and Louisiana have a 
mix of state and local OIGs.  Virginia has a single state OIG, which is a 
predecessor to several state agency OIGs (Virginia Office of the State Inspector 
General Act, 2013).  In addition, the city of Richmond, Virginia, has adopted an 
OIG (Richmond, VA, Inspector General Function, 2008).  Louisiana also has a 
statewide OIG (Louisiana Office of the State Inspector General Act of 2008 
(2013)); and OIGs have also been adopted in New Orleans ( New Orleans, 
Louisiana Office of Inspector General Ordinance, 2006) and in Jefferson Parish 
(Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, Home Rule Charter, 2013).  Florida and Illinois both 
have the most OIGs within their borders, both on the local and state levels.  
Florida’s OIGs date from 1994 (Florida Inspector General Act of 1994 (2013), 
while the first OIG in Illinois was established in 1987 (Illinois Department of 
Human Services Office of Inspector General, n.d.). 
I augmented the information obtained from each interview with a review of the 
following: the OIG’s website, any statutory provisions and legislative history, and a review of 
news articles mentioning the creation of the OIG or the activities of the OIG, collected from the 
America’s News database.  I coded these documents along with the transcripts of the interviews 





Finally, two states, Connecticut and North Carolina, were identified as having, via 
statute, adopted and then repealed a state level OIG.  For these two states the legislative history 
of the OIG and any news reports of the OIG were collected and analyzed with Atlas.ti. 
Overview of Chapters 
Looking through a neo-institutional lens, the concept of the OIG undergoes different 
types of tensions in three distinct phases, each of which is addressed in a separate chapter.  
Chapter two examines phase I, the conceptualization phase, which is when the policy maker, 
whether legislative or executive, decides that an OIG is a good idea.  Chapter three looks at 
phase II, the design phase, when decisions about issues regarding function, jurisdiction, authority 
and independence are hammered out.  Chapter four addresses phase III, implementation, in 
which, the OIG staff get to work.  The final chapter, chapter five, concludes with an examination 
of the implications for government accountability policies and practice that arise from the 






Phase I: Conceptualization 
Why are OIGs spreading so rapidly among states and localities—or some states and 
localities? To answer this question, it is important to understand the conditions that lead to the 
adoption of an OIG.  As the various theories summarized in the past chapter might suggest, I ask: 
are jurisdictions responding functionally to problems of corruption?  Are OIGs, like any other 
government agency, simply an expression of a jurisdiction’s commitment to administrative 
solutions to problems? Are they adopting OIGs as a tool of partisan battle?  Are jurisdictions 
learning from each other?  Or, as neo-institutional theory would suggest, is the adoption of OIGs 
driven less by particular needs than by the power of normative ideas about accountability?  
The first phase of adopting an office of inspector general (OIG), examined in this chapter, 
is what I call the conceptualization phase.  This is when the concept, the broad idea of adopting 
an OIG, is: (1) introduced into the jurisdiction; and (2) the idea is endorsed through adoption.  
During this phase, demands for accountability result in proposals to adopt OIGs: I theorize that 
OIGs have come to be perceived as a legitimate approach to provide government accountability 
and a method to meet normative desires for increased oversight of bureaucratic agencies.  I posit 
that theories of neo-institutionalism provide a better explanation for the spread of OIGs than 
alternative explanations.  First, using an event history analysis (EHA), which has often been used 
to examine the conditions that influence the diffusion of policies, I test and reject the hypotheses 
that OIG adoptions represent responses to long-term corruption, growth in administrative 
bureaucracy, or partisan dominance (or competition).  I also reject other explanations relating to 
theories of policy diffusion and learning by examining the influence of neighboring jurisdictions 
and the increasing number of OIGs on the federal level on state-level OIG adoption.  Second, 





demonstrate how the theories of neo-institutionalism and agenda setting coupled with the norm 
of accountability best explain the conceptualization phase of OIG adoption. 
Conditions Making the Diffusion of Offices of Inspector General Ripe for Adoption 
To test standard hypotheses, I performed an Event History Analysis (EHA), which has 
been used often in policy diffusion studies (see, e.g., Berry & Berry, 1990), to analyze the 
adoption of state-level OIGs.6 A benefit of EHA is that it can identify the relationship between 
the timing of the dependent variable or event, in this case the adoption of an OIG, and covariates 
of interest, which may also change over time.  Additionally, EHA is inherently comparative, 
because it allows analysis of many observations over time for multiple entities, in this case 
American states, as opposed to a traditional time series model which utilizes longitudinal data for 
a single entity (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).  Thus, EHA provides a method by which a 
researcher can identify key predictors of the timing of states’ adoption of OIGs while also 
factoring in the conditions of those states who have not adopted an OIG during the relevant time 
period.    
The year of an initial OIG adoption in a state at the state level is a key dependent variable 
for the EHA. Additional OIG adoptions in the same state are included in the analysis, even 
though, as discussed more fully in the second half of this chapter, it is more likely that 
subsequent OIG adoptions are influenced by previous OIG adoptions in the same state.  The 
adoption variable is coupled with a calculated duration variable, which measures the number of 
years from 1975, the year the very first state-level OIG was adopted in Kansas, to the date of 
                                                          
6  Local OIG adoptions are not included in this analysis because comparable data about local 





adoption, and a censor variable, which indicates with a one or zero whether an OIG was adopted 
in the state at all.  The remaining data used in the analysis are the independent variables, which 
represent alternative explanations for the diffusion of the OIG concept.  Based on the 
information discussed in the first part of the chapter and previous diffusion studies, there are 
several alternative possible independent variables that may explain for these adoptions.  Each of 
these variables is explored in turn below. 
Intrastate conditions of long-term corruption, size of bureaucracy, and partisan 
competition.  Policy diffusion scholars emphasize that internal conditions in states often 
influence adoption of innovations (see, e.g., Berry & Berry, 1990).  The internal conditions that 
affect the rate adoption relate to both the obstacles of innovation and the impulse to innovate.  As 
Mohr (1969) posited, “the probability of innovation is inversely related to the strength of the 
obstacles to innovation and directly related to (1) the motivation to innovate, and (2) the 
availability of resources for overcoming obstacles” (Berry & Berry, 1990).  The motivations to 
innovate and the obstacles against such innovation vary as the nature of innovation itself varies.  
As such, the literature on diffusion of innovations provides a wide range of internal conditions, 
such as problem severity, state wealth, legislative professionalism, and political ideology, which 
have been proposed to impact the adoption of an innovation in new locations (Karch, 2007).  
This research tests whether several internal conditions of a state either motivate the adoption of 
an OIG, support overcoming barriers to adoption, or the opposite: demotivate or erect barriers 
against the adoption of an OIG.  In this EHA, I will focus specifically on levels of long-term 
corruption, size of government, and partisan dominance.   
Levels of long-term corruption provide both a strong motivation for a jurisdiction to 





Thus, if a state has higher levels of corruption, state policy makers may be greatly interested in 
adopting additional watchdogs for state government.  One would consider this a rational 
response to a policy problem.  Alternatively, high levels of corruption in a state might serve to 
prevent the creation of an OIG, as powerful actors who are engaged in corrupt practices may 
oppose establishment of an independent agency with the authority to expose those practices.  
Similarly, low levels of corruption may indicate a state’s commitment to “good government,” 
and this commitment may in turn find expression in widespread support for OIGs as simply 
another tool to assure good government. To be sure, low levels of corruption might also decrease 
the perceived need for having an OIG.  Thus, while it is plausible that the level of corruption 
may be related to adoption of OIGs, it is difficult to predict the direction of the relationship.   
Corruption is measured here by the number of federal public corruption convictions in a 
state, here referred to as “convictions.”  Although it has been shown that there is some bias in 
conviction data based on the presence of prosecutorial discretion (Gordon, 2009; Boylan & 
Long, 2003), this is a common measure of relative corruption among the American states.  The 
source of these data is a report from the Department of Political Science and the Institute for 
Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Simpson et 
al., 2012), containing convictions in federal court, by federal judicial district, from 1976 through 
2010 (the data are compiled from U.S. Department of Justice sources). These scores are 
summarized and aggregated per state.  To normalize the data across states, the totals are divided 
by 1000 full time equivalent (FTE) public employees, state and local, within the borders of the 
state.  The conviction ratio, “convictions,” runs from a low of .24 (Oregon) to a high of 2 
(Louisiana).  If higher corruption levels predict of OIGs adoption, states with a higher ratio of 





Size of government represents a state’s investment in its bureaucracy.  If adoption of 
OIGs is an expression of a general state commitment to bureaucracy, we should find that a larger 
payroll per capita should be positively associated with adoption of OIGs.  Further, a larger, more 
complicated bureaucracy is at higher risk for inefficiency and ineffectiveness.  These factors may 
provide motivation for adoption of an OIG and, if so the higher the bureaucratic investment is in 
a state, the higher the rate of OIG adoption should be.  This variable, “state investment,” is based 
on states’ 2010 annual payroll (in $1000s) per 1000 individuals of the state’s population.  It runs 
from a low of $450.51 (Florida) to a high of $1406.52 (Delaware).  A related variable, a 
legislature’s capacity and professionalism, is not included in the model because many state-level 
OIGs are adopted by actors other than the state legislature.7 
                                                          
7 Boushey (2010) suggests that such things as salaries of legislators, numbers of days in session, 
and size of legislation staff are important predictors of innovation, because those states have 
legislators with the capacity to do more analysis than other states.  Further, Boushey (2010) notes 
that capacity has a different impact on diffusion depending on the type of innovation.  He finds 
that regulatory innovations are more likely to be adopted in states with greater capacity, whereas 
morality-based or governance based innovations are more likely to be adopted in states with 
lower capacity.  He attributes this to the fact that regulatory issues are more technically complex 
and require more study, as opposed to issues of morality or governance.  Also, he notes that 
governance issues, such as term limits, are more likely to be adopted in states that have direct 
democracy mechanisms, such as initiatives or referendums.  Nonetheless, legislative capacity 
may not be as applicable to OIG adoption as it might be for other policies.  First, OIGs are not 





Finally, partisan control of the reins of government, or the degree of partisan competition 
for control of these reins, may influence adoption of OIGs.8   Some states are solidly controlled 
by Republicans; others are solidly controlled by Democrats; and in others the party in power may 
vary between the different branches of government and from election to election. It is possible 
that the relative level of competition between parties may provide motivation for the creation of 
an OIG.  If a state has a great deal of competition between parties, this will be accompanied with 
suspicion about how the other party is administering the government.  This suspicion may find 
provide motivation to adopt an OIG.  In a state where one party dominates party government, 
there may be less motivation to increase bureaucratic oversight.  The measure of “partisan 
competition,” i.e., political control of state government, used here is the Ranney Index (Ranney, 
1976).  This index weighs popular votes for gubernatorial candidates, the percentage of seats 
held in state legislatures, and the amount of time a party has held the governorship and the 
majority of the legislature.  Using data dating from 1976 through 2004 (Lindquist, 2012), I 
calculated an average score for each state based on the number of observations.  The index runs 
                                                          
adopt an OIG on the state level.  Second, according to the survey, OIG adoption is rarely called 
for by the public.  In order to capture capacity that is most relevant to OIG adoption, this 
research examines levels of a state’s investment in its bureaucracy. 
8 Although I have not included legislative capacity as a variable in this analysis, I include a 
measure of partisan control/partisan competition on the grounds that this variable is more 
comprehensive in that it includes consideration of partisan control of the governor’s office in 
addition to the legislature, and governors may have direct influence over bureaucratic 





from zero, representing total Republican control, to one, representing total Democrat control, and 
has a low of 0.272 (Idaho) to a high of 0.792 (Alabama). 
I also tested for the influence of other measures of political culture and partisan ideology, 
including Sharkansky’s (1969) political culture measure, Putnam’s measure of social capital 
(2000), and several measures developed by Erikson, Wright and McIver (2006) that quantify a 
state’s political ideology and partisan identification of the populace., However, I consistently 
found these variables had no statistically significant influence on adoption of OIGs.  Since these 
political measures are collinear with partisan competition, as measured by the Ranney Index, I 
decided, in the name of parsimony, not to include these closely related variables and focus on 
partisan competition.   
The influence of other jurisdictions.  In addition to intrastate factors, traditional policy 
diffusion studies suggest that neighboring jurisdictions learn from each other’s experiences, 
which reduces policy uncertainty (Berry & Berry, 1990).  Even though Shipan and Volden 
(2012) have suggested that in the contemporary period, with the advent of “low barriers to 
communication and travel,” the idea of states learning about innovations from their neighbors is 
simplistic, the map of OIG adoption seems to show that while fairly well-delineated regions of 
the country have adopted OIGs, other regions have not.   Responses to my survey suggest that 
some state policy makers may have learned from the example of other states—but others report 
that other states had no influence. As shown in Table 2.1 below, while about half of all the 
respondents to my survey reported that the adoption of an OIG in their jurisdiction was 
influenced by adoption of OIGs in other jurisdictions, about half reported that the establishment 





percentage of respondents from local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs (64%) reported they were not 
influenced at all by other jurisdictions compared to state OIGs (46%).   
 
TABLE 2.1 
Survey question: How much did the establishment of an OIG in another jurisdiction 









Not at all 
Total 
Responses 
All OIGs 2 (6%) 3 (8%) 13 (36%) 19 (50%) 37 
State OIGs 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 12 (46%) 12 (46%) 26 
Local/ Multi-
jurisdictional OIGs 
0 (0%) 3 (27%) 1 (9%) 7 (64%) 11 
 
The follow up question, shown in Table 2.2, asked survey respondents to identify the 
jurisdiction that had an influence on their OIG adoption.  The responses suggest that federal 
OIGs appear to have the greatest influence along with previously existing OIGs within the state.  
A few other jurisdictions’ OIGs are also pointed to by survey respondents, which are listed 
below, but only three other states, Massachusetts, New York, and California, are identified as 












*The federal OIG system (4 respondents) 
*US Department of Transportation  
State OIGs: 
* Massachusetts  
*New York 
*California Highway Patrol 
Previously adopted OIGs in the same jurisdiction: 
*Other state agency OIGs in the state (2 respondents) 
*Various preexisting agencies OIGs in the city of Chicago (2 respondents) 
Local or other influences: 
*The New Orleans OIG 
*Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
 
These survey results lend some support to learning-based theories of policy diffusion. At the 
same time, however, the results suggest that, at least in the view of OIG respondents, in many 
instances neighboring jurisdictions had no influence whatsoever. Since the survey evidence 
seems mixed, it is unlikely that the adoption of OIGs by neighboring jurisdictions will increase 
the rates of adoption of OIGs.   The measures of geographical proximity used here were adopted 
by Berry and Berry (1990):  the percentage of states sharing a border with the state in question 
that have previously adopted an OIG.  This measure, “%  neighbors,” runs from zero to one.  As 
neither Alaska nor Hawaii have geographical neighbors (nor do they have OIGs), these data are 
only available for 48 states.   
On the other hand, of those who do point to other jurisdictions as being an influence (13 
respondents), five refer to the federal OIG system as influential.  Karch (2007) suggests that the 
dominant influence of federal intervention appears during the agenda setting stage on the state 





regards to OIG adoption, the federal government does not influence states with typical carrots 
and sticks, grants and sanctions that are used in such policy areas, such as the federal welfare 
reform under President Clinton, and which have found to impact state policy making  (Karch, 
2007; Boushey, 2010).  No federal policy directly encourages states and localities to adopt OIGs.  
Still the federal OIG model is prominent and well known, and may serve as an informal model 
for state and local adoption of similar agencies. The model tests for the possible influence of 
federal OIG adoptions.  The measure of federal OIGs, “federal OIGs,” is the number of federal 
OIGs adopted at the time that the state adopted its first OIG.   
Analysis and Findings.  Using the five variables above, I created the following model: 
Rate of OIG adoption= f (convictions, state investment, partisan competition, % of 
neighbors, federal OIGs) 
To perform the EHA, I used a Cox Proportional Hazards model, which is a statistical approach 
that neither requires parametric statistics nor a normal distribution of time to event, i.e. the 
number of years until the adoption of an OIG in a state. The model is also amenable to discrete 
periods of time, as is used here, each year being the period of time in question.  The Cox model 
results in the following statistics, rounded to the nearest 0.001, found in Table 2.3 below.  A 
discussion of this model’s diagnostics is found in Appendix D. 
 
TABLE 2.3 
Results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 







Total number of public corruption 
convictions in the state from 1976 to 2010, 
per 1000 of FTE state and local employees 
in 2010 







Total payroll for 2010 for all state 
employees divided by 1000 of state 
population 
0.998 0.001 0.106 
Partisan 
competition 
The Ranney Index (Ranney 1976), 
measuring party dominance, running from 
zero, representing total Republican control, 
to one, representing total Democrat control 
0.782 1.380 0.889 
% neighbors Percentage of neighboring states with OIGs 
prior to a state’s adoption of an OIG 
0.108 0.102 0.015* 
Federal 
OIGs 
The number of federal OIGs established 
prior to a state’s adoption of an OIG 
.947 .011 0.000** 
* Statistically significant at p < 0.05 
** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 
 
This table shows that three variables have a statistically significant influence on adoption of state 
OIGS: corruption convictions (p<.05); adoption by neighbors (p<.05); and adoption of federal 
OIGs (p < 0.01).  However, the latter two variables are in an unexpected direction. Neither the 
partisan competition variable (Ranney Index) nor the variable reflecting a state’s investment in 
its bureaucracy are statistically significant.  The statistically significant findings and 
accompanying hazard ratios above can be interpreted as follows:   
 As the total number of public corruption convictions in a state increases by one 
conviction per 1000 state FTE, and all other variables are constant, the rate of OIG 
adoption decreases a moderate amount, by 30.2% (1.0 - 0.698= 0.302).   
 As the percentage of neighbors with OIGs increases one unit, and all other variables are 
held constant, the rate of adoption decreases fairly significantly by 89.2% (1.0 - 0.108= 
0.892). 
 As the number of federal OIGs established prior to a state’s adoption of an OIG increases 
by one, and all other variables are held constant, the rate of OIG adoption decreases 





Among these associations, the most easily interpretable is the significant negative 
association between corruption convictions and adoption of state-level OIGs.  Each additional 
federal corruption conviction per 1000 state employees reduces the rate of OIG adoption by 
30%. OIGs are not a response to federal public integrity convictions.  Rather, it may be that 
states with lower levels of these convictions are also likely to have less government corruption 
and a culture that emphasizes good government, and it is possible that this variable is tapping 
this underlying commitment to good government. Thus, this association is consistent with the 
expectation that states with cultures of commitment to good government are more likely to adopt 
OIGs, and states with cultures of corruption of less likely to do so. If so, adoption of an OIG is 
an expression of this underlying commitment. OIGs are of course but one method of improving 
government accountability, but this analysis suggests that their adoption is consistent with the 
active pursuit of other accountability goals which is reflected in reduced corruption convictions.  
It is also possible that in states with higher numbers of public corruption convictions over time, 
policy makers may see federal prosecutors are a successful method of maintaining government 
accountability and, therefore, feel that they have no need to create an OIG to do the same; 
however, this explanation is much less convincing.  It often takes years for a federal prosecutor 
to complete a federal corruption case in the federal courts.  As a result, the conclusion of a 
conviction is quite removed in time from the act of corruption.   
In other respects the results are counter-intuitive. Despite an apparent regionalism shown 
through a visual inspection of a map of the United States, adoption of an OIG by a state’s 
neighbors seems to decrease the likelihood that a state will adopt an OIG.  As additional 
surrounding states adopt OIGs, the rate of OIG adoption decreases significantly and substantially 





were not influenced by other jurisdictions when they adopted OIGs; but the negative effect 
suggests that regarding the issue government accountability and bureaucratic reorganization, 
states may actually be negatively influenced by the examples of neighbors.   
Third, increasing numbers of OIGs on the federal level have a slight negative effect on 
the rate of state OIG adoption.  This finding runs counter to the survey respondents’ comments 
shown in table 2.7 and several other sources (personal communication #6, May 18, 2012; 
personal communication #32, October 17, 2013; personal communication #33, October 17, 2013; 
Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011; Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980; 
Connecticut HB 5090 (1985, May 29)), all of which suggest that the federal OIG system has 
positively, rather than negatively, influenced state adoption of an OIG.  Additionally, although 
50% of survey respondents noted that no other jurisdiction had influence on their adoption of an 
OIG,  the EHA analysis indicates that that, like the influence of surrounding states’ OIG 
adoptions, increasing numbers of federal OIGs actually discouraged OIG adoption in the state 
somewhat.   
Finally, neither the size of state government nor partisan competition influences the rate 
of OIG adoptions.  Thus, states that invest heavily in their state government are not more drawn 
to create OIGs to oversee state bureaucracies than states with smaller governments.  Also, OIG 
adoption is not related to sharp competition between the parties or, conversely, to dominance by 
one of them.    
In light of the counter-intuitive nature of the statistical results, it is possible that some key 
influences on adoption of state OIGs have not been included in the model.  One strong 
possibility may be that the idea of an OIG is transferred by subject matter experts within 





the context of a larger substantive policy area, such as Medicaid (Comlossy, 2013).  It is likely 
that governmental professionals in particular fields are sharing the idea of an OIG through 
associations such as the National Association of Medicaid Directors or the American 
Correctional Association.  Survey data show that 19 states have adopted an OIG to oversee a 
health and/or human services agency, and 11 states have adopted an OIG to oversee a corrections 
agency.  These are the most common areas for which OIGs are adopted on the state level.  
Additional evidence supporting this conjecture about field-specific networks includes a statement 
from an inspector general for a state corrections department who told me that although he does 
not network with inspectors general in other fields because he does not find it useful, he does talk 
with his counterparts in other corrections agencies (confidential personal communication, 2013).  
Similar evidence is shown in the announcement of the creation of the Minnesota Department of 
Human Services OIG in which the Department cited other OIGs in the field of human services as 
influential (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011). 
In sum, this Event History Analysis shows that the reasons for OIG adoption are more 
complex than would otherwise have been expected.  The remainder of this chapter explores 
theories of neo-institutionalism and agenda-setting as they apply to OIG adoption.     
Agenda Setting and the Power of the OIG Idea: The Conceptualization and Adoption of 
OIGs  
Although adoption of OIGs does not appear to be a direct response to federal corruption 
convictions or the example of neighboring states or the federal government, this does not mean 
that the policy makers who adopt these agencies are unconcerned about corruption or 
uninfluenced by shared ideas about how to address it. My survey data, to be reviewed below, 





they have emerged as a key way to do this. To understand the survey data, it is useful to review 
the literature on agenda setting. 
A policy agenda is “the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and 
people outside the government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious 
attention at any time” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3).  Due to time limitations, policy makers can only 
pay attention to so many problems at one time.  Building on Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) 
“garbage can” model of the policy process, Kingdon (1995) suggests that for any problem to 
receive attention, three “streams” of thought must come together simultaneously for an item to 
move up on the policy agenda and receive attention.  These are the problem stream, the policy 
stream, and the political stream.  The problem stream is made up of various pieces of information 
about a vague policy problem, which often coheres into a clear definition of the problem upon 
the advent of a focusing event or crisis.  The policy stream includes the various solutions that 
could be applied to the problem.  This stream unifies into a single solution that becomes 
preferred over others.  Finally, the political stream refers to the political climate, which can be 
either amenable to political action or indisposed to pursue a solution to the problem.  Kingdon 
(1995) suggests that if key stakeholders agree on a problem definition and a policy solution at a 
time when the political climate is ready for the adoption of the solution, an issue will move onto 
the policy agenda and be acted on, often with the push of a policy entrepreneur. 
In the case of OIGs, the power of neo-institutional norms of accountability and of the 
OIG model are evident in each of these streams. The remainder of this chapter reviews how the 
OIG gains a place on the policy agenda as a normative solution to government accountability 





Problem definition and offices of inspector general.  Why are OIGs introduced?  What 
is the primary purpose for these proposed OIGs?  How does Kingdon’s (1995) problem stream 
converge into a single problem for which the OIG is the solution?  My survey and interview data 
suggest that government accountability, writ large, is the problem which an OIG was adopted to 
address.  Thus, the “problem” to which OIGs become the solution is a perceived lack of 
accountability for government agencies, specifically a concern about waste, fraud and abuse 
resulting from what is perceived to be too little accountability. That said, government 
accountability can encompasses a number of types of specific problems related to government 
performance and spending.  The data show that OIGs are adopted to address a variety of specific 
problems under the broad heading of accountability.  These specific performance and spending 
problems are not new to government, but rather, what is new is identifying performance and 
corruption issues as accountability issues. And accountability is precisely the problem to which 
OIGs are the solution. 
The primary goal for the adoption of an OIG that was cited by survey respondents is to 
reduce fraud, waste and abuse.  A full 64% of all survey respondents state that this was the 
primary goal of establishing their OIG, and 32% state that fraud, waste, and abuse held a lot of 
importance in the establishment of their OIGs.  Other common goals, to improve the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of government programs, were cited as the primary goal by only 
28% and 19% of all respondents respectively.  Responses from state-level OIGs and local/multi-
jurisdictional OIGs did not vary to a great extent, except that issues of program effectiveness and 
efficiency were of less importance to the establishment of local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs 






















To reduce fraud, waste, and 
abuse  




2 (4%) 0 (0%) 52 
State OIGs 22 (61%) 
12 
(33%) 
2 (6%) 0 (0%) 36 
Local/ 
Multi-jurisdictional OIGs 
11 (69%) 5 (31%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 16 
To improve the effectiveness 
of government programs 




4 (9%) 1 (2%) 48 
State OIGs 11 (33%) 
21 
(64%) 
1 (3%) 0 (0%) 33 
Local/ 
Multi-jurisdictional OIGs 
2 (13%) 9 (60%) 
3 
(20%) 
1 (7%) 15 
To improve the efficiency 
(reduce costs) of government 
programs 






0 (0%) 49 













0 (0%) 15 
Other 
All OIG respondents 
2 1 1  3  7 
State OIGs 2 1 1 2 6 
Local/ 
Multi-jurisdictional OIGs 
0 0 0 1 1 
 
 
Several survey respondents commented on other reasons that led to the creation of their 
OIGs. Comments include: 





 To improve integrity 
 To lower child mortality 
 To provide accountability  
 To support ethical practices 
 To provide support to executive management and supervisors 
 To improve compliance with federal oversight 
 To address concerns about contracting and procurement 
 To lend a level of objectivity to investigations 
An additional reason for an OIG is found in legislative testimony from Connecticut in favor of a 
statutory OIG.  One legislator stated:   
We need an inspector general.  I am convinced that this office will help restore the 
public’s confidence in State government, and will ensure that we have adequate 
safeguards against the loss of State assets.  This is what this office is all about, and 
clearly, ladies and gentlemen, for those of you who have been here for a few years, you 
well know that there has been much money lost in mismanagement in state government. 
(Connecticut HB 5090, (1985, May 29), pp. 9806-9807).  
The common thread of all these concerns is a sense that an OIG can solve a plethora of problems 
from finding fraud, improving government programs and operations, and providing public 
confidence in government.  In short, for supporters of OIGs, they are a solution to a range of 
problems that all relate to government performance and accountability (Kingdon, 1995).   
A generalized concern about government performance is frequently augmented by a 
focusing event (Kingdon, 1995), such as a concern about a highly publicized case of fraud, 





point to a government corruption scandal or scandals as having a primary influence on the 
establishment of their OIG, although for local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs, a scandal is more 
frequently reported as a primary influence as compared to state-level OIGs.  In addition, 32% of 
all respondents say such scandals had either a lot, some, or a little influence in their jurisdiction 
on the establishment of their OIG.  On the other end of the scale, only 20% of all respondents 
(and 0% of local/multi-jurisdictional respondents) note that a corruption scandal had no influence 
on the establishment of their OIG.  These results are shown in Table 2.5, which follows. 
 
TABLE 2.5 
Survey question: How much did a government corruption scandal or scandal influence the 









Not at all 
Total 
Responses 
All OIGs 19 (46%) 7 (17%) 7 (17%) 8 (20%) 41 
State OIGs 11 (37%) 5 (17%) 6 (20%)  8 (26%) 30 
Local/ Multi-
jurisdictional OIGs 
8 (73%) 2 (18%) 1 (9%) 0 (0%) 11 
 
Narratives of the creation of OIGs provide detail about such focusing events.  I asked the 
interviewees to tell me the story behind the creation of their OIG.  The interviews coupled with 
news reports of the time demonstrate that following a big public corruption scandal, these OIGs 
were proposed as the appropriate response to this scandal (personal communication #7, June 18, 
2012; personal communication #16, July 24, 2013; personal communication #17, July 24, 2013; 
personal communication #19, July 25, 2013; personal communication #25, July 26, 2013; 
personal communication #26, July 30, 2013; personal communication #35, November 5, 2013; 






An example of a focusing event leading to the proposal of an OIG to solve the problem is 
found in Massachusetts. Massachusetts is the home of the first statewide OIG (Massachusetts 
OIG, 2014), which was established by the legislature, the Massachusetts General Court, by 
statute in 1980 (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, 2013).  The OIG was 
born out of work directly related to widespread allegations of corruption in public construction 
contracting (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  It was proposed as an essential 
component of a larger package of statutory reforms (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980). 
 The history of the formation of the Massachusetts OIG is well documented. Following 
reports of pieces of buildings on the University of Massachusetts Boston campus dropping to the 
ground and the convictions of two state senators on charges of extortion, the General Court 
created a special commission to investigate corruption related to public construction and to 
propose legislation to address the problems (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  This 
commission became known as the Ward Commission, named after the chair John William Ward 
(Massachusetts OIG, 2014), an American history professor and former president of Amherst 
College (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  It was made up of reputable citizens, 
including the Massachusetts Attorney General, a professor from the Suffolk University School of 
Management, an architect, two attorneys from prominent Boston law firms, and a professor of 
civil engineering at the Southeastern Massachusetts University, who met for nearly 3 years and 
drafted a 12 volume report of their findings and recommendations (Massachusetts Special 
Commission, 1980).   
 The Ward Commission’s final report provides an extensive review of how the award of 
public construction contracts had become intertwined with political donations, kickbacks, 





Commission noted that both political parties were implicated in this culture of corruption 
(Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  The Ward Commission concluded: 
In the award of design contracts for the construction of state and county buildings, we 
have learned that— 
 Corruption is a way of life in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
 Political influence, not professional performance, is the prime criterion in doing 
business with the state 
 Shoddy work and debased standards are the norm 
 The ‘system’ of administration is inchoate and inferior.  (Massachusetts Special 
Commission, 1980, Vol. I, p. 21).   
The Commission suggested a number of legislative reforms to address the problems, 
including the creation of an agency to oversee public buildings and public construction; 
improved regulation of public construction; the establishment of an ethics commission; several 
components of campaign finance reform; increased criminal penalties for bribery, extortion and 
false record keeping; and the adoption of an OIG (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  
The OIG was touted as important tool because the Commission concluded that the 
Commonwealth lacked the capacity to be “self-critical” and “self-corrective” (Massachusetts 
Special Commission, 1980, Vol. I, p. 42).  Hearing testimony from a federal inspector general, 
the Commission concluded that although the Attorney General could address specific cases of 
allegations of fraud on a case by case basis, and the State Auditor could review state transactions, 
neither could complete investigations into systemic fraud or abuse (Massachusetts Special 





practices, but to reduce program costs diverted to corruption, correct wasteful practices, and 
support prosecution of fraud and corruption (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).   
Illinois offers a similar case, where a focusing event was the occasion for consideration 
of an OIG.  As in Massachusetts, the OIG for the Illinois Department of Children and Family 
Services was created directly in response to a public scandal, but in Illinois, the scandal was a 
real tragedy: the murder of a child by her mother, Amanda Wallace, both of whom had been 
under the care of the Department of Children and Family Services (Baldacci, 1993b).  Wallace 
had been a ward of the state since the age of seven (McWhirter & Gottesman, 1993).  She had 
been in and out of foster homes and mental institutions due to violent and criminal behavior 
towards herself and others.  According to the Chicago Tribune, “From 1987 until 1992, Elgin [a 
suburb of Chicago] police compiled 68 reports involving Wallace” (McWhirter & Gottesman, 
1993).  During this period of time, Wallace conceived a son with a fellow mental hospital 
resident (McWhirter & Gottesman, 1993).  Although the child was immediately taken into foster 
care upon his birth, Wallace petitioned to be reunited with her son, and in fact, the child was 
returned to her and removed from her two times, before the final fatal time (McWhirter & 
Gottesman, 1993; ”Justice and Amanda Wallace,” 1996).  In 1993, with an even younger son in 
the bedroom nearby, Wallace hung her 3 year old son (Dold, 1996).   
 After his death, the public was so outraged about the fact that this woman and her child 
had so clearly slipped through the cracks that they demanded a solution through letters to the 
editor immediately following the tragedy and for several years after the event (see, e.g., BuGay, 
1993; Leonaitis, 1993; Longmire, 1993; Millard, 1993; Yasutake, 1997).  Several newspapers 
added to the pressure with editorials (see, e.g., Baldacci, 1993b; “In Memory of Joseph 





1993;  “Lynching of Joseph Wallace,” 1993; Roeper, 1993; “3-year-old Joseph’s Death Was a 
Tragedy of Errors,” 1993; “What about Joshua?,” 1994; “Victimization of Joshua Wallace,” 
1995; Dold, 1996; “Peace Comes to Amanda Wallace,” 1997).  For example, the Chicago 
Tribune stated: “The child welfare and juvenile justice systems cannot go on as they have, jolted 
briefly, but not significantly, by each tragic murder of a child” (“In Memory of Joseph Wallace,” 
1993).  The governor at the time, Jim Edgar, reportedly proposed the OIG in order to “weed out 
bad managers and caseworkers” in the Department (Baldacci, 1993a).  He proposed an OIG 
along with other legislative reforms to address the standards that family court judges use when 
considering cases of family reunification (Baldacci, 1993a). 
 These data show that the problem stream varies in specifics from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, but that overall, regardless of the specific problem of a poor construction or a foster 
child’s death, a deficit is found in the government’s ability to perform as desired for the public 
good.  Poor performance coupled with lax oversight unifies within the problem stream (Kingdon, 
1995) and becomes a government accountability problem for which a solution is needed.  This 
failure in providing support for the norm of accountability becomes a rallying cry for a solution 
to this problem. 
Offices of inspector general as policy solutions.  In each of these jurisdictions, many 
other solutions might have been proposed to deal with these various accountability problems.  
Yet, as neo-institutional theories would suggest, the idea of an OIG has become a powerful 
normative model for how to address the perceived problem of lack of accountability. Indeed, 
OIGs are widely endorsed as the key bureaucratic accountability mechanism.   
In state after state, the OIG concept has been proposed by a policy entrepreneur.  My 





executive leaders, and agency heads, are the primary individuals who bring the OIG concept to 
their jurisdictions (see Table 2.6 below).  Thirty two percent of all respondents note that a 
legislator or legislators came up with the idea of establishing an OIG, and 23% point to executive 
heads (i.e., the governor or mayor) as the source of the idea.  The next most common source 
(21%) is the head of the agency/agencies to be overseen, i.e., high level government appointees.  
Occasionally career accountability bureaucrats are identified as the source of idea. The survey 
also indicates that, unlike the diffusion of the Amber alert or stiffer penalties for drunken driving 
(Boushey, 2010), there is not a clamoring for an OIG by advocacy groups or the media.  This 
latter finding is quite different than typical findings in diffusion studies (see, e.g., Karch, 2007; 
Boushey, 2010) that interest groups have a large role in both the diffusion process.   In short, the 
agents of the phenomenon of the diffusion of OIGs are found within the government itself, either 
elected or appointed.  Tables 2.7 and 2.8 break out responses from state OIGs and local/multi-









Survey question:   Who came up with the idea of establishing your OIG?  (Please select all 
that apply) (Total responses: 44) 
   
Answers from all respondent OIGs  
 
Response % 
A legislator or legislators   
 
14 32% 
The head of the executive branch, such 









Interest groups or citizen advocates   
 
3 7% 















The media  
 
0 0% 
Lawyers in private practice  
 
0 0% 





Answers from State OIGs Only  
 
Response % 
A legislator or legislators   
 
9 28% 
The head of the executive branch, 









Interest groups or citizen advocates   
 
1 3% 










The media  
 
0 0% 
Local, state or federal prosecutors  
 
0 0% 
Lawyers in private practice  
 
0 0% 














A legislator or legislators   
 
5 38% 
The head of the executive 





The head of the agency/agencies 
























The media  
 
0 0% 
Lawyers in private practice  
 
0 0% 





In the follow up question below, reported in Table 2.9, nine percent (4/44 respondents) 
point to leaders in existing oversight units as the source of the idea.  (All of these respondents 
were from state OIGs.)   
 
TABLE 2.9 
Survey question:  You indicated that individuals or entities not listed above came up with 
the idea to establish your OIG.  Please explain.  (Total responses: 5) 
 
*The head of or leader in the existing internal oversight unit (4 respondents) 
*A federal judge 
 
 
The positive normative value of an OIG as a policy solution seems especially prominent 





 In a context of widespread patterns of corruption and recent scandals, a candidate for 
elected office tries to distinguish him- or herself from the corrupt by campaigning to 
launch a new era of good government. In the process, he or she promises to enact an 
OIG as a symbol of this commitment. (personal communication #5 , May 18, 2012; 
personal communication #9, July 3, 2013; personal communication #12, July 22, 
2013; personal communication #15, July 24, 2013; personal communication #20, July 
25, 2013; personal communication #23, July 26, 2013; personal communication #29, 
October 10, 2013; personal communication #33, October 17, 2013).   
 Administrative professionals within the jurisdiction propose the adoption of an OIG 
as a method to improve accountability as a measure of  “good government” (personal 
communication #8, May 29, 2013; personal communication #18, July 25, 2013; 
personal communication #28, July 31, 2013; personal communication #37, November 
6, 2013; personal communication #39, November 7, 2013).   
Examples of both of these cases follow.   
The OIG for the Minnesota Department of Human Services was promoted as part of a 
gubernatorial campaign.  The candidate for governor at the time, Mark Dayton, ran on a platform 
of increased government accountability (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011).  The 
Governor’s newly appointed Commissioner for the Department of Human Services seized on the 
OIG concept as a method to support the Governor’s priorities, pointing to the health and human 
services OIGs on the federal level and in other states as inspiration (Minnesota Department of 
Human Services, 2011).   The press release announcing the new office emphasized:  “This 





Gov. Mark Dayton’s commitment toward cultivating a more transparent state government that 
works for all Minnesotans” (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011, para. 1). 
 Likewise, the catalyst for the OIGs in Florida and Indiana were newly elected governors, 
both of whom had worked with the federal government and had become familiar with the federal 
OIG system.  Florida’s Governor Lawton Chiles had served in the US Senate during the time that 
the IG Act of 1978 and its 1988 amendment were enacted (Clift, 2014).  After his election, he 
introduced a bill that placed OIGs in every state agency (Florida Inspector General Act of 1994, 
2013).  Similarly, Governor Mitch Daniels of Indiana entered elected office directly after serving 
as the director of the US Office of Management and Budget under President George W. Bush 
(www.biography.com, 2014).  Upon his election as governor, Daniels immediately created a 
statewide ethics OIG by executive order, which was endorsed by the Indiana General Assembly 
in the proceeding legislative session (Morris, 2004; “Inspector General,” 2005; Kelly, 2005; 
Indiana Executive Order No. 05-03, 2005; Indiana Inspector General Act of 2005, 2013). 
 In Illinois, a state beset with a long-term culture of corruption, two OIGs were adopted 
upon the simultaneous exposure of a major public scandal and an election of a candidate who 
proposed an OIG as part of a political platform.  The first example is the creation of the OIG for 
the city of Chicago.   Mayor Richard M. Daley, the son of Mayor Richard J. Daley, made a 
campaign promise to create an OIG (Merriner & Rotenberk, 1989).  Daley used this OIG 
campaign promise to distinguish himself from the sitting mayor, Eugene Sawyer, a popular 
African American politician who had admitted a failure in filing taxes.  Daley also wanted to 
establish himself as standing on an ethical high ground, perhaps in part because several of his 
staff were accused of forging petition signatures (Hardy, 1989).  He also used it to distance 





(Schmidt, 1989).  The OIG for the city of Chicago was created in 1989 (Chicago, Illinois, Office 
of Inspector General city ordinance, 1989) less than one year after Mayor Daley’s election. 
 In 2002-03, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich ran on the issue of ethics reform.  His 
plan included ending “pay-to-play” contracting and government corruption (Saulny, 2008; 
Sweeney, 2011).  The candidate took this position as the corruption scandal related to his 
predecessor, Governor George Ryan, emerged (Saulny, 2008; Sweeney, 2011).  Governor Ryan 
was eventually indicted and convicted, along with several of his aides, for using his campaign 
organization and his previous position as Secretary of State to promote his political aims 
(“Events Leading to Ryan’s Indictment,” n.d.).  Federal prosecutors documented multiple 
instances of the misuse of the granting of state contracts and licenses.  Soon after being elected, 
Governor Blagojevich established an executive branch OIG by executive order to oversee the 
agencies under the Governor’s jurisdiction (Illinois Executive Order 3, 2003) and pushed 
through legislation to codify a set of OIGs in each of the constitutional offices within one year of 
his election (Illinois Executive Ethics Commission and Executive Inspectors General Act of 
2006, 2013).   Governor Blagojevich chose to pursue the creation of an OIG, and held the OIG 
up as a solution to the ethical problems in the state, despite the fact that concurrently Governor 
Ryan’s own inspector general had become implicated in Ryan’s corruption schemes and 
ultimately pled guilty to obstructing justice (“Reformers Hope Ryan Indictments Resurrect 
Ethics Legislation” 2002; “Past Problems with Inspectors General Cloud Blagojevich Ethics 
Plan,” 2003).  Although this might suggest that an OIG in Illinois amounts to empty symbolism, 
the OIG and ethics system that Blagojevich endorsed created a system of OIG monitoring, ethics 
training, and sanctions for state employees that had not existed before and which remains alive 





An example of an OIG proposed by professional public administrators can be found in 
the Colorado Department of Corrections. Initially, the Department’s Executive Director created 
the unit as an internal affairs unit that was to provide an investigative presence in the 
Department, staffed by correctional experts (Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee, April 5, 
1999).   The department’s leadership believed that this unit would be more responsive to major 
crimes, such as homicides, within the correction facilities than external law enforcement because 
internal staff would better understand the closed culture of a prison (confidential personal 
communication 2013).  Further, there were concerns that traditional supervision of staff 
misconduct had become inadequate with the increase in the size of the correction system 
(confidential personal communication, 2013).  The Department of Corrections requested the 
General Assembly (the Colorado legislature) to codify the role in statute, mainly to assure the 
legitimacy of granting the OIG staff the authority to carry guns and serve as law enforcement 
officers (Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee, April 5, 1999).  Another reason for the 
legislation, according to legislative staff summaries at the time, was to authorize a small 
reorganization of the unit (Colorado Legislative Council Staff, 1999).  The existing investigative 
staff were located in the Executive Director’s office and reported to the Deputy Director 
(Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee, April 5, 1999).   The legislation created the position of 
IG, who would oversee the OIG and report to the Executive Director (Colorado Legislative 
Council Staff, 1999). 
 Another example of an OIG promoted by professional staff is found in the city of 
Richmond, Virginia.  The city auditor of Richmond had identified instances of fraud in the 
course of his work, but he felt that sufficiently looking into those issues would be outside his 





council about creating an OIG to investigate fraud, and the council agreed (confidential personal 
communication, 2013), creating a new OIG in ordinance (Richmond, Virginia, Inspector General 
Function, 2008).  A nearly identical story is found in Pinellas County, Florida, where the OIG 
was initiated by internal audit staff (confidential personal communication, 2013) and adopted by 
the County Clerk of the Court and Comptroller (Clerk of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, 
Florida, Division of Inspector General, 2003).   
 All of these examples demonstrate how the OIG has become the dominant policy solution 
to the broad problem of accountability.  In each case the desire to pursue the norm of 
accountability pushes the OIG to the forefront of many other possible solutions in the policy 
stream (Kingdon, 1995).  Thus, OIGs have become a key bureaucratic expression of the norm of 
accountability. 
Offices of inspector general and political climate.  As Kingdon (1995) suggests, a final 
condition is necessary for adoption of a key policy proposal: the political climate must become 
favorable to the solution proposed in the policy stream.  The current political climate is very 
much in favor of addressing accountability problems (Dubnick & O’Brien, 2011).  As one of my 
interviewees stated: “It is hard to be opposed to accountability” (personal communication # 27, 
July 31, 2013).    
Political support for the OIG concept is necessary even when a policy is adopted by 
means other than legislation, as is the case with many OIGs.  In fact, nearly 40% of OIGs were 
adopted in other ways.  As Table 2.10 shows, 22% of all survey respondents noted their OIG was 
formed purely under the discretion of the agency head or the head of the executive branch, and 
14% were established more formally, albeit still through the use of executive discretion, by 





jurisdiction OIGs for comparison.  These tables show that local OIGs, in comparison to state 
OIGs, are more frequently created formally in statute. 
TABLES 2.11-2.12 
Survey question:  Which of the following best describes the legal form of the establishment 
of your OIG?   
 
Answer from all OIG respondents  
 
Response % 
The OIG was established in legislation by the 
legislative body of your jurisdiction, such as the state 









The OIG was established by written executive order   
 
8 14% 
The OIG was established under the executive 





Other   
 
2 3% 
Total  59 100% 
 
 
Answer from State OIGs Only  
 
Response % 
The OIG was established in legislation by the 
legislative body of your jurisdiction, such as the state 









The OIG was established by written executive order   
 
6 15% 
The OIG was established under the executive leader’s 




Other  0 0% 












The OIG was established in legislation by the 
legislative body of your jurisdiction, such as the 









The OIG was established by written executive order   
 
2 10% 
The OIG was established under the executive 





Other   
 
2 10% 
Total  20 100% 
 
 
Other means of establishment are also noted by respondents when responding to the follow up 
question, located below in Table 2.13.  The first answer was offered by a state OIG, while the 
second was offered by a local OIG. 
 
TABLE 2.13 
Survey question: You indicated that your OIG was established through a manner not listed 
above.  Please explain. 
 
*Originally established by federal court order and later codified in statute 
*Established by voters with the passage of a new city charter  
 
One might imagine that political climate is a more important factor when considering the 
adoption of an OIG by legislative action than by a discretionary act; however, political actors, 
whether elected or appointed, are unlikely to adopt an OIG unless the OIG is politically 
attractive.  The key difference is that governors or agency heads need not encounter political 
delays.  They can create OIGs immediately and then claim credit for the solution to the 





For those OIGs that are adopted through formal legislative action, the process is not 
always immediate.  Scholars have noted that policy innovations often take considerable time 
between initial proposal and final adoption (Karch, 2007; Kingdon, 1995), and this is true with 
legislative OIGs as well.  The idea is often introduced over a period of years before the idea is 
adopted.  Although a protracted process was not the rule in many of the jurisdictions I examined, 
there are several examples in my case studies where multiple years passed from initial 
introduction to formal adoption.  
One example is found in Cook County, Illinois.  In 1988, newspapers reported that the 
County Board President was considering backing off on his campaign promise to create a county 
OIG (Ortiz, 1993).  He had argued for the creation of an OIG following an incident of county 
employees stealing paint, lumber and other similar materials; however, after election, he stated 
that he was not sure that another bureaucracy was needed (Ortiz, 1993).  The OIG was eventually 
created 11 years later in 2004 (Patterson, 2004), but formalized as an independent office in 
ordinance in 2006 (Pallasch, 2006). 
 Likewise, a bill to create an OIG for the Illinois Tollway was first introduced in the 
Illinois General Assembly in 1994, but it did not go anywhere (Korecki, 1997).  Following the 
indictment of the Tollway director in 1997 for stealing $250,000 and other fraudulent practices, a 
second bill was introduced.  It was opposed both by a citizen’s watchdog group, who argued the 
bill did not create an OIG with enough teeth, and Tollway staff, who argued that problems had 
been corrected and that they were already audited by the State’s Auditor General (Korecki, 
1997).  A third bill was introduced in 2002 after the Tollway was roundly criticized for building 
a new headquarters, which was dubbed the Taj Mahal, for $25 million (Associated Press, 2002).  





of expensive brick to be used for any Tollway sound barriers (Sabotaging Tollway Reform, 
2003).  Because of this addition, the bill was vetoed.  An internal office of investigations was 
created by the Tollway board, and with the help of a legislator, a bill was finally passed in 2010 
to create the Tollway OIG (confidential personal communication, 2013; Illinois Toll Highway 
Inspector General, 2013). 
 A final example in found in Minnesota.  In this state, three different legislators had 
introduced four bills in 2008 and 2010 to create an OIG for the Minnesota health programs, 
several years prior to the Commissioner’s creation of the Department’s OIG (Minnesota HF 
3047, 2010; Minnesota HF 2256, 2010; Minnesota HF 4049, 2008; Minnesota HF 4119, 2008).  
The bills did not pass; however after the Commissioner announced the creation of the agency’s 
OIG in 2011, these legislators claimed credit for the idea (confidential personal conversation, 
2013).  To date, the Minnesota Legislature has passed a statutory reference to the OIG, which 
assigns it duties related to fraud investigations (Minnesota Child Care Provider and Recipient 
Fraud Investigations, 2013), but a more formal adoption has yet to be considered. 
 Although the process to get an OIG on the legislative or policy making agenda may be 
protracted, typically there is little opposition to an OIG when it is adopted.  Very few survey 
respondents, whether on the state, local, multi-jurisdictional levels, identified opponents.  The 
largest groups identified by all respondents are preexisting oversight agencies and agency heads 
of the agency or agencies to be overseen, as is illustrated in Table 2.14 below.   
 
TABLE 2.14 
Survey question: After the concept of an OIG was introduced, to what degree did the 

















Interest groups or citizen 
advocates 
All OIG respondents 26 (87%) 3 (10%) 1 (3%) 30 
State OIGs 15 (83%) 2 (11%) 1 (6%) 18 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 11 (92%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 12 
Legislators 
All OIG respondents 
28 (85%) 4 (12%) 1 (3%) 33 
State OIGs 19 (90%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 21 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 9 (75%) 3 (25%) 0 (0%) 12 
The media 
All OIG respondents 
23 (82%) 5 (18%) 0 (0%) 28 
State OIGs 12 (80%) 3 (20%) 0 (0%) 15 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 11 (85%) 2 (15%) 0 (0%) 13 
The head of the executive 
branch, such as the governor or 
mayor 
All OIG respondents 32 (80%) 5 (13%) 3 (7%) 40 
State OIGs 24 (89%) 3 (11%) 0 (0%) 27 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 8 (62%) 2 (15%) 3 (23%) 13 
The public at large 
All OIG respondents 
20 (77%) 6 (23%) 0 (0%) 26 
State OIGs 11 (79%) 3 (21%) 0 (0%) 14 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 9 (75%) 3 (25%) 0 (0%) 12 
The head of the agency/agencies 
to be overseen 
All OIG respondents 26 (68%) 8 (21%) 4 (11%) 38 
State OIGs 23 (85%) 3 (11%) 1 (4%) 27 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 3 (27%) 5 (46%) 3 (27%) 11 
Local, state or federal 
prosecutors 
All OIG respondents 19 (%) 7 (%) 1 (4%) 27 
State OIGs 15 (75%) 4 (20%) 1 (5%) 20 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 0 (0%) 7 
Lawyers in public service (not 
prosecutors) 





State OIGs 9 (82%) 2 (18%) 0 (0%) 11 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 2 (40%) 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 5 
Lawyers in private practice 
All OIG respondents 10 (55%) 5 (28%) 3 (17%) 18 
State OIGs 8 (66%) 2 (17%) 2 (17%) 12 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 2 (33%) 3 (50%) 1 (17%) 6 
A preexisting oversight agency 
All OIG respondents 10 (48%) 6 (28%) 5 (24%) 21 
State OIGs 9 (56%) 4 (25%) 3 (19%) 16 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (40%) 5 
Other interested individual or 
entity 
All OIG respondents 2 (25%) 6 (75%) 0 (0%) 8 
State OIGs 1 (17%) 5 (83%) 0 (0%) 6 
Local/ Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 2 
 
Interviewees’ comments further illustrate these patterns. Most interviewees stated there was no 
opposition to the creation of their OIG (personal communication #9, July 3, 2013; personal 
communication #25, July 26, 2013; personal communication #27, July 31, 2013; personal 
communication #28, July 31, 2013; personal communication #29, October 10, 2013; personal 
communication #37, November 6, 2013; personal communication #38, November 7, 2013; 
personal communication #39, November 7, 2013).  The following quotes illustrate this point. 
 Regarding the creation of a local OIG:  Interviewer: “Were there any opponents to the 
concept?”  Respondent: “No.  At that time, there were none” (personal communication, 
#28, July 31, 2013). 
 Regarding the conversion of a local internal audit unit to an OIG:  Interviewer: “When 
you changed the name of the OIG, was there any opposition?” Respondent: “No” 





 Regarding a state agency OIG created by the legislature following a public scandal:  
“[There were] no opponents.  I think everyone was so horrified” (personal 
communication #25, July 26, 2013). 
 Regarding a statewide OIG created in statute: “It was almost like a World War I Sarajevo 
assassination, all that kind of stuff.  There were powder kegs that had been found in 
audits.  It was one of the governor’s campaign promises, to bring accountability and 
integrity across the government . . . Obviously [the legislature] saw the writing on the 
wall and thought it would be a good thing” (personal communication #27, July 31, 2013). 
 Regarding an internal OIG, created by a state agency head through her discretion: “I 
would hear from people that [the OIG] was their idea. . . . I told the [agency head] that 
the theme out there is: finally someone at this agency listened” (personal communication 
#9, July 3, 2013). 
 Regarding the passage of a state statute creating several state OIGs: “I don’t know of 
anybody that fiercely fought the bill at all” (personal communication #29, October 10, 
2013). 
 Regarding the creation of a local OIG in ordinance:  “I think that it’s hard to publically 
oppose an inspector general’s office, especially in the wake of a scandal.  I think you saw 
a lot of public support and behind the scenes, some grumbling” (personal communication 
#38, November 7, 2013). 
When opposition was noted, it was from individuals who did not want to be overseen by 
the OIG, and in particular one whose IG is chosen by someone who could potentially be a 
political enemy (personal communication #23, July 26, 2013; “Future of Ethics Reform in the 





employees would maintain their union rights (personal communication #17, July 24, 2013; 
personal communication #18, July 25, 2013).  For example, when Governor Blagojevich 
proposed the creation of an OIG to oversee the whole of the executive branch, the other 
constitutionally elected officials, the Comptroller, the Treasurer, the Attorney General, and the 
Auditor General argued against the Governor’s appointment of someone who would oversee 
their offices (“Future of Ethics Reform in the Hands of the Governor, 2003; Roeper, 2003).  
Nevertheless, at the conceptualization phase, these protests are few and far between. 
Absence of opposition is striking in that 66% of all survey respondents report that at the 
time their OIG was created, there was at least one, and as many as seven non-federal entities 
already overseeing the agency/agencies that were to be within the proposed OIG’s jurisdiction. 
(To be sure, fewer local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs reported preexisting oversight.)  These 
survey results are shown in Table 2.15-2.17 and Figure 2.2. 
 
TABLES 2.15-2.17 
Survey question:   At the time the establishment of your OIG was being considered, were 
there other non-federal agencies, such as internal auditors, legislative auditors, etc., who 
had oversight for same agency/agencies the OIG was intended to oversee? 
 
All Respondent OIGs  
 
Response % 
Yes   
 
29 67% 
No   
 
14 33% 
Total  43 100% 
 
State OIGs  
 
Response % 
Yes   
 
21 78% 
No   
 
6 22% 











Yes   
 
7 47% 
No   
 
8 53% 
Total  15 100% 
 
FIGURE 2.2 
Survey question: How many? (Total responses: 23) 
 
 
 In summary, the norm of accountability as embodied in an OIG unites Kingdon’s (1995) 
political stream to make the OIG a politically attractive policy solution to accountability 
problems.  Even though the OIG may not be adopted automatically in every jurisdiction, the fact 
that very few opponents to the OIG step forward, even though other oversight entities may 
already be in place, seems to illustrate the power of the norm. 
Conclusion   
This chapter has examined the process of placing the OIG concept on the political agenda 
and adopting it. In this process, one thing is abundantly clear: the OIG idea has considerable 
normative power.  This chapter has suggested that the power of this idea, understood through the 
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such as levels of corruption, investment in bureaucracy, and partisan competition.  The 
institutionalization of the OIG and the norm it embodies has more influence on OIG adoption 
than the adoption of OIGs by neighboring states or by the federal government. 
Kingdon’s (1995) description of the three streams of agenda making is demonstrated by 
the adoption of OIGs, which adoptions are fueled by the norm of accountability.  When the idea 
is initially introduced to the jurisdiction, it is generally brought policy entrepreneurs who are 
either campaigning for an elected office or by professional bureaucrats pursuing “good 
government.”  The idea often is introduced following a public scandal, which serves as a 
focusing event.  Nevertheless, during this phase, the role of the OIG tends to be rhetorically 
inflated as a solution to all manner of governmental ills, suggesting that OIGs are able to solve 
all manner of problems and bring about accountability. The claims for OIGs’ effectiveness are 
especially striking in light of the fact that OIGs typically have no authority to impose solutions 
but only may collect information and make recommendations.  This observation only punctuates 
the point that OIGs have become a symbolic solution to the perceived need for bureaucratic 
accountability. This normative power is reemphasized by the fact that the proposal to establish 
an OIG has remarkably few opponents. Who can oppose greater accountability of government 
agencies? Who stands in favor of corruption, fraud, and abuse? At least at the conceptualization 
phase, the idea of an OIG seems unassailable. It is wrapped in the symbolic legitimacy of 
accountability itself. 
Given the power of the norm of accountability and its influence in the widespread 
adoption of OIGs, it is striking to remember that OIGs have limited authority in the 
accountability process.  Although their role is to monitor government activities through audits, 





issues, from fixing problems to providing public confidence in the government.  The idea of an 
OIG becomes much bigger and broader than the actual role of an OIG in the accountability 
process.  The normative expectations of OIGs are large and perhaps unrealistic.   
In fact, at this initial adoption phase, OIGs seem to have the cachet of a magic wand, able 
to solve nearly any accountability problem. This high expectation stands in sharp contrast to the 
reality of OIGs’ limited authority: they can report information but not act on this information. An 
interviewee, the first IG for his jurisdiction, dramatized this conflict between dream and reality: 
I came here and  . . . I was asked one day, what do you think is going to happen when 
you’re here?  And I said, nothing.  And they said, what do you mean?  And I said, 
nothing, because you are all so apathetic.  Change doesn’t come from me.  Change is 
going to come from all of you, members of the public, the citizens, finally, when you get 
sick of seeing the same old thing happen again and again. Because you could have 100 
IGs here, it’s not going to matter.  Until your voices are made public and they are loud, 
there won’t be change.  So that’s really the message that I try to tell anyone is that you 
could put 100 of me and 100 of [another IG] and 100 of everybody else, it doesn’t matter.  
Until you as citizens decide enough is enough, that’s when the real changes come.  And 
that goes not just for [this jurisdiction] but for any jurisdiction anywhere, any business, 
any jurisdiction. (personal communication # 20, July 25, 2013) 
As the limitations of an OIG to affect accountability appear to be ignored in the 
conceptualization phase, they are similarly overlooked in the design and implementation phases.  
Instead the norm of accountability overshadows these limitations, but instead of encouraging 





opposition to an OIG in the design and implementation phases. These phases and the dynamics 







Phase II: Design 
 
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, since 1976, the powerful norm of 
accountability in the context of bureaucratic agencies has come to be embodied by an office of 
inspector general (OIG). This office has come to be seen as an appropriate—and perhaps the 
ideal—solution to the problem of ineffective government programs, bureaucratic waste, and 
corruption. Political leaders who seek to style themselves as bureaucratic reformers have seized 
on this model as a symbol of their commitment to reform, and professional bureaucrats have 
proposed OIGs in order to embrace “good government” ideals.  Jurisdictions have adopted OIGs 
mainly at the instigation of these reformers, often after an event of public corruption is 
publicized. This chapter takes the story of the conceptualization and adoption of OIGs to the next 
stage: the design phase.  I explore how the norm of accountability impacts OIG design, and how 
these designs vary from state to state.  
The design phase refers to the point at which pencil is put to paper and the details of how 
the OIG will be structured and what the OIG will do are worked out.  Sometimes the design 
process occurs through a political process resulting in the passage of legislation imposing new 
oversight on an agency or agencies (see, e.g., Chicago, IL, Office of Inspector General city 
ordinance (1989); Florida Inspector General Act of 1994 (2013); Illinois Executive Ethics 
Commission and Executive Inspectors General Act of 2006 (2013); Indiana Inspector General 
Act of 2005 (2013)).  Other times, the design process occurs within an agency and results in a 
reorganization of staff (see e.g., Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011; personal 
communication #34, 2013; personal communication #36, 2013; personal communication #37, 
2013).  As this chapter will show, OIGs vary considerably in their design in ways that matter to 





Most studies of policy diffusion examine only whether a policy is adopted; they do not 
go on to examine whether, or how, common policies that are widely adopted vary in their design.  
To be sure, some studies of policy diffusion analyze how common policies vary in their design in 
relation to varying conditions among jurisdictions, particularly demographic characteristics of 
the population as a whole, the relative power of particular constituencies or interest groups, the 
degree of legislative professionalism, or other factors (Rogers, 2003; Berry & Berry, 1990; Epp, 
2009; Karch, 2007, Daley & Garand, 2005; Boushey, 2010; Jun & Weare, 2011). Diffusion 
scholars call variations in policies that arise from location to location “reinvention,” although 
Karch (2007) prefers “customization.” These terms suggest progressive improvements or 
adaptations in the design of policies that make them appropriate for local conditions. Often, 
these changes in policy design are credited as progressive improvements in a policy over time 
based on learning from other jurisdictions’ experiences about policy implementation. 
This chapter builds on these studies but reaches a very particular conclusion about the 
factors shaping the place-to-place variations in the design of offices of inspector general. In 
contrast to the image cast by the idea of reinvention, the thesis of this chapter is that many 
jurisdictional variations in the design of offices of inspector general are best characterized 
instead as deliberate debilitation: the intentional effort, based on a recognition of the potential 
power of an OIG structured according to the ideal model, to disable the office in ways that 
undercut its effectiveness. Put another way, in some places the designers of these agencies seem 
to want to have it both ways: they want the symbolic legitimacy of adopting an office styled as 






This thesis rests on the premise that there is a common normative model of the office of 
inspector general that is remarkably specific regarding the ideal design of this office: its legal 
form, independence, activities, and authority. This chapter’s analysis is structured in relation to 
this “ideal model,” or archetype, as a baseline and describes how OIGs are consistent with or 
vary from the archetype. 
  This chapter focuses first on the characteristics of a shared concept of the “ideal” OIG.  
Second, I explore how state and local OIGs differ and the reasons for this variation.  I focus on 
the following four specific areas of variation:  
 The legal form of the OIG’s establishment 
 The duties that the OIG staff perform 
 The authority granted the OIG to perform its duties 
 The independence granted to the OIG 
The Common Model of an “Ideal,” or Archetypal, OIG.   
Since the federal Inspector General Act of 1978, a common model of the structure and 
powers of an office of inspector general has developed. This common model is codified in three 
sources: the federal Inspector General Act of 1978 (as amended), and two publications of the 
Association of Inspectors General: Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General 
(Association of Inspectors General [AIG], 2004), also known as the “Green Book,” and Model 
Legislation for the Establishment of Offices of Inspector General (2002).  The federal legislation 
is important to consider because it represents the modern civilian OIG, from whence the general 
idea of an OIG came.  It illustrates several innovations that have developed into the shared 
understanding of an OIG.  Building on the federal prototype, the Association’s publications 





accountability process. The Association of Inspectors General’s model expanded out of the 
federal model, strengthening the characteristics that exemplify what has become a shared 
understanding of an OIG.  These three sources of the elements of the archetype are reviewed 
briefly, followed by a more detailed description of the OIG archetype. 
The prototype of the OIG archetype: The federal Inspector General Act of 1978.  
The initial federal model was established with the passage of the IG Act of 1978.  By and large, 
this federal model has not been altered since its first enactment. To be sure, in 1998, a set of less 
independent federal OIGs were created for 34 small agencies headed by independent regulatory 
boards, and in 2008, oversight and coordination of all federal OIGs was formalized; however, the 
OIGs for the large cabinet agencies and agencies headed by presidentially-appointed secretaries 
have not changed in design.   
Before the passage of the IG Act of 1978, Congress made some forays into 
experimenting with civilian OIGs.  First, Congress created an “Inspector General and 
Comptroller” in 1959 to oversee the State Department, but its legislation was repealed ten years 
later.  This entity had a unique authority in that it could alter or discontinue programs it 
disapproved of, rather than simply make nonbinding recommendations; however, the Inspector 
General and Comptroller never exercised this authority (Light, 1993).   This authority was 
eschewed by Congress with the IG Act of 1978, and has not been endorsed by the Association of 
Inspectors General.   
Second, the Secretary of Agriculture created a non-statutory OIG in 1962 following the 
exposure of the infamous Billie Sol Estes scandal.  Estes was a Texas businessman who was 





clandestine lease-back arrangements, phony mortgages on nonexistent fertilizer storage 
tanks, illegal transfers of federal-compensation rights, kickbacks for bankers and bribes 
for Washington. The scams were so complex that prosecutors eventually had to break 
them down into 50 state and federal indictments.  (McFadden, 2013)   
An OIG was one of 12 reforms recommended for the Department of Agriculture by the House 
Intergovernmental Relationship subcommittee (Light, 1993) after an exhaustive investigation 
into Estes’ actions.  Fourteen years later, the Secretary did away with the OIG, highlighting the 
weakness of an oversight body established on a discretionary basis.   
Third, two statutory OIGs were created in 1976 and 1997, when Congress created OIGs 
for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Energy 
respectively.  Finally, the federal model of the office of inspector general was formalized with 
the passage of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which created OIGs for 12 large federal 
agencies. This act established the broad brush strokes of a federal OIG model that continues to 
exist today in 73 federal OIGs. The 1978 Act instituted several innovative characteristics that 
previously were not present in federal internal oversight.  This nascent OIG prototype is found in 
the federal Act, the characteristics of which have largely been incorporated in the Association of 
Inspectors General’s Green Book and model legislation.   
Codifying the OIG archetype: the Association of Inspectors General’s Green Book 
and model legislation.  The Association of Inspectors General is the author of the two 
documents that together make up today’s accepted understanding of an archetypal OIG.  This 
Association dates to 1996, when, according to its website,  
Approximately thirty inspectors general and professional staff met in Atlanta, Georgia.  





state, local, and international level [sic].  The need for an organization to provide 
leadership in the promotion of integrity efforts in government became evident.  
(Association of Inspectors General, n.d.) 
The Association’s mission is: 
To foster and promote public accountability and integrity in the general areas of 
prevention, examination, investigation, audit, detection, elimination and prosecution of 
fraud, waste and abuse, through policy research and analysis; standardization of practices, 
policies, conduct and ethics. (Association of Inspectors General, n.d.) 
To do so, the Association has drafted not only Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector 
General, also known as the “Green Book,” and model OIG legislation, but a constitution and 
bylaws, a policy manual, and a strategic plan.  It also provides annual training conferences, and 
has developed professional certifications for three types of OIG personnel: an IG, an auditor, and 
an investigator (Association of Inspectors General, n.d.b).   The Association has become a vital 
professional organization bringing together OIG staff from around the world to discuss how to 
perform OIG work.   
A review of the Association’s Green Book and model legislation shows that many key 
components of these documents grew out of the federal legislation; however, characteristics of 
the federal OIG model have been strengthened in several instances.  These key components have 
gained wide support among the professional networks around OIGs and are widely regarded as 
key elements of a structure best positioned to provide objective, reliable analyses.   
The office of inspector general archetype.  Four key elements have come to be 
accepted by OIG practitioners as keys to a strong OIG archetype.  These are: (1) the legal form 





authority granted the OIG to perform its duties; and (4) the independence granted to the OIG.  
Each of these elements is discussed separately below.   
The first key characteristic of this model is its establishment of OIGs by statute.  The 
legal form of the OIG is important as statutory creation ensures that the OIGs cannot be done 
away with easily by the entity that is overseen if this entity does not like the OIG’s oversight.   
As Light (1993) states in reference to the internal OIG created by the Secretary of Agriculture in 
1962: 
[T]he problem with having one boss and no statutory base is clear: What the secretary 
giveth, the secretary can take away.  Despite the [Department of Agriculture] IG’s 
enviable record and strong endorsement from GAO, Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, 
Earl Butz, abruptly—some say casually—eliminated the position in 1974, dividing it into 
the two offices from which it came, audit and investigation. (Light, 1993, pp.33-34) 
Of course, statutes can be repealed, but the hurdles to do this are great and hard to surmount.  It 
requires sufficient salience to land on the legislative agenda, a majority vote of two houses of 
Congress, and approval by the president. Thus, a statutory foundation provides more permanence 
and legitimacy than establishment merely at the fiat of an agency executive. 
 A statutory basis for authority has been endorsed by the Association of Inspectors 
General.  The Association’s Green Book states:  “An OIG should be formally created as a legal 
entity.  The [Association of Inspectors General] recommends that the OIG be established by 
statute or, if necessary, by executive order” (Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 3).  This 
legal form should also “establish the OIG’s mandate, authority, and powers; provide for 
confidentiality of records and proceedings; identify qualifications for the inspector general and 





of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 3).   In furtherance of these principles, the Association of 
Inspectors General drafted its model legislation. 
As one IG explained, the fact that his OIG was created in statute helps to give the OIG a 
basis of authority and legitimacy.  As a result, the agency management has to “figure out how to 
work with his office rather than try to get around it” (personal communication #24, July 26, 
2013).  He stated: 
We’re created by state statute.  So that is definitely stronger than being created by 
municipal ordinance or some internal board action that creates an IG office.  So to change 
anything, there needs to be legislation.  Not to say that couldn’t be done, but that gives us 
more power.  And our subpoena power comes from that statute as well.  So that gives us 
more stability that way.  That gives us a little independence, because at the whim of some 
board, they are not going to change some IG rules or [a] board created IG.  (personal 
communication #24, July 26, 2013) 
 The opposite is true for OIGs that are not created in statute.  A deputy IG explained her 
view about the precarious position of her office as follows: 
If we never get a legislative base for our existence and this [agency head] goes away, I’d 
be concerned about our… what kind of authority would you call that?  Political presence, 
or something.  Because all the long-standing division directors and everybody are here as 
they were before the [agency head arrived].  And she is our champion, and [the IG] is our 
champion, and without her I’m not certain that we wouldn’t lose a lot of force and energy 
and presence and ability.  There are persons and functions within a bureaucracy that raise 
issues and raise challenges, but the bureaucracy doesn’t necessarily respond particularly 





them [the agency head and the IG] with no coverage of authority and rule.  So I don’t 
think we should go bare [without statutory authority] ongoing. Doesn’t have to be next 
year, but the year after that for sure we should establish ourselves. (personal 
communication #10, July 3, 2013) 
In short, creation in statute provides a firm authority for an OIG to play an independent part in 
the accountability process by giving it a presence and a level of legitimacy that is recognized by 
those being overseen and those who may receive and review the OIG’s work product.   
The second characteristic of an archetypal OIG is that its duties encompass both auditing 
and investigations.  This characteristic was a federal innovation (Light, 1993).  Prior to the IG 
Act, investigations and audit were two disciplines that operated separately in federal agencies.  
Both functions were identified by Congress as being woefully inadequate after the Billie Sol 
Estes scandal came to light, particularly because the two units operated in silos and did not 
communicate (Light, 1993).  The Act merged investigation and audit units in order to address 
fraudulent behavior alongside inefficient practices.  An interviewee who worked in the federal 
OIG system before moving to a state OIG explained:   
When we started making IGs in the federal government, what happened with Billie Sol 
Estes was the underlay of a lot of the Inspector General Act, especially with Department 
of Agriculture.  In that case, the people who were doing the investigations didn’t talk to 
the people who were doing the audits at the Department of Agriculture. And for that 
reason, [Estes] would run circles around them both.  And so afterwards we said, we can’t 
have that happening.  (personal communication #29, October 10, 2013) 
Despite the arguably practical need to strengthen both units, enhanced accountability was a 





reactive, or post-factum, approach to oversight, and began to carry out audits with an eye towards 
improving performance, which is a proactive, or pre-factum, approach to oversight (Light, 1993; 
Dubnick & Frederickson, 2011b).  Since the decision to bring these two functions together, this 
combination has been widely viewed as essential to effective oversight.  In fact, Dubnick and 
Frederickson (2011b) assert that to “break or qualify the link between the two [post-factum and 
pre-factum dimensions of accountability] . . . is something that is accountability in name only” 
(p. 8).  The ideal of an OIG performing both auditing and investigations has been codified in the 
Association of Inspectors General’s Green Book and model legislation.   
The Association suggests that the archetypal  OIG “audit, inspect, evaluate, and 
investigate the activities, records and individuals affiliated with contracts and procurements 
undertaken by the government entity and any other official act or function of the government 
entity” (Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 4; Association of Inspectors General, 2002, 
§11).  Investigations here include “criminal, civil and administrative investigations.”  
(Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 4; Association of Inspectors General, 2002, §11). 
Audits encompass the “economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the agency’s operations and 
functions” (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, §11).  Although additional activities, such 
as training and issuing public reports, are detailed in the model legislation, the Association of 
Inspectors General emphasizes that OIGs pursue both audit and investigatory disciplines by 
providing the following comment:  “The intent of this section is to detail the authority that the 
[Association of Inspectors General] recommends be provided to every Inspector General 
function” (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, §11, emphasis added).  A benefit to having 





There’s a synergistic value to having auditors and investigators work together.  And 
that’s what the theory underlying the Office of the Inspector General is. I never wanted to 
see it be auditors and investigators – I wanted – I don’t want to call them “audigators” – 
but I want them to have both skills.  Because I think both of them use the same skill set, 
they just apply it a little differently.   . . . And auditors make good investigators once they 
get their dander up; I mean they’re really good. And investigators make good auditors 
once they understand what they’re doing.  (personal communication #29, October 10, 
2013) 
Although most OIGs do not cross-train their employees for carrying out both tasks, this 
interviewee saw advantages in having both disciplines present, not only to improve 
accountability and the OIG’s work product, but to manage an OIG’s resources efficiently.  He 
stated:  
A lot of auditors want to be auditors – that’s the truth.  And a lot of investigators don’t 
want to audit.  But I think you have to have [both].  We just are not big enough to have 
that degree of specialty. I think there’s a comfort level in doing what you know.  Well, 
there probably is, but at the same time, to be effective, you’ve got to make every resource 
you have count and you just can’t have one resource dedicated that can’t work in the 
other area.  (personal communication #29, October 10, 2013) 
Management concerns aside, an OIG with both investigators and auditors can not only identify 
wrongdoers and legal violations, but review systems for weaknesses to prevent the wrongdoing 
before it happens.  Combining both disciplines in one OIG allows the OIG to be more holistic in 





The third characteristic of an archetypal OIG is that it is granted several types of 
authority to perform its role.  These authorities are found in both the Association of Inspectors 
General’s Green Book and model legislation.  Each of these powers helps an OIG to collect 
information, follow the facts where they lead, and then report its findings and recommendations 
to others in the accountability process.   
The list includes: 
 The right to full and unrestricted access to agency records and the records of those 
involved with the agency under its jurisdiction (Association of Inspectors General, 
2002, §12; Association of Inspectors General, 2004).  The OIG keeps any 
confidential items as such to the extent to the law (Association of Inspectors General, 
2002, § 9) 
 Access to the head of any public entity when necessary for purposes related to the 
work of the OIG (Association of Inspectors General 2002, §12; Association of 
Inspectors General, 2004). 
 The authority to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths or affirmations, take testimony, 
and compel the production of such records as may be relevant (Association of 
Inspectors General, 2002, §12; Association of Inspectors General, 2004).  This 
authority extends to documents and individuals outside the authority of the public 
entity. 
 Law enforcement authority (Association of Inspectors General, 2004).  Law 
enforcement authority generally includes authorization to carry a firearm on duty; 





warrant when either witnessing a crime or having reasonable grounds to believe a 
felony has been committed (see, e.g., IG Act of 1978, as amended, §6). 
Also, the publications include a provision that requires all public employees to report fraud, 
waste, corruption, illegal acts, and abuse to the OIG (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, 
§12; Association of Inspectors General, 2004).  To encourage this reporting, the OIGs are 
authorized to keep complainants’ identity confidential unless disclosure of their identities is 
unavoidable in the course of an investigation (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, §9; IG 
Act of 1978, as amended, §7).   
 Most of these authorities are found in the federal IG Act of 1978, as amended, but several 
have been expanded in the subsequent publications so as to provide an OIG with the full 
authority it needs to obtain the information required to fully monitor an agency’s programs and 
operations.  For example, federal OIGs may use subpoena power to obtain documents relevant to 
their inquiries (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §6); however, they lack the authority to compel 
testimony.9  Additionally, the IG Act provides that OIG investigators may be granted law 
enforcement authority, but only upon application to the Attorney General for a grant of law 
enforcement powers.10   
                                                          
9 A bill to grant such authority was introduced as recently as 2010 (HR 5815, 111th Congress). 
10 A 1991 bill that would have provided all OIGs blanket law enforcement authority is discussed 
in Light (1993), pp. 189-194.  Currently only certain specified OIGs are exempt from needing to 






The fourth and most important characteristic of an archetypal OIG, which was an 
innovation of the IG Act of 1978, is independence for an OIG from the agency it oversees.  As 
Light (1993) states,  
At its most elemental level, the IG Act was an organizational device for unifying two 
simple functions, audit and investigation into one unit.  However, what made the IG Act 
much more significant was the decision to protect those new units from administration 
politics.  (Light, 1993, p. 23) 
Independence from the agency that the OIG oversees is crucial because it allows the OIG to be in 
the best position to provide the most objective, reliable information it can without external 
influence, which is the essence of the OIG role.  The Green book explains:  “The inspector 
general is responsible for establishing and maintaining independence so that OIG opinions, 
conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and viewed by others as 
impartial” (Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 8).   
 In order to do so, both internal and external “impairments,” the Green Book’s term for 
risks to the independence of an OIG, must be examined and addressed.  Internal impairments 
arise from an individual’s relationships, preconceived ideas, previous involvement or 
employment, and biases (Association of Inspectors General, 2004).  Such impairments could 
hinder the individual from fairly evaluating the evidence.  OIG staff are counseled to evaluate 
whether they have personal impairments that might create actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest, which might impact the outcome of a report’s conclusions, and disqualify themselves 
from the project.  If disqualification is not possible, the individual must disclose his or her 





External impairments are those things external to the office that “can restrict the efforts or 
interfere with the OIG’s ability to form independent and objective opinions and conclusions” 
(Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 9).  Specific examples of external restrictions 
include such things as “influences that jeopardize continued employment of the inspector general 
or individual OIG staff for reasons other than competency or the need for OIG services” 
(Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 9); “restrictions on funds or other resources 
dedicated to the OIG, such as timely, independent legal counsel, that could prevent the OIG from 
performing essential work” (Association of Inspectors General, 2004, p. 9); interference in the 
hiring or firing of OIG staff or the selection and scope of the OIG’s work; and interference with 
OIG access to documents or individuals necessary for OIG work (Association of Inspectors 
General, 2004).  
Personal impairments are largely a matter for OIG management, but external impairments 
can be prohibited by design.  The Association of Inspectors General’s model legislation provides 
guidance on how to protect an OIG’s independence from external impairments.  First, the model 
legislation includes a clear statement of intent:  “The intent of this legislation is to create a 
wholly independent office of Inspector General” (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 2, 
emphasis added).  This statement provides a signpost for not only the OIG and the jurisdiction 
that it oversees, but also to the public, who are ultimately the final stakeholders in government 
accountability. 
Second, certain hiring and firing protections are afforded the IG.  The model legislation 
provides for appointment by either the governor with advice and consent of the senate, the 
governor, the legislature, or a high ranking government official with a position equal to or higher 





2002, §4).  The IG holds a term of office of five years, after which he or she may be reappointed 
(Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 5).  Finally, the IG may be only removed for cause 
(Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 6).  The model legislation addresses personal 
impairments for the IG as well.  It provides that the IG is selected based on professional 
qualifications and without regard to political affiliations;  and the IG may not have previously 
served as a manager within the agency for at least five years before appointment (Association of 
Inspectors General, 2002, § 4).11 
Third, the model legislation addresses budgetary independence.  It states:  “The Office of 
Inspector General will be funded from the General Fund of the Agency and will receive no less 
than (X percent) of the General Funds annual appropriation each year” (Association of 
Inspectors General, 2002, §7).  This method of funding aims to ensure that the OIG will receive a 
guaranteed level of funding each year, which will be directly proportional to the funds allocated 
                                                          
11 In the federal system, hiring and firing protections are currently limited to three.  First, IGs are 
to be selected on the basis of professional qualifications (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §3).  
Second, IGs of large agencies are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate (IG 
Act of 1978, as amended, §3); however, IGs of smaller regulatory boards are appointed by the 
boards (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §8G).  If removed from the position, the president is 






for the agency within the OIG’s jurisdiction.12  This funding scheme also removes the OIG 
budget from the annual political budgetary process. 
Fourth, an OIG’s independence is buttressed by giving the IG full authority to manage 
the OIG without interference.  The model legislation, much like the federal statute, states:   
The Inspector General shall establish the organization structure appropriate to carrying 
out the responsibilities and functions of the office.  The Inspector General shall have the 
power to appoint, employ, promote, and remove such assistants, employees, and 
personnel as deemed necessary for the efficient and effective administration of the office.  
(Association of Inspectors General, 2002, §7) 
Further, “[The OIG] is operationally independent from the appointment authority, the legislative 
branch, and the agency.  The appointing authority, legislative body, or agency head shall not 
                                                          
12 The budgets for federal OIGs are proposed by the IGs and aggregated by the president or 
agency head. Those OIGs whose IGs are appointed by the president have access to Congress to 
discuss their budgets and request increases.  This independent relationship assures that the 
agency cannot unilaterally retaliate against the OIG by cutting its budget if there is an audit or 
investigation that it does not like (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §6; Project on Government 
Oversight, 2008).  Those OIGs with IGs appointed by the agency head, usually a regulatory 
board, do not have the opportunity to discuss their budget with Congress.  They are dependent on 
their agencies to make their budget requests.  Thus, “their budgets are dependent on the good 
will of their agency heads” to get their full requests (Project on Government Oversight, 2008, 





prevent, impair, or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any 
audit, investigation or review” (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, §8). 
 Finally, to ensure that the OIG’s work product has an independent audience, which is 
necessary for a government actor to be ultimately held to account for their actions, the model 
legislation states:   
The Inspector General will report the findings of the Office’s work to the head of the 
investigated/audited agency, to the appropriate elected and appointed leadership and to 
the public.  The Inspector General shall also report criminal investigative matters to the 
appropriate law enforcement agencies.” (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 10) 
Further, if any serious or flagrant issues are uncovered, the IG reports this immediately to the 
agency head, who is required in turn to report the issue to appropriate representatives of the 
executive and legislative branches, with any comments that the agency head wants to add  
(Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 10).  Finally, the IG issues an annual report that 
describes its activities over the previous year to the agency head and any interested oversight 
bodies (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 10). 13  Regarding this annual report the 
model legislation states: “Upon issuance, members of the media and the public shall be promptly 
advised of the issuance of the report.  Such reports will be provided to their representatives upon 
request” (Association of Inspectors General, 2002, § 4).   
 Following the Model—and Deviating from It     
                                                          
13 Federal OIGs are required to provide their prescribed semiannual reports.  Any egregious and 
flagrant problems or abuses uncovered by the OIG are required to be reported to both Congress 
and agency head (IG Act of 1978, as amended, §5).  Thus, an OIG has a secondary audience for 






Some designers of state and local OIGs closely follow the recommended archetype. This 
illustrates its influence. Many other designers, however, deviate from the recommended model in 
significant ways.  Ironically, this, too, illustrates the model’s influence, as often designers who 
choose to deviate clearly do so in order to undercut the OIG’s position in the accountability 
process in specific, well-planned ways.  The deliberate deviation occurs in states that have both 
high and low levels of corruption and states that have both Democratic and Republican control of 
state government.  Two examples illustrate the breadth of variation found across state and local 
OIGs: the Massachusetts OIG, in a state that tends to have more Democratic control of state 
government and that falls in the middle range of average federal public corruption convictions, 
and the Minnesota Department of Human Services OIG, in a state with governance more 
balanced between parties as measured by the Ranney index and with very few corruption 
convictions.     
The Massachusetts OIG is an example of an office that does not deviate much from the 
archetypal model, even though it predates the codification of the model by the Association of 
Inspectors General.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the Massachusetts OIG was designed by 
the Ward Commission, a special commission that was tasked to examine corruption in 
contracting for public building construction in the State of Massachusetts. It recommended the 
creation of an OIG as part of a larger set of reforms to address the problems it found, and it 
modeled its legislation after the federal OIGs, having taken testimony from a federal IG 
(Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  The Massachusetts OIG embodies the archetype 





First, the Massachusetts OIG was created by statute, and thus, has a strong legal base of 
authority. This statute was adopted in 1980 by the Massachusetts General Court, the term for the 
Commonwealth’s legislature (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980).   
Second, like the archetype, the Massachusetts OIG performs both audits and 
investigations into fraud, waste, abuse, effectiveness and efficiency (Massachusetts Office of the 
Inspector General Act of 1980, §8).   It can also make recommendations to agencies that arise 
from its oversight work and weigh in on proposed legislation in relationship to public integrity 
issues (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, §8).   In addition to these 
primary oversight activities focused on detecting fraud, the Massachusetts OIG had developed an 
extensive training program based on its mandate to prevent fraud (Massachusetts Office of the 
Inspector General Act of 1980, §7).  The OIG administers the Massachusetts Certified Public 
Purchasing Official (MCPPO) program, which trains public administrators across the state about 
cost effective, ethical purchasing practices (Massachusetts OIG, 2014).  In connection with 
MCPPO training, the OIG has created six different certifications, which people can receive 
through initial training and maintain through continuing education (Massachusetts OIG, 2014).  
The OIG provides specific assistance on local procurement of supplies, services, equipment and 
real property, as well as dispositions of the same, which support includes maintaining a hotline 
for questions from local governmental bodies (Massachusetts OIG, 2014).  Last but not least, it 
performs statutorily required monitoring of special initiatives, such as Medicaid and large 
construction projects, e.g., the Big Dig (see, e.g., Annotated Laws of Massachusetts GL ch. 6A, 
§16V (2013)) 
Similar to the archetypal OIG, this OIG has several statutory provisions that provide it 





the OIG’s jurisdiction are required to cooperate with the office and make all necessary 
employees and documents available to OIG staff (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General 
Act of 1980, §9).  Further, the OIG is granted access to all documents maintained by public 
contractors and public grantees (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, §9).  
Access is granted even if documents are confidential, and further, OIG documents are 
confidential unless required to be made public in the course of performing the statutory duties.  
(Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, §13).  Also, the IG has subpoena 
power, called summons power in Massachusetts, for documents (Massachusetts Office of the 
Inspector General Act of 1980, §9).  The OIG also may summon individuals for sworn 
testimony, but to do so, it must comply with a much more cumbersome process than is required 
for documents.  Here, the OIG is required to petition for permission from the IG Council, a 
statutory body made up of the four constitutional officers of the state and five appointees, and it 
must receive approval from three fourths of the Council (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector 
General Act of 1980, §15).  The only area where the Massachusetts OIG varies significantly 
from the archetypal OIG in terms of authority is that it lacks law enforcement authority; 
however, it does have authority to institute a civil action to recover funds from a bad actor, with 
permission from the attorney general, or refer such cases to the attorney general (Massachusetts 
Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, §11). 
As for independence, this is where the OIG is closest to the archetypal model.  Although 
the statutes that create the OIG do not specifically refer to it as an independent unit, several other 
protections to the office’s independence from the agencies it oversees are in place.  The 
appointment of the IG is to be made only on demonstrated professional experience and without 





the State Auditor (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, §2).   The IG 
holds office for a term of five years for a maximum of two terms, and can only be removed for a 
finding of neglect of duty, gross misconduct, or a conviction of crime upon a majority vote of the 
appointees (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General Act of 1980, §2).  Reasons for the 
removal must be made public in writing and provided to the legislature (Massachusetts Office of 
the Inspector General Act of 1980, §2).  Regarding its budget, the Massachusetts OIG derives its 
budget directly from the legislature, but unlike the archetypal OIG, it is not a set percentage of 
the commonwealth’s general fund budget.  The OIG submits a budget for approval like any other 
state agency, with some supervision from the IG Council (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector 
General Act of 1980, §4).  Nevertheless, by statute, the IG has sole authority to hire, set salaries, 
and fire OIG staff, and promulgate personnel regulations for the office, and further, no OIG 
employees shall hold or be a candidate for an elective public office during the term or 
employment or for three years after employment (Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General 
Act of 1980, §4).  Finally, annual and interim reports go to the legislature, the governor, and all 
agencies that were reviewed in the past year, as well as to the public (Massachusetts Office of the 
Inspector General Act of 1980, §12).   
 By contrast, the OIG for the Minnesota Department of Human Services is designed rather 
differently from the archetype in multiple ways.  It was created in 2011 through the agency 





Department of Human Services, 2011).14  The duties this OIG performs are limited to 
investigations only, and do not extend to conducting audits.  Additionally, its investigative duties 
do not extend to the agency’s employees, but rather, its jurisdiction is external, over contractors, 
licensees and beneficiaries of the Department.  A separate preexisting unit, a compliance office, 
oversees internal activities.  The OIG has no formal subpoena power or requirements for 
cooperation.   
Finally, the Minnesota OIG has no independence in the sense recommended by the 
Association of Inspectors General in its Green Book and model legislation.  There are no hiring 
or firing protections for the IG, and the agency head sets the budget, so there is no budgetary 
independence.  Most important is the fact that this OIG is in charge of all licensing duties for the 
agency, which provides an external impairment to the OIG’s independence.  Licensing is clearly 
a regulatory function, not an oversight function.  With the assignment of these duties, the OIG 
immediately lacks independence to monitor one of the primary duties of the Department.  In 
other words, the OIG cannot without bias oversee the licensing program as it runs the program 
itself.   
In sum, the Minnesota OIG is nearly as different from the archetypal OIG as possible: it 
has no statutory basis, no budgetary independence, no job security for the inspector general at its 
helm, only investigatory duties (and not audit duties), few investigatory powers, no protections 
from retaliation, and its independence is compromised by being weighed down with regulatory 
                                                          
14In 2013, the OIG did succeed in receiving a statutory reference to the OIG, which provides it a 
specific role in the Minnesota Child Care Provider and Recipient Fraud Investigations Act 






duties in addition to oversight duties.  This is not to say that within these confines, the OIG is not 
improving accountability and performance.  In fact, it has identified weaknesses in home child 
care and methadone programs and suggested legislation to fix these problems, both of which 
were passed by the Minnesota legislature (Minnesota Department of Human Services Office of 
Inspector General, 2013).   
The examples from Massachusetts and Minnesota provide stark contrasts in the design of 
state-level OIGs.  Which is more typical: Massachusetts or Minnesota? How much do other 
states adhere to the archetypal model, how much do they depart from it, and why?  Data from my 
survey help to answer this question. 
  Beginning with legal form, of the 159 OIGs surveyed, 68% were established formally 
through statute or ordinance, whereas the remaining 32% were established by a discretionary act. 
Put another way, while two-thirds of these OIGs are designed in keeping with the statutory 
element of the archetype, a full one-third of state and local OIGs lack a basis for legal existence 
and can be eliminated at any time at the discretion of a policy leader.  These patterns vary 
between state-level OIGs and local or multi-jurisdictional OIGs.  While three-fourths of state 
level OIGs have been created in statute, only a little more than half (52%) of local and multi-
jurisdictional OIGs were established by statute. 
The nature of the discretionary act that creates an OIG varies as well, as is illustrated in 
Tables 3.1-3.3 below.  These tables provide survey respondents’ answers to a question about 
their OIG’s discretionary legal form.  The first table includes the responses from all OIG 
respondents (Table 3.1); the second (Table 3.2) and third tables (Table 3.3) break out the data 
according to whether the respondents are on the state level or from the local and multi-






Survey question: Which of the following best describes the discretionary legal form of the 
establishment of your OIG?   
 
Answer from All Respondent OIGs  
 
Response % 





The OIG was established by the executive leader by 




The OIG was established under the executive leader’s 




Other   
 
4 15% 
Total  26 100% 
 
 
Answers from State OIGs  
 
Response % 





The OIG was established by written executive order   
 
6 32% 
The OIG was established under the executive leader’s 




Other   
 
1 5% 
Total  19 100% 
 
 
Answers from Local/Multi-Jurisdictional OIGs  
 
Response % 





The OIG was established by written executive order   
 
2 33% 
The OIG was established under the executive leader’s 




Other   
 
2 33% 
Total  6 100% 
 
 
Although the number of cases is small for this survey question, these data show that the 
most common discretionary action creating a state level OIG is from the agency head.  This 





as is it well within an agency head’s discretion to reorganize his or her staff.  The second most 
common legal form for state OIGs is an executive order by a governor or mayor, which provides 
more protection to an OIG than action by an agency head.  Although a governor or mayor’s 
authority to issue an executive order comes out of the same discretionary authority an agency 
head has to reorganize an agency, the reversal of an executive order requires a public 
announcement.  The political ramifications of doing away with an OIG created by executive 
order in the eyes of the public would discourage a reversal.  Respondents from local and multi-
jurisdictional OIGs indicated that executive orders were the most common form of discretionary 
establishment. 
 How often are state and local OIGs designed to perform both audits and investigations, as 
advised by the archetype?  As shown in Table 3.4, 67% follow the archetype model of 
performing both audits and investigations, while 30% performed only investigations.  The 
minority of OIGs, 3%, perform only audits.  Local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs tend to conform 
to the archetype and perform both investigations and audits more often than state OIGs, although 
the difference is not great. 
 
TABLE 3.4 
Activities pursued by OIGs 
 Both Investigations Audits Total 
All OIGs 107 (67%) 47 (30%) 5 (3%) 159 
State OIGs 71 (65%) 35 (32%) 3 (3%) 109 
Local/Multi-
Jurisdictional OIGs 
36 (72%) 12 (24%) 2 (4%)  50 
 
Additionally, twelve respondents reported that their OIGs perform activities other than audits, 





OIGs.  Like the Minnesota OIG, these twelve are potentially weighed down with duties that may 
hamper their role of collecting unbiased information for the accountability process.  In Table 3.5 
below, these additional duties are listed and categorized as consistent with oversight or 
inconsistent with oversight.  The table does not indicate this fact; however, the local OIGs’ extra 
activities were all consistent with archetypal OIG oversight, while some state OIGs reported 
performing activities that appear to be inconsistent with the archetype.  Without more detail 
about these activities than was provided in the survey, I cannot be sure whether the duties 
constitute an external impairment to independence, i.e., the OIG’s participation results in the 
OIG’s inability to provide an impartial assessment. Nevertheless, certain duties, because of their 




Survey question:  You indicated that your OIG performs activities other than 
investigations, audits and evaluations.   
 
Total responses: 12 
 
Other duties that appear consistent with oversight 
*Complaint intake and reporting (2 respondents) 
*Coordination of external audits, investigations, and reviews (2 respondents) 
*Ethics guidance, formal and informal (4 respondents) 
*Inspections (2 respondents)  
*Policy and procedure recommendations and other technical assistance to management (3 
respondents) 
*Referrals to law enforcement (1 respondent) 
*Reviews of trust account activities (1 respondent) 
*Training on corruption, error reduction, and ethics (3 respondents) 
 
Other duties that appear inconsistent with oversight 
*Administrative sanctions, suspensions, and terminations, and/or appeals (2 respondents) 





*Licensing (1 respondent) 
*Special projects (1 respondent) 




How much does the design of state and local OIGs follow the archetype regarding 
specific authority to carry out the OIG mission? 72% of the responding OIGs report that they 
have subpoena power or other authority to compel cooperation.  Although the extent of this 
authority is not specified, i.e., who is required to cooperate with the OIG and whether the OIG 
has authority to compel both record and testimony, these OIGs generally seem to have formal 
authority to gather the information they need to perform their oversight duties.  Nonetheless, 
nearly 28% of OIGs lack any authority to compel disclosure of information.  On this matter, 
state- and local or multi-jurisdictional OIGs do not seem to differ significantly, although fewer 
local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs have this authority.  Specifically, 76% of state level OIGs 
and 62% local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs have some authority to compel cooperation with 
their work. 
Finally, there is large variation in OIGs’ levels of independence.  For example, one key 
way that an OIG’s independence is protected is through a grant of autonomy to the OIG to 
determine which issues to audit or investigate.  Without this grant of autonomy, the OIG’s work 
can be directed by those who have a political stake in the outcome of the OIG’s work product.  
Most survey respondents noted that they have full authority to audit or investigate without 
interference from the agency or agencies they oversee; however, 14% (of an n of 51) lack that 
independence, as is shown in Table 3.6, which follows.  Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the breakdown 
of responses from state OIGs vs. the local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs.  A higher percentage of 











Answer from  State OIGs only  
 
Response % 
Full authority, without any 
interference from the 





Less than full authority, subject to 
direction from the 





Total  37 100% 
 





Full authority, without any 
interference from the 





Less than full authority, subject to 
direction from the 





Total  15 100% 
 
Answers from all OIGs   
 
Response % 
Full authority, without any 
interference from the 





Less than full authority, subject to 
direction from the agency/agencies 









OIGs also vary in the extent to which they have budgetary independence from the agency 
that is overseen.  The manner in which the OIG is protected from budgetary retaliation in 
response to an audit or investigation may be a flat percentage of the general fund of the agency 
that is over seen, as is proposed in the Association of Inspectors General’s model legislation, or 
simply a method by which the agency that is overseen is not setting the budget for the OIG.  
Frequently, this protection is provided when an OIG’s budget is appropriated directly from the 
legislative body.  Less than half--44%, to be precise--of OIGs of 149 survey respondents 
reported they have budgetary independence from the entities they oversee.  Budgetary 
independence is much greater in local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs than state OIGs: 62% of 
local and multi-jurisdictional respondents report some type of budgetary independence, while 
only 35% of state-level OIGs report the same.   
A third type of independence relates to the appointment of the IG.  The archetype 
recommends an appointment process that is not under the discretionary control of the agency 
being overseen.  In some locations, this hiring independence is maintained with an IG’s 
appointment by an entity external to the agency to be overseen.  Other jurisdictions have a statute 
that requires the IG be hired on the basis of his or her professional qualifications, and others 
require external confirmation of the appointment by an entity such as a senate.  Regarding this 
type of independence, just over half of the OIGs have hiring protections.  Out of 155 
respondents, 53% reported some type of hiring protection, such as those mentioned above, while 
the remaining 47% lacked any such protections.  In this aspect, local and multijurisdictional 
OIGs (74%) have more independence than state level OIGs (43%).   
To understand the adherence to and deviation from the archetype across the universe of 





independence: statutory creation, budgetary independence, and hiring protections for the IG.  
This independence index ranges from zero to three.  If an OIG reported having all three 
protections, they rank a 3, but if it has none of these protections, it ranks a 0.  Table 3.9 below 
shows that nearly the majority of state-level OIGs, almost 50%, have only one of these 
protections available.  Only a little more than 25% have all three indicators of independence.  
Although there are fewer local OIGs, the data show that they are generally more independent, 
with nearly 50% having all three indicators of independence.  The local OIG independence is not 
surprising as the government structure is less complex.  Many of the local IGs are appointed by a 
city or county council and get their budget from that source rather than from the mayor or the 
city manager, which provides them with two points on this index. 
 
TABLE 3.9 
   Independence Index 
(0 is low, 3 is high) State Local Total 
0 11 (11%) 11 (25%) 22 (15%) 
1 47 (46%) 5 (11%) 52 (36%) 
2 16 (16%) 7 (16%) 23 (16%)  
3 27 (27%) 21 (48%) 48 (33%)  
Total # of OIGs  101  44  145 
 
 
The data in Table 3.9 reveal considerable deviation from the archetypal model of OIG 
independence. Local OIGs generally appear to be more similar to the archetype than state level 
OIGs. Many state-level OIGs have only one or none of the three attributes of independence 
favored by the archetype. Although there are other ways to support an OIG’s independence and 
its ability to produce unbiased, reliable information than just these three methods of statutory 





conditions for effective OIG independence.  In sum, design variations often potentially undercut 
an OIG’s ability to do its job. 
What is the source of these variations?  As noted in the introductory chapter, studies on 
the diffusion of innovation identify several sources of variation in policy design. Perhaps the 
most important of these, as noted, is reinvention or customization (Karch, 2007) that results from 
policy-makers’ adjustments of common models to local conditions.  This explanation seems to 
describe some of the variations in OIG design.  Nonetheless, much of the variation in OIG design 
seems to result from another consideration: policymakers’ deliberate effort to undermine the 
effectiveness of OIGs.     
The Minnesota case, although a dramatic deviation from the archetype, ironically 
illustrates the first pattern: adaptation of the common model to fit local conditions.  This benign 
customization occurs in a state that has experienced low numbers of corruption convictions over 
time and fairly even competition between the two major political parties.  The state’s single OIG, 
which is described at the beginning of this chapter, is found in the Department of Human 
Services.  Before its adoption, governor-elect Mark Dayton had run on a campaign pledge to 
increase government transparency and performance.  The Governor appointed Lucinda Jesson as 
Commissioner of the Department of Human Services and, following the Governor’s lead, she 
announced a plan to increase accountability, fraud prevention, and recovery through the creation 
of an OIG (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011).   The public announcement of the 
OIG noted that the Commissioner had been influenced by the federal OIGs and other state OIGs 
in the area of human services (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011).  
Although Commissioner Jesson was firmly committed to having an effective OIG, her 





authority and independence, focused only on investigations and not audits, and mixing regulation 
(licensing) with oversight—reflected pragmatic adaptations to existing Minnesota governing 
structures and policies (Featherly, 2011).  The decision to establish the office by means of her 
discretion rather than pursing an executive order or statute resulted from an interest to move 
quickly after her appointment to consolidate the agency’s existing fraud investigators who were 
located in individual program units across the agency (Featherly, 2011).  The decision to include 
the regulatory licensing unit in the new OIG was a result of her learning that the head of 
licensing was concerned about the limitations of using licensing sanctions to address fraud 
(confidential personal communication 2013).  He had concerns, for instance, that if a licensee 
was found in violation of licensing requirements, the licensing unit could only take 
administrative action against the license.  Meanwhile, the licensee could continue receiving 
payments from the state for substandard service.  As his ideas to address these issues were in line 
with the Commissioner’s concerns about program integrity, she asked him to become the first IG 
and brought the agency’s licensing staff into the OIG (Featherly, 2011).   
The decision to craft the OIG’s jurisdiction to include monitoring of contractors, 
licensees, and beneficiaries but not Department employees, was an effort to avoid turf battles 
(confidential personal communication, 2013).  At the time the OIG was created, the Department 
already had an internal compliance unit, tasked with compliance activities of employees 
throughout the agency, and an internal audit office, which examined and evaluated the 
Department’s fiscal and program management (Minnesota Department of Human Services, n.d.).  
Thus the OIG was crafted to provide a different focus than already existed.  The unique 
combination of the Commission’s vision, the licensing director’s interest, and the existing 





Despite its deviation from the OIG archetype, it has been well received in the state and within the 
Department (Confidential personal communication, 2013).   Further, the OIG has spearheaded 
multiple legislative amendments to improve the Department’s oversight over external 
stakeholders (Minnesota Department of Human Services Office of Inspector General, 2013). 
Another example of localized needs shaping the design of an OIG is found in the OIG for 
the Illinois Department of Human Services.  This OIG, which is one of many in the state of 
Illinois, has many characteristics of the archetypal OIG.  It is created in statute; has subpoena 
powers for documents and testimony; has access to any facility, agency or employee within its 
jurisdiction; has an IG appointed by the Governor for a term of four years; and a line item 
appropriation from the Illinois General Assembly (Illinois Department of Human Services Act. 
2013).  Still, this Illinois OIG differs from the archetype in one key way: it has a very narrow 
statutory mission, to investigate allegations of abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of adult 
individuals receiving services in state facilities or agencies licensed by the Department (Illinois 
Department of Human Services Act, 2013).  It also investigates any deaths of individuals in these 
facilities (Illinois Department of Human Services Act, 2013).  The statute that creates the OIG 
specifically states the OIG has no oversight over the routine programmatic, licensing, and 
certification operations of the Department (Illinois Department of Human Services Act, 2013).   
This unique jurisdiction was created to address a very particular concern of the Illinois 
General Assembly, that older citizens were being exploited and the Department was not 
effectively addressing the issue with its internal investigations unit (Illinois Department of 
Human Services Office of the Inspector General, n.d.b).  A task force report prepared for the 
Department exposed poor conditions in the state’s 21 institutions including “patients . . . starved, 





wounds” (Briggs, 1986).  The Department’s Director responded to the report by creating an 
internal OIG (Lawrence, 1987).  Advocacy groups complained about this action stating:  
“Instead of addressing the underlying problem of abuse, all they are doing is reorganizing within 
the department” (Gerber, 1987), and “Throwing more millions of dollars at the large institutions 
or tightening up on procedures is not the answer” (Gerber, 1987).  These groups lobbied for an 
independent OIG, whose work would be open for public review (Illinois Department of Human 
Services Office of the Inspector General, n.d.).  As a result, the General Assembly created the 
OIG in 1987 to investigate suspected abuse or neglect (Illinois Department of Human Services 
Office of the Inspector General, n.d.).  In sum, this OIG’s narrow jurisdiction seems to be 
directly the result of the specific problem to which it was addressed.   
In contrast to these examples, other instances of deviation from the archetype OIG seem 
based on a desire to undermine its effectiveness.  In these cases, concerns about the potential 
power of an archetypal OIG result in design characteristics that lessen the ability of the OIG to 
do its job. In the following pages I will summarize a number of examples of deliberate efforts to 
limit the independence or authority of OIGs at the design stage. In doing so, I will consider 
whether these efforts are more likely in states (or cities) with high levels or traditions of 
corruption (where we might expect powerful actors to fight to limit the power of an OIG). I will 
also consider whether these efforts are more likely in states (or cities) strongly controlled by one 
or the other political party (where powerful actors may want to limit the authority of an agency 
like an OIG that has an independent base of power).   Ultimately, the evidence does not support 
either of these hypotheses. These design choices aimed at undercutting the independence or 
authority of OIGs are made in states with high and low levels of corruption (as measured by 





divided party control. Instead, efforts to weaken an OIG at the design stage seem somewhat 
idiosyncratic, based on somewhat unpredictable political dynamics in each setting. 
Simple evidence of the foregoing point is the absence of any clear correlation at the state 
level between my index of OIG independence and my measures of corruption and party control. 
(For states with more than one OIG, I summed the index scores for all OIGs and divided by the 
number of OIGs to produce a state average OIG independence score.)  The n of states with state-
level OIGs is 30. The Pearson correlation coefficient between this state-level OIG independence 
score and level of corruption (measured by federal conviction rate) is .26, and is far from 
statistically significant. The correlations coefficient between OIG independence and the Ranney 
party dominance measure is -.15, again far from statistically significant. (Nor is there a 
significant correlation with the “folded” Ranney index [calculated as 1-|(.5-Ranney)|), which 
measures the level of single-party dominance of state government, whether it be by Democrats or 
Republicans (Bibby & Holbrook, 2004); the Pearson correlation with this variable is -.01.) 
One example of an effort to weaken an OIG’s design is from Massachusetts. This OIG, as 
described above, follows the archetypal model closely except in certain key respects. I will now 
describe the source and context for these key deviations. It is important to note that 
Massachusetts has been historically dominated by the Democratic Party and has had moderate 
levels of public corruption—neither very high, like Louisiana, nor very low like Minnesota—as 
measured by the rate of federal convictions for public corruption. As was described in the 
previous chapter, the OIG was adopted by the state legislature, the General Court, in the wake of 
a major public construction scandal (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).   The Ward 
Commission, which was established to investigate the problem, exposed a statewide culture of 





Commission, 1980).  The OIG was one of several reform methods suggested by the Commission 
(Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).   
The Ward Commission completed its final report following the passage of the OIG 
legislation, and it sharply criticized the General Court’s design decisions regarding the OIG 
(Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980). These criticisms document how legislators’ fears of 
OIG power motivated it to weaken the design in key ways. To be sure, the Massachusetts OIG 
was established by statute, had several appropriate powers to do its job, and had many 
protections to its independence, all key elements of the archetypal OIG. Nonetheless, the Ward 
Commission was quite frustrated that the General Court had exempted itself and its documents 
from the subpoena powers of the OIG as it had recommended (Massachusetts Special 
Commission, 1980).  Indeed, the legislature and its campaign fundraising practices were 
implicated in the corrupt practices that the Ward Commission documented (Massachusetts 
Special Commission, 1980).  The Commission noted that the amendments to exempt the 
legislature were written into the bill in a Senate back office between the second and third 
readings of the bill in the second house (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  The 
provisions never had a public hearing, and despite the best efforts of the Commission and its 
staff, no one seemed to be able to explain how these amendments came about (Massachusetts 
Special Commission, 1980).   
It is important to acknowledge that the Ward Commission’s proposal to grant the OIG 
power to investigate not only state agencies but also the Massachusetts legislature itself was in 
some respects radical. By granting an executive agency investigative authority over the 
legislature it would have introduced novel checks in the traditional concept of the separation of 





equally important to note that the Ward Commission thought this innovation necessary to 
address a major corruption scandal in Massachusetts. Whichever view one takes, it is clear that 
the Massachusetts legislature’s decision to strike this key element from the legislation undercut 
the OIG’s effectiveness, at least in the view of the Ward Commission. 
The Ward Commission also criticized the legislature’s decision to statutorily prevent the 
OIG from making referrals to federal prosecutors upon finding evidence of the violation of a 
federal crime (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980). Under these provisions, if the OIG 
collected relevant information regarding a violation of federal law, it would be unable to provide 
it to the precise entity that could hold individuals accountable for their actions.  Ultimately, this 
issue was addressed by the legislature the year following the issuance of the Ward Commission’s 
final report (Massachusetts Office of Inspector General Act, 2013, §10), but the exemption of the 
General Court has never been changed (Massachusetts Office of Inspector General Act, 2013, 
§9). 
A similar story of a legislative body exempting itself from oversight by an OIG that 
otherwise had jurisdiction-wide authority can be found in Chicago where battles erupted over the 
creation of a city-wide OIG. Like Massachusetts, Chicago is dominated by the Democratic Party, 
but it has a considerably deeper tradition of corruption than Massachusetts.  Mayor Richard M. 
Daley proposed the creation of the city’s OIG to replace the existing Office of Municipal 
Investigations, a unit that lacked an independent director, subpoena power (Merriner & 
Rotenberk, 1989) and authority to investigate contractors and city council members (“Chicago is 
Ready for Reform,” 1989).  When the city council considered the proposal, it agreed to all of 





Inspector General’s Bite,” 1989; Kaplan, 1989).  Aldermen stated that they were concerned the 
office’s power could be abused for political purposes (Kaplan, 1989).   
In Chicago, however, unlike Massachusetts, this objection by the council was met with a 
public outcry that demanded more independent oversight over the aldermen and their staff.  At 
that point, the council begrudgingly created what is known as the Office of the Legislative 
Inspector General (Bogert, 2010; Chicago, Illinois, Legislative Inspector General city ordinance, 
2013).  This new office, which clearly has a mission of oversight, is required to follow very 
restrictive investigatory procedures, which were carefully designed by the city council (Bogert, 
2010; “Thanks, Alderman,” 2010; Chicago, Illinois, Legislative Inspector General city 
ordinance, 2013).   Thus, although this OIG has several characteristics that would be considered 
as consistent with the archetypal  model, such as the hiring and firing protections recommended 
in the Association of Inspectors General’s model legislation (Chicago, Illinois, Legislative 
Inspector General city ordinance, 2013), the IG may not investigate unless upon a sworn 
complaint (Chicago, Illinois, Legislative Inspector General city ordinance, 2013).  The problem 
with this requirement is that many potential complainants may not be willing to come forward if 
they cannot make an anonymous complaint against powerful aldermen.  Additionally, the OIG 
must get approval from the Board of Ethics (BOE) to pursue a full-blown investigation, who 
must find reasonable cause in the complaint), and criminal investigations are prohibited 
(Chicago, Illinois, Legislative Inspector General city ordinance, 2013).  The Chicago Legislative 
OIG provides a good example of an OIG that was designed very narrowly by those subject to its 
oversight with the goal of reducing its ability to pursue its mission.   
 Florida provides a third example of an OIG designed to weaken its ability to do its job. 





Massachusetts, it occurred in a state characterized by stiff party competition for control of the 
reigns of state government.  The state of Florida has an extensive system of state OIGs that dates 
to 1994 (Florida Inspector General Act of 1994, 2013).  That year, the Florida legislature adopted 
a law that places an OIG in every state agency (Florida Inspector General Act of 1994, 2013).  
This law was passed on the urging of then-governor Lawton Chiles, a former US senator who 
was familiar with the federal OIG system and wanted to implement it in Florida (Clift, 2014).  
Yet the Florida OIGs were designed to have considerably less independence than the federal 
OIGs. Specifically, Florida OIGs lack the budgetary independence and appointment protections 
that the federal OIGs have, and their reports do not go to anyone besides the agency head.  When 
I asked an IG who was present in the legislature’s chamber when it passed the Florida IG Act 
why these changes occurred, the IG stated: “It just didn’t work out.  It wasn’t something they 
could get sponsored, you know?  They [the legislature] already had something [the Office of the 
Auditor General]—someone they thought was looking after them” (confidential personal 
communication, 2013).  The political actors were concerned about the policy implications of this 
new office and reduced its power in the design phase.    
 A post script to the story of the design of the Florida OIG Act illustrates the significance 
of these earlier efforts to debilitate Florida OIGs: there have been ongoing efforts to overcome 
these limitations.  This year, the legislature passed legislation that increased the independence of 
the OIGs (Florida House of Representatives, 2014).  This legislation was sponsored by two 
legislators who had accounting backgrounds and deliberately wished to strengthen the OIGs’ 
independence (confidential personal communication, 2013).  The new law instituted several 
changes to bring the Florida IGs into closer congruence with the archetypal OIG.   IGs are now 





they oversee, and the IG may be removed only for cause by the Chief IG with prior notification 
to the governor (Florida House of Representatives, 2014).  IGs have the independent authority to 
hire and remove staff within the OIGs, after consulting with the governor’s chief inspector 
general, and are no longer subject to agency control in this crucial personnel matter (Florida 
House of Representatives, 2014).  Finally, IGs report to the Chief IG, rather than the agency 
head, and final audit reports are provided to the agency head, the Auditor General, and the Chief 
IG (Florida House of Representatives, 2014). The bill was signed into law by Governor Rick 
Scott on June 13, 2013. 
A final example of designing an OIG in a way that limits its independence is found in the 
Colorado Department of Corrections OIG.  Across the period of this study Colorado’s state 
government, too, was controlled mainly by one political party,  in this case the Republicans, but 
it has very low rate of federal convictions for public corruption. Nonetheless Colorado designed 
its key OIG much like the Florida OIGs by withdrawing key elements of independence. 
Although the Colorado OIG was created in statute in 1999 (Colorado Revised Statutes 16-2.5-
134), other than this statutory foundation it has little independence from the agency head.  It 
functions more like an internal affairs unit in a police department (confidential personal 
communication).  This OIG carries out investigations of criminal acts by employees, inmates, 
and co-conspirators, performs background checks and random drug testing, manages sexual 
offender registration, and coordinates the agency’s compliance with the federal Prison Rape 
Elimination Act.  (Colorado Department of Corrections, n.d.) 
When testifying in favor of the bill that created the OIG, the Deputy Director of the 
Department asserted that the OIG would be an independent voice in various Department 





participation in hiring staff by completing background checks was useful to make sure human 
resource staff were not hiring friends and family.  Yet when he was asked by a Senator whether 
an internal unit as was contemplated in the bill could truly be independent, the Deputy Director 
brushed off the question.  He said that there is always a question about whether any agency can 
police itself, but in this case, if it is seems to be working, then it ought not be questioned.  He 
also stated that citizens seem satisfied with how the department is working, thereby suggesting 
that independence need not be an issue of concern to the legislators (Colorado Senate Judiciary 
Committee, April 5, 1999).   
In fact, the OIG of the Colorado Department of Corrections never has been independent 
from the executive director (confidential personal communication, 2013), which would be 
considered an external impairment to the OIG’s independence.   The IG answers to the executive 
director and performs the duties assigned to it in statute and by the executive director 
(confidential personal communication, 2013).  The OIG is, however, independent from other 
units in the Department, which allows it to provide oversight of other units’ compliance with 
professional standards and policy violations without interference from those units (confidential 
personal communication, 2013).   That said, it also is assigned several duties that are 
programmatic in nature, having more to do with performing the mission of the Department of 
Corrections than overseeing the performance of the mission.  For example, the OIG oversees the 
sex offender registration program, ensuring that sex offenders released from prison register with 
local law enforcement.  Also, the OIG maintains a K-9 unit that is used to search for drugs or 
escapees (Colorado Department of Corrections, n.d.). 
In sum, states and localities commonly design new OIGs in ways that withdraw key 





benign in light of the expectations of the archetypal model, but sometimes these withdrawals of 
independence or authority, or both, seem to be deliberate, strategic efforts to limit the power of 
an OIG.  Neither the benign nor the deliberate variations seem related to partisan control of the 
state (or partisan competition) or to the level of corruption.  Instead, these variations seem 
idiosyncratic, related to how particular political fights over OIG design have played out in 
particular contexts.  
Conclusion 
 This review describes the institutionalized design of an ideal OIG, a generally accepted 
archetype of an office that is designed to provide thorough and unbiased oversight over a 
governmental agency or agencies.  This model has certain characteristics related to its legal form, 
activities, authority, and independence that help to ensure the OIG has a legal basis, can be both 
proactive and reactive to problems in the entity it oversees, has the powers to obtain the evidence 
it needs to make a fair evaluation, and can operate without interference and bias.   
Despite the emergence of this archetype, many jurisdictions have deviated from its core 
requirements when designing their OIGs.  Although some of these deviations arise directly from 
practical, localized needs, most grow out of political concerns about the implications of 
heightened oversight.  These political concerns result in deviations from the archetype that 
weaken an OIG’s ability to pursue its mission of monitoring fully, and these deviations occur in 
states with both high and low long-term corruption and Republican, Democratic, or balanced 
party competition.  Many OIGs are based in an executive order rather than statute or ordinance; 
perform only investigations or audits, but not both; lack subpoena power or other authority that 
helps it obtain the documents and testimony it needs; or do not have independence from the 





The adherence to the archetype, where it occurs, as well as the deviation from the model 
both demonstrate the power of the idea of accountability as embodied in OIGs.  On one hand, the 
fact that a definitive archetype has emerged and has been endorsed by OIG practitioners and that 
the concept has been widely adopted, demonstrates the general enthusiasm for this archetype as a 
powerful solution to accountability issues.  On the other hand, the power of the idea of an OIG is 
so strong that it simultaneously gives rise to concerns about the policy implications of its 
oversight.  Deviations from the archetype for this reason result in a weakening of the model.  
How does this push and pull for and against the idea of an OIG play out in implementation?  







Phase III:  Implementation 
 
Now we turn to the third phase: implementation. After the idea of an OIG has been 
endorsed and the OIG has been designed, OIG staff have the difficult task of doing the job.  Most 
studies of the diffusion of innovations conclude their analysis with the adoption of these 
innovations. This implicitly assumes that once an innovation is adopted the process of creation, 
at least for that jurisdiction, is finished. At least with regard to offices of inspector general, as the 
evidence in this chapter will reveal, the process of refining and shaping the final form of these 
offices is far from complete at the point of adoption.  Rather, this phase is characterized by two 
opposing forces documented in this chapter: the overseen agency’s opposition to this new form 
of oversight and the OIG’s staff activity to defend the OIG’s ability to pursue its mission.  The 
opponents of the OIG work strategically to weaken the office or its reputation. OIG staff, in turn, 
work strategically to strengthen it and protect its ability to pursue its mission.  Both the 
opponents and the proponents of this form of oversight continue their struggles, which shapes 
these offices.   
This chapter explores the challenges that occur as an OIG is implemented on the state and 
local levels; however, a recent example can be found on the federal level, which demonstrates 
that pushback against OIG oversight can occur even if an OIG is well established.  In August 
2014, 36 years after the enactment of the federal IG Act of 1978, 47 federal IGs sent letters to the 
Congressional oversight committees alerting them that the agencies they oversee were 
preventing OIG staff from accessing agency records.  These agencies were arguing that the 
material was privileged or otherwise protected and not required to be disclosed to OIG staff, 






This struggle between OIGs and those they oversee largely echoes the Congressional 
debate about the role of the federal OIG that is described by Light (1993).  Congress struggled 
with deciding whether the role of the OIG was to an independent, critical overseer or a helpful, 
analytical consultant.  Some members of Congress (as well as President Ronald Reagan) wanted 
a federal IG to be a “lone wolf” or a “junkyard dog,” policing management, while others 
preferred to create OIGs that would serve as a “strong right hand” of management (Light 1993).   
Today, OIG opponents or those under an OIG’s oversight fear the junk yard dog image of 
an OIG.   They have great trepidation about OIG monitoring and the potential fallout from OIG 
reports.  Most OIG staff, on the other hand, cast their offices as consultants.  They suggest that 
the OIG’s role is to improve government programs and to assist management.  Both groups use 
tactics, both adversarial and non-adversarial, that end up shaping the OIG itself. 
This chapter explores the strategies used by opponents of the OIG and OIG staff. My 
analysis is informed by the theory of bureaucratic politics (Allison, 1971, and extended by 
Carpenter, 2001), which posits that institutional policies are subject to ongoing contestation 
among elite decision makers in and around bureaucratic agencies. Where that theory has 
sometimes been criticized for assuming that bureaucratic officials act on the basis of a narrow 
self-interest that is tied to the interests of their agencies, my analysis brings to the discussion a 
focus on the norms that inform these officials’ understanding of their agencies’ mission.  Thus, 
as will be demonstrated, OIG staffers are deeply committed to the normative ideal of 
bureaucratic oversight that is associated with the OIG concept, and, collectively, have developed 
strategies to support their office while reducing conflict with those that are being overseen.  The 





conceptualizing OIG oversight and the institutional design of these agencies. This chapter will 
extend it to the bureaucratic politics context.    
First, I will summarize the nature of the opposition to OIGs during the implementation 
phase.  Second, I will describe the strategies that OIG staff pursue to help support the OIG’s role 
in the accountability process.  As in chapter three, I will consider whether more intense 
challenges tend to occur in states (or cities) with high levels or traditions of corruption and 
whether these efforts are more likely in states (or cities) strongly controlled by one or the other 
political party.  Ultimately, the evidence suggests that OIGs in states with higher levels of 
corruption do experience more challenges to OIG implementation. There is no clear relationship, 
however, between the extent of these challenges and whether the jurisdiction is controlled by a 
single political party or is subject to fierce competition between the parties.  Challenges 
described in this chapter occur in both Republican and Democratic dominated jurisdictions, as 
well as states that have balanced competition between the parties.   
Continuing Pushback against the Office of Inspector General 
As chapter two illustrated, those who are to be monitored by the OIG and other policy 
makers sometimes are suspicious of the OIG.  In the implementation phase, these suspicions only 
deepen.  These challenges to oversight are so prevalent that practitioners in OIGs often fully 
anticipate them.  One of my interviewees, a local IG, simply referred to these challenges as 
“expected bumps in the road” (personal communication #18, July 25, 2013).  Another local IG 
from a different state reported: “We always have these kinds of disputes, not [that] often, but I’m 
always up for a challenge, and they know it” (personal communication #37, November 6, 2013).   
   Efforts to undermine the OIG come in two general forms: (1) attempts to reduce the 





what is seen in the design phase, but now the opposition is more intense because, at this stage, 
OIG staff are in place and the OIG is no longer merely a theoretical possibility.   Thus, 
opponents either protest the OIG’s jurisdiction and authority in order to weaken the OIG’s ability 
to monitor or challenge an OIG’s credibility by calling into question the validity of an OIG’s 
reports.  Agencies that are overseen by the OIG naturally feel threatened by the possibility of 
public exposure and criticism by an entity over which they have little or no control. They fear an 
unfair witch hunt from an overaggressive overseer.  Even though OIGs by design only produce 
the information that is used by others and, thus, are not the authorities that ultimately hold 
agencies accountable for whatever this information reveals, agencies naturally feel threatened by 
the activities of OIGs.15   
 Although a major theme of this chapter is conflict over the role of the OIG, it should be 
acknowledged at the outset that the majority of state, local, and multi-jurisdictional survey 
respondents report that their relationships with key stakeholders are more supportive or 
cooperative than challenging or openly hostile.  The results of the survey are shown in Table 4.1 
below.  The survey indicates that the most difficult relationship to navigate for OIG staff is with 
the upper management of the agency or agencies that the OIG oversees; however, only 9% report 
this relationship is challenging or openly hostile.  Of those that reported any challenging or 
hostile relationships, the locus of these external challenges seems to vary with whether the OIG 
                                                          
15 It should be noted that this negative reaction to oversight is not unique to OIGs.  A 
local IG who previously was the head of internal audit before the unit transitioned into an OIG 
stated:  “This kind of fight [against our presence and our work], we’ve always had it.  It’s not the 






is at the local level or at the state level. Local and multi-jurisdictional OIGs reported challenges 
by the jurisdiction’s executive (commonly the mayor) or the legislative body (commonly the city 
council). By contrast, state-level OIGs more commonly reported that challenges came from 
lower-level professionals or interest groups/citizen advocates.  A few respondents from both 
























The lower level 
professional staff of 
the agency/agencies 
that the OIG 
oversees 
All respondents 
43 (84%) 4 (8%) 1 (2%) 3 (6%) 51 
State-level OIGs 29 (82%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 3 (9%) 35 
Local/Multi-
Jurisdictional OIGs 
14 (88%) 2 (12%) 0 0 16 
The upper 
management of the 
agency/agencies 
that the OIG 
oversees 
All respondents 
41 (86%) 1 (2%) 4 (8%) 2 (4%) 48 
State-level OIGs 31 (88%) 0 2 (6%) 2 (6%) 35 
Local/Multi-
Jurisdictional OIGs 
10 (77%) 1 (8%) 2 (15%) 0 13 
The head executive, 
such as the governor 
or the mayor 
All respondents 
33 (74%) 9 (20%) 2 (4%) 1 (2%) 45 
State-level OIGs 24 6 0 1 31 
Local/Multi-
Jurisdictional OIGs 
9 3 2 0 14 










State-level OIGs 16 (52%) 
12 
(39%) 
0 3 (9%) 31 
Local/Multi-
Jurisdictional OIGs 
10 (84%) 1 (8%) 1 (8%) 0 12 






1 (3%) 4 (10%) 40 
State-level OIGs 15 (56%) 8 (29%)  1 (4%) 3 (11%) 27 
Local/Multi-
Jurisdictional OIGs 
9 (69%) 3 (23%) 0 1 (8%) 13 
 
Despite this rosy report, interviewees report episodic challenges to their office and their 
work that goes to the heart of their ability to do their job.  These episodes, while infrequent or, 
alternatively more frequent when an OIG is initially being established or with a change in 
personnel, are quite intense for interviewees.  Understandably, an agency’s attempts to reduce 
the OIG’s ability to do its job and challenge its credibility can be taken quite personally by IGs 
and their staff.  Alternatively, these challenges to an OIG’s presence are taken as evidence of 
suspicious behavior indicating that the agency staff have something to hide and wish to avoid 
accountability.  Thus, these episodes loom large in my interviewees’ memories. As the examples 
in the following pages will illustrate, pushback seems more extensive and sharp in places with 
traditions or high levels of public corruption. In these jurisdictions, vigorous OIG oversight 
directly challenges standard ways of doing things, and some officials respond by trying to 
weaken the OIG. 
Reducing an OIG’s ability to do its job.  When agencies challenge an OIG’s ability to 





scope of their OIG’s jurisdiction; (2) the OIG’s powers and authority to do their job; and (3) the 
OIG’s access to the tools needed to do its job.  I detail each of these methods in turn below. 
Challenging an OIG’s jurisdiction.  Agencies that are presumptively subject to OIG 
oversight, and/or their political advocates, often resist this oversight by claiming that the OIG has 
no jurisdiction over them.  A very public example of this pushback can be found in Cook 
County, Illinois, home to a well-known tradition of public corruption. There, the County’s 
State’s Attorney long objected that the county’s OIG had no jurisdiction over her office.  The 
county’s OIG was created  in 2007 in ordinance by the Board of Commissioners for the purpose 
of “detect[ing], deter[ring] and prevent[ing] corruption, fraud, waste, mismanagement, unlawful 
political discrimination or misconduct in the operation of County government” (Cook County, 
Illinois, Office of Independent Inspector General ordinance 2013, §2-283).   Individuals subject 
to OIG oversight include county employees, elected and appointed officials, contractors, 
subcontractors and those doing or seeking to do business with County government (Cook 
County, Illinois, Office of Independent Inspector General ordinance 2013, §2-284).  This 
language seemed to include the State’s Attorney’s Office within the OIG’s jurisdiction, but the 
State’s Attorney for the County objected to this. From the earliest deliberation by the County 
Board on the OIG concept, the County’s State’s Attorney objected that it would be 
unconstitutional for the OIG to have jurisdiction over her office on the grounds that the office 
was a state agency rather than a county agency (Olmstead, 2007).   The Board eventually 
approved the ordinance “against the advice of the state’s attorney (Patterson, 2007).   
The issue was neither resolved nor addressed until four years later in 2011.  That year, the 
2004 murder of a young man in a street brawl suddenly became a highly publicized and 





was a nephew of former Chicago Mayor Daley (Novak & Fusco, 2011; Kass, 2012).  To many 
observers, the role of the police and the State’s Attorney for the County, who had declined to 
charge Vanecko, appeared to be a result of political power rather than criminal justice 
(Schmadeke, 2014).  When the OIG set out to investigate the State’s Attorney’s Office’s 
handling of the case, the State’s Attorney again rejected the idea that OIG had jurisdiction over 
the office for the same reasons she had asserted before: that her office was not within the County 
government, but rather was a state agency operating in the county (Novak & Fusco, 2011).  In 
response, the IG chose not to challenge the State’s Attorney’s refutation of its jurisdiction. 
The following year, the county assessor, an independently elected county official, 
followed the State’s Attorney’s lead and refused to cooperate with OIG investigators and 
rejected a subpoena (Donovan, 2012).  The Assessor’s argument was that it was an 
unconstitutional overreach for the Board of Commissioners to impose oversight over another 
elected official.  In this case, the IG sought to enforce the subpoena in court (Seidel, 2013). Two 
years later, a judge ruled that the OIG’s jurisdiction over the Assessor was constitutional, and 
that the agency had authority to investigate the Assessor and other independently elected county 
officials and their staff (Associated Press State Wire: Illinois, 2014).  Thus, the jurisdiction of the 
Cook County OIG was shaped by the actions of both the State’s Attorney and the assessor during 
implementation.   
Another method to challenge an OIG’s jurisdiction is to claim the OIG has oversight over 
only particular kinds of governmental actions and not others.  For example, one local IG told me 
that those under the OIG’s oversight claim his office may investigate only ethics violations, but 
not incidents of fraud, waste, or abuse (confidential personal communication, 2013).  This 





and register complaints alleging misconduct against [those within the OIG’s jurisdiction]” 
(confidential personal communication [italics added], 2013). The OIG favors a broader 
interpretation of the term “misconduct.”  In this case, the dispute has not yet been resolved.   
A third jurisdictional argument made against an OIG is that another oversight body has 
preemptive jurisdiction.  In a state with high levels of corruption, an IG who heads a state agency 
OIG related an incident where the OIG’s staff were investigating several high level appointees 
within the state agency over which it had jurisdiction, and staff from the governor’s own 
oversight unit stepped in to take over the investigation, claiming that their authority to 
investigate trumped the OIG’s authority, due to an interpretation of which piece of authorizing 
legislation had priority (confidential personal communication, 2013).  In the course of this 
conflict, the governor’s staff confiscated the agency OIG’s computers.  The conflict seemed to be 
triggered by allegations that one of the OIG’s staff had leaked news of the investigation to the 
press, which ultimately proved to be untrue.  The state’s ethics commission, an external body to 
both the OIG and the governor’s oversight unit, backed up the agency OIG.  The commission 
determined that the OIG had sufficient independence from the individuals being investigated to 
be objective and, therefore, should not be preempted.  Eventually the governor’s staff backed 
down, and the computers were returned.  The agency OIG proceeded with the investigation, 
which eventually led to federal charges of fraud and theft against the governor’s appointees 
(confidential personal communication, 2013).   
 Challenging an OIG’s Authority and Legal Powers.  Agencies subject to an OIG’s 
oversight sometimes push back against the accountability regime by claiming that its authority or 
powers granted an OIG to do its job are not appropriately exercised.  For example, a local IG in a 





they oversaw resisted providing the OIG with virtually every document that the OIG staff asked 
for, including pictures of agency employees (confidential personal communication, 2013). The 
agency claimed that the OIG had no authority to demand these documents, despite the wording 
of the authorizing legislation, which provided that the OIG had the authority to “request 
information related to an investigation from any employee, officer, agent or licensee of the 
[jurisdiction]” (confidential personal communication, 2013).   
Another local IG, in another city with a reputation of corruption, explained that critics of 
his office claim that he can only perform narrow, reactive investigations.  He stated:   
That’s a point of contention here in the [jurisdiction] so far.  My interpretation of the 
statute is that there is nothing preventing me from looking at doing an audit or being 
proactive, which I think is essential for any inspector general position.  I think that is 
exactly what the position is designed for, to be proactive.  Unfortunately, the way this law 
is written, you’ll see the vagueness in it and the not-so-clear language.  And so that has 
been a contention, whether I can be more proactive or not.  There are some that believe I 
should only be reactive, and so a complaint will have to come through the door, but I 
disagree with that view.  But at the same time, I operate within the boundaries of the law.  
We will not violate any rules here or break the law, on the face of that, we can’t do that.   
It’s a source of contention.  We try to do what we can. (confidential personal 
communication, 2013) 
The subpoena authority granted many OIGs is often a particular target of criticism.   
Subpoena, or summons, authority granted to an OIG generally allows the office to use the force 
of law to require an entity to provide access to agency records or to compel someone’s 





court to request judicial enforcement.  For example, early in its existence the Massachusetts OIG 
had to resort to court enforcement (confidential personal communication, 2013).  After the court, 
in an unpublished opinion, agreed that the agency in question was legally required to give the 
documents to the OIG, agencies generally stopped resisting these subpoenas.  
More recently, the OIG for the City of Chicago encountered a similar challenge to its 
authority to obtain documents. Unlike the case of Massachusetts, which, as we just saw, was 
resolved relatively quickly and in favor of the OIG, the challenge to the Chicago OIG was drawn 
out and ultimately was decided against the OIG in a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court 
(Ferguson v. Patton, 2013).  The litigation focused on the interpretation of the following 
provision of city ordinance: “It shall be the duty of every officer, employee, department, agency, 
contractor, subcontractor and licensee of the city, and every applicant for certification of 
eligibility for a city contract or program, to cooperate with the inspector general in any 
investigation or hearing undertaken pursuant to this chapter” (Chicago, Illinois, Office of 
Inspector General city ordinance §2-56-090). Still, when the OIG asked for documents from the 
mayor’s law department, the department refused to comply (Ferguson v. Patton, 2013).  The IG 
issued a subpoena, which was rejected, and then took the subpoena to court to enforce it.  The 
law department responded that the OIG did not have independent authority to represent itself and 
enforce subpoenas in court, but rather had to be represented by the city’s corporate counsel, i.e., 
the law department.  This argument, which was ultimately accepted by the Illinois Supreme 
Court (Ferguson v. Patton, 2013), makes it impossible for the OIG to have access to any 
documents in the law department in the course of an investigation if the law department refused 
to acknowledge the OIG’s authority to access.  Further, it is unlikely that the law department will 





the law department represents the Mayor’s interests as well.  The Supreme Court reinforced the 
Mayor’s superior position by stating:  “Where a conflict of interest precludes such representation 
[of the OIG by corporate counsel] under [Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct], the dispute is 
for the mayor to resolve . . .” (Ferguson v. Patton, 2013). 
Challenging subpoena power is only one way to thwart the OIG’s access to information.  
Another way is much more subtle: to make the presence of an OIG unwelcome.  One 
interviewee, a state-level IG, explained the negative impact of ambivalence on an OIG’s work:  
I’ve seen [hostile relationships between an OIG and an agency head].  Yes, I’ve seen that.  
But I think probably more typically, it would be not that there’s a hostile relationship but 
[that] there’s an ambivalence toward the Office of Inspector General by the agency head 
which can impact productivity.   . . .  I mean, if the agency head really isn’t interested, 
you’re just cut out.  I mean, you don’t get invited to the meetings that you should be 
going to learn what’s happening in the organization.  You don’t get support from him in 
areas where you may need it.  He may not necessarily comment on any of the reports you 
send out, so you don’t know if you’re being helpful or not being helpful, and really, to me 
I’d rather deal with an agency head who’s happy with my work and says so, or who’s 
displeased with my work and says so.  Not getting any feedback at all is the worst of the 
three options.  It hinders the effectiveness of the OIG.  (personal communication #32, 
October 17, 2013) 
Hindering access to the tools an OIG needs to do its job.  A third way to undercut an 
OIG’s ability to do its job is to either: (1) fail to facilitate the OIG’s efforts to get the staff, 
equipment, and funding it needs; or (2) take away such essential items.  In my case studies, I 





could begin work.  In the case of the Massachusetts OIG, the original legislation required 
appointment to be made through unanimous agreement by the three state constitutional officers, 
the attorney general, the state auditor, and the governor; however a year after the statute had 
passed, the three officers had yet to agree on a candidate (Massachusetts Special Commission 
1980).  The Ward Commission, which had proposed the creation of the OIG, expressed great 
disappointment in this result and recommended that the selection by made by the deans of the 
state’s law schools.  In the end, the statute was amended to clarify that only two constitutional 
officers need agree on the appointment of an IG (Massachusetts Office of Inspector General Act 
of 1980, §2). 
A similar story is found in Cook County, Illinois.  There, a year passed after adoption of 
the OIG before an IG was hired (Olmstead, 2008).  According to the enacting ordinance, the 
initial IG was to be selected from a slate of three candidates chosen by the Chicago and Cook 
County Bar Associations, who were to be helped by a search firm selected by the Board of 
Commissioners (Cook County, Illinois, Office of Independent Inspector General Ordinance, § 2-
282 (2013).  Some of the delay was attributed to the fact that the Bar Associations did not like 
the search firm that the board picked, claiming it was infringing on their independence 
(Olmstead, 2008).  Also some argued that the salary was too low.  One Board member 
announced that he would offer an amendment that authorized another entity to select the IG if the 
bar associations did not offer a slate of candidates within 75 days.  Eventually, with a higher 
salary, a slate of three candidates was submitted to the Board of Commissioners. 
Another method to prevent an OIG from operating is to prevent the office from getting 
necessary supplies.  Both the New Orleans OIG and the Chicago Legislative OIG dealt with 





histories of public corruption, and the fights over basic supplies for the OIG reflect an open 
hostility to this office that seems common in such a context. In New Orleans, a city staffer 
requisitioned the OIG’s computers and stored them in the basement of city hall, without 
informing the IG of the computers’ location (Association of Inspectors General conference 
presentation, 2013).  Similarly, the Chicago Legislative OIG was not given staff, an office, or 
even basic supplies (Tarrant, 2013).  In the absence of these supplies, the Chicago Legislative IG 
was reduced to pleading for office space, using his personal computer, and relying for supplies 
from other city departments.  In some instances he paid for supplies out of his own pocket.  He 
borrowed money from other departments to set up a complaint line, and he hired part-time 
employees while waiting through several budget requests to receive enough funding to hire full 
time employees.   
Among the most important necessities for an adequately functioning OIG is funding.  
Two state-level OIGs dealt with proposals to defund their offices by their critics.  The 
Massachusetts OIG endured several periods over the course of a decade in which a hostile 
governor entirely defunded the office (see, e.g., Phillips, 1991).  Each time, the legislature 
reinstated the OIG’s budget during the legislative session, even at times providing the IG with a 
raise (see, e.g., Wong & Aucoin, 1997).  Likewise, the Louisiana state OIG lost its funding from 
the Louisiana House of Representatives during the 2012 legislative session (Deslatte, 2012; 
Association of Inspectors General conference sessions, 2012, 2013).  Only following a large 
statewide grassroots movement to support the OIG did the Senate reverse the decision 
(Association of Inspectors General conference session, 2013; “Notes and Quotes from the 





Battles over the funding of the New Orleans OIG, a jurisdiction with a well-deserved 
reputation for public corruption, represent an extreme case.  In this case, the OIG was added to 
the city charter by voters in 1996 but denied funding a 10 years later (New Orleans, Lousiana, 
Office of Inspector General, 2014).  Implementation and funding came only after Hurricane 
Katrina shifted local politics due to what New Orleanians call the “Katrina Effect,” which caused 
many reforms to be taken to address corruption in city and state government (Association of 
Inspectors General Conference session 2013).  Still, even after the initial funding, the staff 
believed that future funding was likely to be precarious as it was dependent on the good will of 
the city council, which had declined to fund the OIG for many years.  The staff helped initiate a 
local referendum (confidential personal communication, 2012), which is required for a city 
charter amendment, that guarantees future OIG funding will be based on a flat percentage of the 
city’s general fund budget (Rhoden, 2013).  Today, the OIG’s existence, as least based on having 
the moneys to operate, seems to be protected for the future.16 
 Palm Beach County, Florida, provides a final but more complex example. This 
jurisdiction, like Cook County, Illinois, has a long tradition of public corruption. Here the OIG 
experienced a one-two punch: an expansion of jurisdiction coupled with refusals to fund the 
expanded tasks.  This OIG was created by public initiative, following several major public 
scandals, and codified in county ordinance (Palm Beach County Office of Inspector General 
Ordinance, 2009). The OIG’s original jurisdiction was to be the county government, but a year 
later, the county board placed an amendment on public ballot to ask the voters of each 
                                                          
16 This approach to funding is now recommended in the Association of Inspectors General’s 





municipality within the county whether they wanted OIG oversight (Palm Beach County, 
Florida, Ordinance No 2010-019).  In all 38 municipalities, the majority favored an OIG (Town 
of Gulf Stream et al., 2011).  Funding had been assessed to county residents through the county 
government, and after the vote, funding for the OIG was requested from the municipalities (Palm 
Beach County, Florida, Ordinance No 2010-019).  Several of the large cities, including West 
Palm Beach, sued the county arguing that this was double taxation (Town of Gulf Stream et al., 
Complaint for Declaratory Relief 2011).  The litigation is ongoing (see Palm Beach County 
OIG’s website, http://www.pbcgov.com/oig/lawsuit.htm), but like in Chicago, the court 
determined that the OIG could not represent itself in the law suit (Palm Beach County Office of 
Inspector General, 2013).    The IG has appealed the denial of her motion to intervene (Palm 
Beach County Office of Inspector General, 2013); however, the IG has noted that the OIG’s 
inability to represent itself in court in this case raises a larger question: does the Palm Beach OIG 
have independent authority to enforce its subpoenas?  This is the same question that was litigated 
by the Chicago, Illinois, OIG. 
Calling into question an OIG’s objectivity and credibility.  Another method to lessen 
the impact of an OIG’s oversight is to suggest that their work product is biased and unreliable.  If 
the public or decision makers come to believe they cannot trust the OIG’s reports about the 
actions of the people and entities they oversee, then the OIG’s influence is compromised.  
Challenging the OIG’s credibility is a common strategy of opponents, whether justified or not.   
In Indiana, opponents of the state IG and his office have repeatedly claimed the agency is 
politically biased in favor of the state’s Republican elected officials.  Immediately after the state 
OIG was created in statute in 2005, the legislature’s Democrats, who had initially been worried 





investigate the governor himself (Smith, 2005).  At issue was the governor’s use of a state 
recreational vehicle (RV) to attend a political fundraiser (Smith, 2005).  After an investigation, 
the OIG issued a report that stated that the governor’s use of the RV violated no ethics rule 
(Nesbit, 2005).  In response, the chairman of the Indiana Democratic Party “scoffed at the idea 
that [the IG] would have done anything but clear his own boss.  ‘I was shocked that [the 
governor’s] personal political inspector would let him off.  This goes to [the IG’s] independence 
and the fact that he is purely an extension of [the governor,’ he said” (Kelly, 2005).   
In another instance, Indiana Democrats castigated the OIG for clearing an outgoing 
Republican appointee of allegations of improper travel reimbursement. The spokeswoman for the 
state Democrats declared: “It shows yet again [that the inspector general] is nothing more than a 
partisan prosecutor who does the governor’s bidding and doesn’t act in a fair and impartial way” 
(Kelly, 2007).    The next month, the OIG’s finding that state lottery employees did not act 
unethically by attending a Republican political fundraiser was called a “whitewash,” an example 
of “cronyism,” and “a joke” (Associated Press, 2007).    The Democratic chairman “said the 
report made [the OIG] ‘irrelevant,’ in part because it was playing politics by favoring 
Republicans and treating Democrats more harshly” (Associated Press, 2007).    The chairman 
claimed that the OIG had acted inconsistently by finding ethical violations the previous year 
when examining state contractors attending a Democratic fundraiser. The IG responded that he 
had interpreted the ethics rules consistently and vigorously, and that this had resulted in more 
than 40 arrests (Associated Press, 2007).  These attacks on the Indiana OIG’s credibility 






In Cook County, Illinois, charges of bias arose upon the appointment of the first IG.  The 
new IG had previously worked as an attorney in the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, and 
it was alleged he had political connections that gave rise to conflicts of interest (Konkol, 2008b).  
A leading local reformer, Michael Skakman, who had successfully sued the county for political 
corruption in hiring, and against whom the new IG had defended the county in his previous 
position, threatened to sue the county over the appointment (Konkol, 2008a; Olmstead, 2008).  
Shakman stated: “You cannot be a lawyer for a party accused of illegal misconduct in several 
lawsuits and then take off your lawyer’s hat and begin to enforce against  . . . clients the very 
rules your former clients were accused of violating. . . .  This is legal ethics 101” (Olmstead, 
2008).  The IG responded he disagreed that conflict of interest would be a problem, but that he 
would recuse himself from any investigation if conflict arose (Omstead, 2008).   
Two aldermen for the City of Chicago who were targets of investigations publically 
railed against the Legislative OIG (Spielman, 2013).  The tone of the charges was quite ugly.  A 
newspaper article (Spielman, 2013) reported:  
[E]mbattled Ald. Joe Moore (49th) . . . is still on the warpath nearly two months 
after Khan [the Legislative IG] accused him of using his taxpayer-funded ward office to 
do political work, firing an employee who blew the whistle on it, and giving the former 
staffer an $8,709 payment equal to 81 days’ worth of severance to try to cover it 
up.  Moore has tried to salvage his reputation as a self-declared champion for ethics 
reform — by accusing Khan of violating the law in his investigation of him. On Tuesday, 
Moore insisted that he’s not alone — and that Council dissatisfaction with Khan is about 





“There’s been an incredible amount of dissatisfaction with the lack of 
professionalism exhibited by Mr. Khan and his blatant refusal to follow the guidelines 
governing his office. The City Council has the ability to remove him from office. The 
City Council also has the ability to refuse to fund his office,” he said. Moore said he’s 
well aware that “it can’t just be me” leading the charge against Khan or it would look like 
he was getting even.   “Ideally, it’ll be a coalition of independents and others in the City 
Council who are all united in believing that Mr. Khan gives reform and inspectors 
general a bad name,” Moore said. “The alleged misconduct he’s uncovered, even if all 
true, is such penny-ante stuff, it makes you wonder how he justifies his existence. 
Moore’s statements were supported by a second alderman who also had been subject to an OIG 
investigation.  He stated: “A lot of people have a lot of questions about how he has conducted his 
investigations and whether it’s been done legally and fairly” (Spielman, 2013). 
One year later, the Chicago aldermen continue to fight against the OIG’s presence.  After 
IG Khan received permission from the City’s Ethics Commission to investigate an alderman’s 
campaign finances, the same alderman sponsored a proposal that blocked the OIG from 
investigating campaign finance issues and placed that responsibility with the Ethics Commission 
itself, which reportedly had stated it did not want the authority (Ruthhart & Dardick, 2014).  The 
Alderman claimed that the timing was coincidental.  Rather he was motivated to “close a 
loophole” and “ensure there was a review process in place before we got into the next election.” 
(Ruthhart & Dardick, 2014).  Although Inspector General Khan spoke against the proposal as a 
“cynical ploy” to avoid scrutiny, the measure passed 41-6 (Dardick, 2014). 
In Richmond, Virginia, opponents of the IG/City Auditor leveled charges of bias against 





noted the city had yet to implement security measures on gas cards (Ress, 2008).  “Wilder 
accused [the IG/City Auditor] of playing politics, saying he gave $250 to [the] City Council 
President’s mayoral campaign.  [The IG] said his wife, a businesswoman, gave the money (Ress, 
2008).  The following year, the City Council appeared to withdraw support for the IG by ceasing 
to issue press releases upon the publication of the IG/City Auditor’s reports (Jones, 2009, 
October 4). The Richmond Times-Dispatch came to the defense of the IG in an editorial that 
condemned the decision to stop issuing these press releases (“City Government Buried,” 2009).   
It must be noted that charges that some OIGs lack objectivity are not always without 
merit.  IGs may exhibit bias or may be unqualified for the job.  For example, in Connecticut, the 
perception of the state IG as an overly aggressive and incompetent watchdog led to the repeal of 
the OIG in its entirety.  This OIG was created in 1985 and repealed only two years later.  
According to the testimony on the floor of the Connecticut House of Representatives and Senate, 
the primary reason was the IG’s actions since taking office.  Certainly, partisanship played a role 
in the repeal, as the OIG was an initiative of the Republicans when they were in the majority in 
the state legislature but who were no longer in the majority; however, much was said about the 
IG’s management of his office.  The representative who carried the bill, whose testimony was 
indicative of others’ comments, stated: 
And so we got the Office of Inspector, soon to be followed, ladies and gentleman, by a 
series of rather embarrassing episodes. The first of those was the Inspector General 
asking for guns so he could fight organized crime and whackos.  And after that electronic 
equipment to sniff and snoop.  Followed by wanting remote control starters to see that 
their cars didn’t explode.  . . .  But I might just turn a little attention to some of the 





Transportation Accountability Board], the minority leader said TAB wasn’t at least an 
office that embarrassed us.  Well, I’m afraid that wouldn’t necessarily [be] true for the 
inspector general.  (Connecticut HB 6742, 1987, May 19, pp. 7876-7877)   
Arguments were made in response to this line of testimony suggesting that the behavior of the 
officer should not jeopardize the entire office and that two years was too little time to judge the 
potential of the office. These arguments did not prevail, and the office was repealed by a vote of 
87-52 in the House and 23-10 in the Senate (Connecticut HB 6742, 1987, May 19 & May 27). 
 A second example of an IG having questionable qualifications for the job is found in the 
state of Kansas.  The qualifications of the IG appointed to oversee the Kansas Medicaid program 
were questioned.  The Topeka Capitol Journal broke the story of the appointment and pointed 
out that the IG had neither a college degree nor career experience in the field of insurance, health 
care, accounting, law, or law enforcement (Carpenter, 2014a).   Further, the appointee had filed 
for a bankruptcy in a personal business, had experienced personal financial problems, and had 
been found guilty of a DUI and campaign finance violations (Carpenter, 2014b), which did not 
suggest a strong ethical compass.  Even though some legislators who supported the appointee 
noted that he was technically only “acting” IG, because he had not yet been confirmed by the 
Senate (Carpenter, 2014c), the appointee resigned within a few days of the story hitting the press. 
A final example is found on the federal level.  Although federal OIGs are not the primary 
topic of this research, this example demonstrates how an OIG could be manipulated in such a 
way as to fail in its accountability mission.  A recent Congressional investigation found that the 
acting IG for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regularly deleted portions of OIG 
reports, amended the reports to minimize findings, or delayed issuance of such reports to make 





management staff in the agency and “gave them inside information about the timing and findings 
of investigations” (Leonnig, 2014, para. 2).   The investigation began after several 
whistleblowers stepped forward from the acting IG’s own staff complaining about his lack of 
objectivity.  He resigned days before a Senatorial hearing at which he was scheduled to answer 
questions in relation to the Congressional investigative report.   
Working collaboratively with an OIG.  Pushback against the OIG from those who are 
subject to OIG oversight is not inevitable.  OIGs seem to be less subject to challenge when the 
upper management of the agencies being overseen have respect for the role of the OIG.    For 
example, in response to my question about a state agency IG’s relationship with the head of the 
agency he oversees, he replied, “It’s great, actually.  I get a lot of support.  She asks me if she’s 
butting in when she shouldn’t.  I generally do get a lot of support.  I work for a really impressive 
[woman] . . . I mean she’s sharp as a tack and ethical, too.  It makes the job a lot easier” 
(confidential personal communication #30, October 10, 2013). 
Another state agency IG explained that the executive director of the agency his office 
oversaw was a career bureaucrat and she understood and accepted the OIG’s oversight role 
(personal communication #17, July 24, 2013).  In particular, the executive director understood 
the value of the OIG’s independence.  He stated:   
She understands that I’m independent, and [she understands that] if any issues [about her 
actions or those of her staff] come up, I need to talk with the Board Chairwoman.  And if 
there are any issues with [actions of] the Board, I have to talk with the Governor.  I don’t 






Similarly, a general counsel of a local agency overseen by an OIG told me although he does not 
agree with every finding or conclusion made by the OIG, he respects the role and the 
professionalism of the IG (personal communication #21, July 25, 2013).  
Conclusions about pushback against OIGs.  In summary, although survey respondents 
generally indicate good relations with agencies that they oversee, my interviews revealed many 
instances of pushback against the OIG and its oversight.  These incidents arise either from 
concern that the OIG is a “lone wolf” who is out to do some damage or suspicion that the IG is a 
committed partisan who is seeking dirt on members of the opposing political party.  Ultimately, 
the extent of pushback does not seem related to the partisan political context. Thus, these 
incidents have occurred in states that are characterized by energetic party competition, such as 
Illinois and Indiana, and in states that are dominated by the Democratic Party, such as Louisiana 
and Massachusetts. 
By contrast, the extent and intensity of these incidents of pushback seems directly related 
to the level of corruption in the jurisdiction. They seem to occur more frequently and become 
more intense in states and cities that have a tradition of government corruption.  Interviewees in 
states with higher levels of federal public corruption convictions, such as Louisiana, Virginia, 
Illinois and Florida reported more challenges in the implementation stage than those in states 
with lower numbers of convictions, including Massachusetts, Indiana, Colorado and Minnesota. 
In several of these cases, political opponents succeeded in cutting funding or other crucial 
resources for the OIG. These fundamental challenges to an OIG occurred exclusively in places 
with high levels of corruption. By contrast, interview respondents in Colorado and Minnesota, 
the states in my sample with the lowest levels of public corruption, did not report any problems 





Pushback against OIGs thus may be seen as a product of an OIG’s level of threat to 
established ways of doing things. Where an OIG’s commitment to clean, honest government is 
consistent with state or local culture, the OIG is more or less accepted and faces no open hostility 
or fundamental challenge. But where an OIG clashes with a tradition of corruption, it often faces 
hostility and direct challenges aimed at undermining its ability to do the job.  
That said, intense confrontations appear to be relatively infrequent and seem to be 
concentrated either in the first few years of the establishment of an OIG or upon a personnel 
change in either the position of the IG or the head of the agency/agencies to be overseen, when 
the role of the OIG needs to be newly understood and new relationships need to be developed.  
Further, OIG staff are on the look-out for such challenges. However, with time, and with the 
institutionalization of the OIG concept in a jurisdiction, the conflict can lessen.  One local OIG 
explained: “It’s a learning curve for them [those being overseen] to really understand what an IG 
does.  . . . You have to keep working, working towards getting a better relationship, getting the 
job done” (personal communication #20, July 25, 2013).  The strategies that are used by OIGs to 
improve relationships with the entities that they monitor are discussed in the next section.   
OIG Responses to Pushback  
In the face of pushback, OIG staff act strategically to strengthen the OIG’s position in the 
accountability process and position the office as a helpful consultant, rather than a lone wolf or 
partisan attack dog.  Yet, OIG staff must constantly balance the consultant role with their 
independence and professionalism, which are key to their ability to monitor objectively.  My 
interviews indicate that OIG staff employ four types of strategies to protect the role of their 
offices.  These include: fixing design flaws as soon as possible; strengthening independence; 





objectivity, helpfulness, and professionalism.  When these strategies fail, an IG often has to 
confront criticism and challenges directly.  I describe each of these approaches in turn. 
Fixing design flaws.  If possible, an initial step is to advocate for amendments to the 
OIG’s authorizing legislation in the first year after establishment.  For example, as mentioned 
above, the Massachusetts Grand Court amended the appointment provisions in the first session 
after the OIG had been created (Massachusetts Office of Inspector General Act of 1980, 2013, § 
2), ostensibly because an appointment was not possible under the original rules requiring 
unanimity (Massachusetts Special Commission, 1980).  In Virginia, the state IG pursued law 
enforcement authority for OIG investigators in order to ensure the office had the authority to 
pursue its mission (Virginia Office of the State Inspector General Act, 2013, §2.2-311).  Another 
state agency IG strove to improve her office’s independence by requesting an amendment to her 
OIG’s enacting legislation to clarify statutory reporting lines (confidential personal 
communication, 2013).  The amendment ensured that IG would report to the governing board of 
the agency as opposed to the Executive Director, which increased the OIG’s independence from 
top management (confidential personal communication, 2013). In Minnesota, the OIG, which is 
a purely discretionary unit on the part of the Commissioner of the agency, pursued a handful of 
legislative initiatives, one of which assigns a statutory role to the OIG (Minnesota Department of 
Human Services Office of Inspector General, 2013).  Thus, although the office has not been 
formally created in statute, it has been referenced in statute (Minnesota Child Care Provider and 
Recipient Fraud Investigations, 2013).   
Shoring up the OIG’s independence.  When formal steps to strengthen an OIG’s 
authority or independence are not possible, other informal strategies are implemented to increase 





selected from outside the community. To be sure, this is not within an IG’s control. In the case of 
the Chicago Legislative OIG, the individual who was hired as the first IG was from New York 
(Chicago, Illinois, Legislative Inspector General, n.d.).  Several aldermen considered his outsider 
status as essential for the IG’s effectiveness (Dardick & Byrne, 2011).  Thus, an alderman stated: 
“This is nobody nobody sent,” meaning that the new IG neither had political power (was a 
nobody) nor was sent by someone with political power (nobody picked him for a partisan task) 
(Dardick & Byrne, 2011).  In other words, the new IG was not beholden to anyone, and this 
independence was of considerable importance, particularly considering the history of Chicago 
patronage.   
When outsider status is not readily available, as is more often the case, IGs commonly 
choose office space that is physically separated from the rest of the agency as a means of 
enhancing the independence of their staff, physically and symbolically, from the agency being 
overseen.  Multiple IGs reported to me that they employ this tactic (personal communication 
#13, July 23, 2013; personal communication #14, July 23, 2013; personal communication #18, 
July 25, 2013; personal communication #19, July 25, 2013; personal communication #24, July 
26, 2013).  One local IG explained the importance of his insisting his office move to separate 
space as follows.  When he launched the OIG, he was located on the same floor as the executive 
director, and was located between legislative affairs and marketing. This was an inauspicious 
location as both of these functions were dedicated to promoting the agency and looking out for 
its best interests and representing the agency in the public eye (personal communication #18, 
July 25, 2013).  As the IG stated, these advocacy roles are the “antithesis” of an OIG’s role in 
maintaining objectivity.  By being located in close proximity to these advocacy offices, the IG 





confidential and unknown to other agency personnel.  He also found the location hindered 
complainants from stopping in to visit.  Likewise interviewees were uncomfortable providing 
information when they had to walk through the halls in close proximity to the executive director 
and her staff.  As a result, the IG quickly looked for office space that was nearby, but in a 
separate building.  He noted that the new investigators he had hired would be in a better position 
to do surveillance if necessary, because they would not be generally recognized by the staff. 
 To be sure, this IG acknowledged that having been present among the upper level 
managers for a period of time had some benefits.  He noted that it was helpful that people got to 
know him and to see that he was not a “nasty person” (Personal communication #18, July 25, 
2013).  This comment was echoed by other IGs on both state and local levels.   Despite the 
importance of physical distance to help strengthen an OIG’s independence, or appearance of 
independence, it was equally important to be approachable.  Some told me that they visit the 
main office at least once a week, not to catch people behaving badly, but to be seen as available 
to answer questions or receive complaints (confidential personal communication #13, July 23, 
2013; Personal communication #14, July 23, 2013).  Despite having established a separate office, 
a local IG told me he thinks it is important to understand the “ebb and flow” of the government 
unit his office oversees (personal communication #19, July 25, 2013).  He encourages staff to 
conduct interviews out in the field, to “carry the flag to let people know we are there,” to 
“develop relationships and put boots down” (personal communication #19, July 25, 2013).   
Another state-level IG told me that for similar reasons she deliberately located her office 
at the primary site of the agency she oversees (personal communication #22, July 26, 2013).  She 
finds that her presence is useful to emphasize the importance of accountability and to be on hand 





Nevertheless, among my interviewees most preferred to have their office at a distance 
from the agency’s headquarters.  Thus, a local IG reported that when the chair of his governing 
board suggested moving the OIG back into central offices in order for the agency to save money, 
the IG spoke to him about the importance of separation to maintain independence, and the chair 
reversed his position (personal communication #24, July 26, 2013).   
 Another method to help shore up an OIG’s independence is to obtain separate legal 
counsel.  As indicated by the lawsuits involving the Chicago OIG and the Palm Beach County 
OIG, noted above, independent legal counsel ensures that the OIG is not dependent on the legal 
counsel of an agency that is within the oversight jurisdiction of the OIG.  Both state and local 
IGs emphasized that they had obtained permission to hire their own general counsel (personal 
communication #9, July 3, 2013; personal communication #19, July 15, 2013).  The OIG for the 
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) achieved a similar result through a somewhat more convoluted 
path. It involves a formal agreement with the CPS legal department, endorsed by the Board 
through the adoption of a formal resolution.  While the CPS general counsel will provide legal 
advice to the OIG, the IG has authority to retain his own counsel if he determines that there is a 
conflict of interest with the CPS general counsel or with the Board (Chicago Board of Education, 
2003).      
Developing alternative ways to get attention for the OIG’s work product.  Both state 
and local OIGs may enhance their position by developing positive publicity or attention for their 
reports. These efforts are relevant in light of the nature of OIGs’ role in the policy process, which 
is limited to providing objective, reliable information about the actions of the agency or 
individual for whom the OIG has oversight.  Once the information is provided, whether it is 





question. Thus, while an OIG plays an important role, ultimately this role is limited to providing 
information and making recommendations about how to fix problems or improve processes.   
OIGs can improve the chances that their findings and recommendations are acted on if 
they develop alternative ways to bring attention to their work products.  Three methods pursued 
by OIGs to do so are discussed here: developing relationships with prosecutors, who serve as an 
alternative forum; providing information directly to the public for action and reaction; and 
working with the press to create an additional conduit to the public.   
Productive relationships with prosecutors are important when OIGs find evidence of 
criminal behavior.  Although a few OIGs, like the Indiana State OIG (Indiana Inspector General 
Act of 2005, 2013), have independent prosecutorial authority, most do not.  As a result, these 
OIGs can only be a catalyst to the imposition of criminal penalties when a prosecutor is willing 
to pursue the violations through the courts.  Thus, many state and local IGs proactively build 
relationships with local, state, and federal prosecutors (personal communication #8, May 29, 
2013; personal communication #9, July 3, 2013; personal communication #11, July 22, 2013; 
personal communication #14, July 23, 2013; personal communication #20, July 25, 2013; 
personal communication#26, July 30, 2013; personal communication #33, October 17, 2013; 
personal communication #35, November 5, 2013).  One state agency IG explained how he 
believed his OIG’s office could be more effective with strong relationships with prosecutors.  He 
said: 
I think we’ve got a pretty good relationship with [prosecutors in the Attorney General’s 
office] . . .  And so they do a significant amount of prosecution of cases provided to them, 
and some of our investigators are former [Attorney General] investigators, so we’ve got 





regularly with county attorneys, too, especially metro area county attorneys, and trying to 
establish with them, kind of, that we want to be as supportive as we can in the criminal 
prosecution of these cases.  Because we want criminal prosecution to be a deterrent, and 
unless there is prosecution, there is no deterrent on that end.  Then what we’re left with is 
the worst thing that happens to these people is that they steal from us like crazy until we 
catch them and then we tell them don’t do it anymore.  We’re not going to let you do it, 
and maybe we’re not going to let you do it for a while, and then you can come back, 
because there are all these grace periods in there. It’s crazy.  We want there to be a little 
more teeth there.  If we catch you with your hand in our pocket, we want you to go to jail.  
It sounds harsh, but we want that message to get out there.  So we have county attorneys 
that are in the metro area who are very supportive of our kind of moving forward and 
establishing some kind of service here that’s going to be supportive of them. (personal 
communication #9, July 3, 2013) 
Survey respondents report that their relationships with prosecutors are largely positive, as 
is shown in Table 4.2 below.  Tables 4.3 and 4.4 break out the data by state and local/multi-
jurisdictional OIGs, indicating that all the responses that report neutral relationships with 







Survey questions:  Please identify the quality of the relationships your OIG has with the 
following stakeholders. 
 
















State-level prosecutors 38 (90%) 4 (10%) 0 0 42 
Local prosecutors 38 (89%) 4 (9%) 0 1 (2%) 43 
Federal prosecutors 37 (84%) 7 (16%) 0 0 44 
 
















State-level prosecutors 25 (86%) 4 (14%) 0 0 29 
Local prosecutors 24 (83%) 4 (14%) 0 1 (3%) 29 



















State-level prosecutors 13 (100%) 0  0 0 13 
Local prosecutors 14 (100%) 0  0 0 14 
Federal prosecutors 15 (100%) 0  0 0 15 
 
Often, IGs may lend their investigative staff to support prosecutions arising from the OIGs work 





Additionally, many OIGs ensure that their staff are well trained in preserving evidence for 
effective prosecutions (See, e.g., Colorado Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 
300-20 (2009); Chicago Board of Education Office of Inspector General, 2013).   
The second alternative forum for an OIG’s work is the public.  Reaching out to the public 
not only informs the public about the actions of their government but also encourages 
complainants to contact the OIG with concerns.  To encourage the public’s attention to an OIG’s 
role and work product, most OIGs develop robust websites that detail the OIG’s mission, provide 
contact information, and post public reports (see, e.g., the Massachusetts OIG’s website at 
http://www.mass.gov/ig/; the website for the Office of the Executive Inspector for the agencies 
of the Illinois Governor at http://www2.illinois.gov/oeig/Pages/default.aspx; the website of the 
OIG for the city of Chicago, Illinois, at http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/; and the New 
Orleans, Louisiana, OIG’s website at http://www2.illinois.gov/oeig/Pages/default.aspx).  For 
example, the Chicago OIG’s website provides the following explanation: 
By providing narrative summaries of investigative cases, OIG will better ensure that its 
activities are more transparent and more accountable to both the City’s elected officials 
and the City’s residents. The quarterly reports are intended to provide the City’s 
taxpayers with a clearer, more informed understanding of City government, and to 
describe OIG’s ongoing efforts to uncover and prevent fraud, corruption, misconduct, 
mismanagement, and waste in the pursuit of a more effective and efficient provision of 
City services. (Chicago, Illinois, Office of Inspector General, n.d.). 
In addition to websites, many OIGs develop regular newsletters to provide guidance on 
legal obligations or ethics rules (see, e.g., Office of Executive Inspector General for the Agencies 





Office of the Legislative Inspector General; the Baltimore, Maryland, OIG; the Los Angeles, 
California, Police Commission OIG; and State of Ohio OIG are among the OIGs on Facebook, 
and the New York State Medicaid OIG, the Pinellas County Clerk of the County Court OIG, and 
the Philadelphia OIG are some of the OIGs on Twitter.  The New Orleans, Louisiana, OIG has a 
robust e-mail distribution about its activities.   
Finally, several IGs make themselves available to local citizen groups or clubs to speak 
about the role of the OIG and its work (personal communication #25, July 26, 2013; personal 
communication #35, November 5, 2013).  The IG from Palm Beach County, Florida, explained 
that she views this tactic as crucial for her office as the public created the OIG and the public is 
the ultimate forum for the OIG’s work. She also measures the impact of her public speaking.  
She stated:  “We do a before and after [test], so that we can see how much they knew before and 
how much they knew after.  So we have lots of measures that we look at about enhancing the 
knowledge base of the people in the county” (confidential personal communication, 2013). 
Statutory limits on the publication of information can pose problems for OIGs that want 
to reach out to the public but are prohibited by particular provisions in their authorizing 
legislation.   The Green Book (2004, p. 5) recommends that an OIG should be granted statutory 
authority to maintain confidentiality of records and identities of individuals who provide 
information to the OIG, unless this information must be made public for purposes of prosecution 
or other OIG-related duties.  Yet, often OIGs are subject to additional confidentiality 
requirements in order to protect the reputations of individuals who may be wrongly accused.  
One deputy IG for a state agency OIG noted that the strict confidentiality requirements initially 
imposed on her OIG limited its effectiveness, because “nobody ever knew what we did.  Only 





in disclosing our reports or what we found.  So it was very difficult, right, to have some teeth or 
to get people to do what we wanted” (personal communication #16, July 24, 2013).  A statutory 
change allowed this OIG to report to the public general information on investigations that 
resulted in sanctions, and the interviewee asserted that relaxing the confidentially requirement 
has led to both specific deterrence of an individual’s behavior and generalized deterrence from 
others who learn about what behavior is problematic. 
The third forum that OIGs develop for their work product is the news media.    While 
most IGs prefer not to engage with the press and some actively avoid the press in order to avoid 
embarrassment for the agency that they oversee (personal communication #12, July 22, 2013; 
personal communication #25, July 26, 201; personal communication #27, July 31, 2013), some 
told me that they will strategically issue press releases to draw attention to significant problems.  
For example, one state-level IG told me she does not go to the press often, but has done so in 
extreme cases.  One time she approached the press when she found that “the department was 
[endorsing unsafe conditions for state wards] intentionally and looking the other way” (personal 
communication #25, July 26, 2013.)  Others more aggressively court the press.  One state agency 
OIG explained that his office’s findings and recommendations are seen as protecting vulnerable 
people and freeing up moneys for more deserving citizens (personal communication #9, July 3, 
2013).  He also pointed out that media coverage about bad acts provides a deterrent for others 
considering fraud, waste or abuse in a way that a single prosecution will not.  Another local OIG 
asserted that change will not arise unless the public pushes for change, and the only way they 
will know to push for change is if they are fully informed of problems through the media 





An example of an OIG working closely with the news media can be found in a series of 
articles published by the Star Tribune called “Day-Care Threat,” about infants dying in home 
daycare in 2012-2013.  The Minnesota Department of Human Services IG worked closely with 
the reporters, Jeremy Olsen and Brad Schrade, who ultimately won a 2013 Pulitzer Prize for the 
series, to provide facts about the OIG’s discovery of the problem and recommendations for a 
solution (see, e.g., Olsen et al., 2012).  The series brought together the OIG’s findings with the 
positions of stakeholders and legislators, which ultimately resulted in legislation changes 
requiring increased training for home daycare providers (Minnesota Department of Human 
Services Office of Inspector General, 2013).  The collegial relationship between the IG and the 
reporters shine clearly throughout the series as the IG is quoted in nearly every article.  
Building the OIG’s reputation as helpful. An affirmative strategy adopted by most IGs 
is to present their office as a valuable partner in the wellbeing of the agency.  In other words, the 
majority of IGs prefer to strike the balance between lone wolf and strong right hand in favor of 
helping rather than policing.  This is a challenge because being a partner must be carefully 
balanced with asserting the OIG’s independence and meeting professional standards.  As one 
state IG stated:   
To me, my job is to make the agency head look good, in a way.  But I’m independent and 
. . . I’m trying to make the agency look good, too.  Sure, you’ve got to do audits and 
investigations, [but] you want to be able to go and evaluate things on an independent 
basis [in order] to add value and to help the Secretary to be able to do their mission, for 
management to accomplish their mission, goals and objectives.  If you can stop things 





prevent problems]; that’s what you’re trying to do is help your agency to not look bad. 
(personal communication #31, October 13, 2013) 
This is not an easy task.  Thus, another state-level IG stated: 
It’s walking on that razor’s edge.  I mean, you have to be independent in your work, and 
you have to know that sometimes your work might not be necessarily pleasing for the 
boss to hear about, but you’ve got to find a way to do the work and couch it in such a way 
that you can, you know, retain your position, [and] at the same time you’re doing the 
right thing.  Because if you don’t, either one way or the other, if you go ahead and do it 
the way the management team and the agency would like to see it done, then you’ve 
compromised your independence from a work perspective and from a service-to-the-
citizens perspective.  But if you blindly disregard the perspectives of the agency head, 
and just blurt it out there and say it precisely and exactly the way it is, you might find 
yourself looking for employment. (personal communication #32, October 17, 2013) 
 Still, overall IGs emphasize that their offices are there to help rather than hurt.  In my 
interviews, a number of IGs on both the state and local levels stressed this point. For example: 
  “We view it as one of our responsibilities not to play gotcha but to look at how things are 
being done according to the policies and procedures manual.  And when we see the need 
to make recommendations about how to improve it, [we will].  But not to say that you’re 
doing all this wrong, but that there is a better way” (personal communication #17, July 
24, 2013).   
 “The job is not to be the police, not the boogieman.  I want to have presence, not to check 
up on people, but to let people know me.  This helps people ask me questions” (personal 





 “Doing annual training helps staff know who I am, as well as the background of the 
[OIG] legislation and the [OIG’s] role.  It helps that I am a local guy.  I am relatable” 
(personal communication #13, July 23, 2013).   
 “That was one of the things that I thought was important . . . to create an entity that was 
not only trusted and professional, very professional.  But the people, the citizens and 
employees wouldn’t view us as doing our business of the dark hallways of the county 
government.  I wanted to have a face to the office” (personal communication #19, July 
25, 2013).   
 “Well, [we gain] credibility because we are fair. . . We’re thorough but fair.  We’re not 
out to get anybody; we don’t put cases on anybody; we don’t make up stuff.  We’re fair.  
. . .  There was a case where [I was asked whether an employee should have been 
sanctioned.  I could have easily twisted some things around and said yes, but we don’t do 
that.  We’re not the gotcha people” (personal communication #24, July 26, 2013).   
 “The key is to build credibility. When complainants call, we act on the complaint as soon 
as possible.  [Also we] do thorough, reasonably objective investigations. . . . Now you’re 
always going to have some conflict, as you are investigating people.  Then the people 
learn not to like you because they don’t like being investigated vs. is it right, when they 
are a victim or a complainant to have enough faith in the office to call” (personal 
communication #18, July 25, 2013). 
 “Our general approach is that we want to work with people, not against people” (personal 





 “[W]e are not ‘gotcha police.’ We do investigations, but we’re here to make things better.  
But also we’re here to tell the truth, too.  So we, you know sometimes the truth is not 
very pleasant. But, that’s our job, too” (personal Communication #29, October 10, 2013). 
  “I’ve always had more of a proactive approach, more proactive in the IG shop. I always 
feel that’s the way we’ll move to, being more proactive to help management on the front 
side instead of the back side [when] you have to do audits and investigations. Try to be 
more proactive to help out.  Be more proactive, and that’s a deterrent to fraud and 
anybody doing things.  Helping management out” (personal communication #31, October 
13, 2013). 
 “That’s what I want to be is fair.  You may not agree with the report, you may not agree 
with what was said, but were we fair in our approach.  So far people have been very 
receptive.  We have been very open with them. Any issues that have come up, we have 
worked out.  And I don’t think there’s any major issues out there that I’m aware of at 
present” (personal communication #34, October 30, 2013). 
Building positive relationships takes time.  A local IG stated:   
I tell the . . . managers, I’m here to add value to your operation, and so you got to get 
buy-in.  There was such fear and rumor about how bad this was going to be it took years, 
a couple years, for me to calm people down.  I said, look, you are not going to trust me, 
because you don’t know me.  Trust my work product.  So the work product has spoken 
for itself, and over time, we have built the confidence of the government officials, 
because they know we’re not out to get them.  We’re here to provide value.  Those who 
don’t want to be told what to do, you offer them some value, they say, I’ve been in the 





need to go when their time is up and get out.  But for the majority of people down there, 
they are seeing the value of this service and it’s beginning to change, which is great.  
(personal communication #35, November 5, 2013) 
IGs use several methods to craft their offices’ reputation for being a helpful consultant.  
One is to work closely with top management in order to create a cooperative rather than 
adversarial relationship.  As one local IG stated: “We measure our effectiveness [on whether] we 
have such a good relationship with everybody.  And to me, it’s important.  If you don’t have that 
relationship, you can’t get things done” (personal communication #37, November 6, 2013). 
Several state level IGs in different states told me that if the agency head asks for a review 
of a program, they make it a priority to review the program and provide consultation and advice 
(personal communication #13, July 22, 2013; personal communication#14, July 22, 2013; 
personal communication #27, July 31, 2013).  Another noted that his predecessor was not very 
communicative with the agency, so he deliberately expanded and improved communication.  He 
explained “without positive communication, it’s difficult to suggest change in policy” (personal 
communication #11, July 22, 2013).   
Another method for establishing a good reputation is to avoid embarrassing the entities 
that are overseen.  Thus, a state IG stated: “We’re not trying to get headlines on everything we 
do.  We are trying to work with the administration to try to correct the things that need to be 
corrected, and I think we are fair in our investigations. And people see that.  And I’ve been here 
long enough to know there are times where people call us and we work things out. . . . [This is 
preferable to] us just standing on the side firing bullets at people.  I think that helps” (personal 





splashy for a lot of stuff, although I will testify at legislative hearings as needed” (personal 
communication #25, July 26, 2013).  A third IG stated: 
We can work together to get to the right place, but remember that we are independent of 
each other.  It doesn’t have to be a fight every time.  It doesn’t have to be a battle to get to 
the truth.  There are good honest people that you oversee that will help you and you just 
have to recognize that.  I have colleagues that will fight their battles in the press . . . I just 
don’t see success in that, other than creating a bigger wall of animosity.  It doesn’t send 
the right message. (personal communication #20, July 25, 2013) 
It should be noted, however, that not all IGs subscribe to a low profile approach.  For example, 
one local IG said that for real change to happen the public had to be involved and, for this 
reason, he pursues regular coverage in the press of his office’s actions (personal communication 
#23, July 26, 2013).   
A final strategy is to exercise careful discretion in selecting the topics for review.  For 
example, one local IG told me that while he views the oversight role to be responsive, he thinks 
it is important not to review every new initiative that management undertakes, because to do so 
would accentuate the adversarial relationship that can exist between an OIG and the agency it 
oversees ~~(personal communication #24, July 26, 2013).  A state IG referred to his law 
enforcement background and restated the same idea: “You don’t have to arrest everyone” 
(personal communication #14, July 23, 2013).  To target issues in a more objective manner, 
some OIGs complete risk assessments to focus their staff’s efforts on programs that are of high 
dollar or are vulnerable to fraud, waste and abuse (personal communication #23, July 26, 2013; 
personal communication #27, July 31, 2013; personal communication #28, July 31, 2013; 





source of their work (personal communication #20, July 25, 2013; personal communication #18, 
July 25, 2013).   
Maintaining professional standards.  Being a helpful consultant does not mean that an 
OIG may compromise the quality of its work or the ethical and legal behavior of staff.  
Compromises of these types would diminish the OIG’s ability to contribute to the accountability 
process.  These qualities are emphasized in the Association of Inspectors General’s Green Book.  
The introductory material states: 
Accountability is key to maintaining public trust in our democracy.  Inspectors general at 
all levels of government are entrusted with fostering and promoting accountability and 
integrity in government.  While the scope of this oversight varies among Offices of 
Inspectors General (OIGs), the level of public trust, and hence pubic expectation, 
embodied in these offices remains exceptionally high.  The public expects OIGs to hold 
government officials accountable for efficient, cost-effective government operations and 
to prevent, detect, identify, expose and eliminate fraud, waste, corruption, illegal acts and 
abuse.  This public expectation is best served by inspectors general when they follow the 
basic principles of integrity, objectivity, independence, confidentiality , professionalism, 
competence, courage, trust, honest, fairness, forthrightness, public accountability and 
respect for others and themselves.  Inspectors general are granted substantial powers to 
perform their duties.  In exercising these powers, inspectors general regard their offices 
as a public trust, and their prime duty as serving the public interest.   
By the nature of their work, OIGs are held to the same or higher expectations than 
other government officials in using prudence with pubic resources.  Because OIGs often 





they have a concomitant duty to conduct their own work in an efficient and effective 
manner.  Office of the Inspector General (OIG) work should adhere to professional 
standards and include quality controls to assure that all products are of the highest 
possible quality.  This requires an internal quality assurance program and suggests 
periodic external quality reviews for each OIG.  
An OIG is judged by the results of its efforts and the timeliness, accuracy, 
objectivity, fairness, and usefulness of these results.  These are the cornerstones of OIG 
accountability.  Qualitative and quantitative performance measure should be developed, 
measured internally, and reported to the public. (Association of Inspectors General, 2004, 
p. 3) 
What do these exhortations mean in practice? A local IG told me she operationalizes these 
principles as follows: 
[I coach my staff to] be polite, show respect, follow the rules 120%, because [if] we’re 
going to tell other people what to do, we better follow those rules.  I had to fire several of 
my staff that didn’t.  All my staff are at will because I will not tolerate [unethical 
behavior].  I have a 0% tolerance policy . . . But I tell my staff, be mission focused, do 
your job and do it well, quality is the most important thing, and you got to produce and 
get a good return on investment. (personal communication #35, November 5, 2013) 
The same IG holds herself to these strict ethical standards as well, and she advises: 
I think the bottom line for an IG is that you have to have courage, and that is the key, you 
have to be ready to walk out the door.  If someone, in my situation, I don’t technically 
have someone to report to, but I’ve had in the agency setting, if you are asked to do 





the door.  You can’t ever question.  You have to have the integrity and you can’t ever 
break that because you will lose all credibility.  It takes courage to do this job, no matter 
where you are. (personal communication #35, November 5, 2013) 
  IGs also emphasize the necessity of following the law.  All the IGs I interviewed noted 
that they are very careful to follow the law that applies to their office in order to protect the 
reputation of their offices (personal communication #20, July 25, 2013; personal communication 
#27, July 31, 2013; personal communication #35, November 5, 2013).  Several IGs reported to 
me that they have asked for legal opinions from their Attorney General to make sure they were 
acting appropriately (personal communication #27, July 31, 2013; Virginia Attorney General 
Opinion 12-076, 2013).  One IG publically recused himself from an investigation because he had 
a prior relationship with the person who was being investigated (Associated Press State Wire: 
Indiana, 2013).  Many IGs told me they in particular follow confidentiality restrictions very 
carefully.  In Illinois, many IGs take confidentially so seriously that it hampers their ability to 
ask each other for professional advice (personal conversation #18, July 25, 2013; personal 
conversation #20, July 25, 2013; personal conversation #23, July 26, 2013; personal conversation 
#25, July 26, 2013; personal conversation #25, July 26, 2013).  An IG in another state observed 
that careful protection of confidential information encourages cooperation as the parties know 
that their information will remain within the OIG (personal conversation #26, July 30, 2013).   
To ensure that their work product is of high quality, IGs may play to the particular 
strengths of the professional staff, in particular their own professional skills (personal 
communication #7, June 18, 2012; personal communication #17, July 24, 2013; personal 
communication #18, July 25, 2013; personal communication #20, July 25, 2013; personal 





example, if the IG is an accountant or has an auditing background, the IG may focus his or her 
efforts on audits.  On the other hand, if the IG has a law enforcement background, he or she may 
focus on investigations.  In Minnesota, the IG for the Department of Human Services has worked 
in social service licensing, and several major initiatives the OIG has taken address licensees: 
home daycare providers and methadone clinics (Minnesota Department of Human Services 
Office of Inspector General, 2013).  A local IG explained the rationale for this approach as 
follows:   
I didn’t want to spend a year doing all planning. I wanted to get going from day one.  
And so, knowing the investigative side a lot better, even though the [OIG] does have an 
audit function in the IG’s Office,  . . . I wanted to get the investigations side going, kind 
of make a name for the office, let people know we’re here.  And now if a second term 
takes place, I think that’s where I want to concentrate on, the  . . . program audit side. 
(personal communication #18, July 25, 2013) 
 A final method to help ensure the quality of an OIG’s work is to join professional 
organizations, follow professional standards, and gain professional certifications for staff.  As 
shown in Table 4.5, 82% of all survey respondents reported that they are members of 
Association of Inspectors General or another professional organization.  Slightly fewer local and 
multi-jurisdictional OIG respondents are affiliated with a professional organization than 
respondents from state, as shown in Tables 4.6-4.7.  Table 4.8 lists the organizations with which 








Survey question:  Is your OIG a member of the Association of Inspectors General or other 
similar professional organization?   
 

















































Survey question: Which professional organizations does your OIG belong to? 
Total responses:  29 
 
*Association of Inspectors General (22 respondents) 
*Institute of Internal Auditors (7 respondents) 
*Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (6 respondents) 
*Association of Government Accountants (5 respondents) 
*ISACA (formerly Information Systems Audit and Control Association) (3 respondents) 





*American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2 respondents) 
*Association of Local Government Auditors (2 respondents) 
*Council on Governmental Ethics and Laws  (2 respondents) 
*National Association for Medicaid Program Integrity (2 respondents) 
*National White Collar Crime Center (2 respondents) 
*Government Finance Officers Association 
*Illinois Chiefs of Police  
*International Law Enforcement Auditors Association 
*International Association of Financial Crime Investigators 
*Missouri Corrections Association  
*National Association of Professional Women 
*National Fraud & Abuse Technical Advisory Group 
*National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association 
*Ohio Investigator's Association   
*Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics 
*The International Association of Chiefs of Police 
*United States Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force 
 
As Table 4.8 below shows, survey respondents report that these professional 
organizations affect their OIGs in a variety of ways. Half of the respondents reported strong 
benefits in the area of staff training; nearly half reported benefits in the area of establishing 
standards for audits, investigations and evaluations. Significant proportions also reported benefits 
in the areas of how to draft written reports and the content of written policies. By contrast, 
majorities found professional associations to be of little help in the areas of peer review, 
cultivating positive relationships with the agency being overseen, internal hiring and firing 
decisions, and external public relations (with the press or elected officials). In sum, professional 
associations are seen as especially helpful in the technical areas of the job, but much less helpful 







Survey question:  How much would you say these professional organizations have 














Training for staff 17 (50%) 16 (47%) 1 (3%) 34 
Standards and/or processes for 
audits, investigations, evaluations, 
etc. 
15 (44%) 18 (53%) 1 (3%) 34 
Written work products and 
findings, such as audit or 
investigation reports 
11 (32%) 18 (53%) 5 (15%) 34 
The content of written policies 8 (24%) 22 (67%) 3 (9%) 33 
Peer review 4 (13%) 10 (31%) 18 (56%) 32 
Relationships with the 
agency/agencies that the OIG 
oversees 
3 (9%) 14 (42%) 16 (48%) 33 
Human resource management, 
such as hiring and firing 
1 (3%) 14 (41%) 19 (56%) 34 
Working with the press or public 1 (3%) 9 (27%) 23 (70%) 33 
Relationships with elected 
officials 
0 (0%) 9 (27%) 24 (73%) 33 
Other 0 0 9 (100%) 9 
 
Several of the IGs reported that they have gained certification as an inspector general, 
which is offered by the Association of Inspectors General (personal communication #17, July 24, 
2013; personal communication #18, July 25, 2013; personal communication #19, July 25, 2013; 





2013).  The certification requires a 40-hour training session over five days, and the curriculum 
covers issues such as the context of the IG function, ethics, law, office management, 
investigating, and auditing (Association of Inspectors General, n.d.).  The Association offers two 
other professional certifications for a certified IG inspector and a certified IG auditor.  These 
certifications cover the nuts and bolts of auditing and investigation, taught in the same time 
period as the IG certification.  The auditor curriculum covers the audit process, professional audit 
standards, working with investigators, internal controls, and forensic and information technology 
auditing., and the investigator curriculum covers the investigative process, professional 
investigative standards, working with auditors, procurement fraud, and computer crime 
(Association of Inspectors General, n.d.).  Most IGs encourage their staff to become certified, 
although several noted that they are hampered by funding (personal communication #17, July 24, 
2013; personal communication #19, July 25, 2013; personal communication # 37, November 6, 
2013).  Other professional certifications are commonly pursued as well.  For instance, an IG told 
me he was a certified public accountant, a certified internal auditor, certified government 
financial manager, and a certified government auditing professional (personal communication 
#34, October 20, 2013). 
Although my survey data suggest that OIG staff appreciate professional associations 
mainly for their technical help and less so for their political advice, there is some evidence that 
these professional associations provide support from colleagues in dealing with pushback and 
balancing the consultant and oversight roles.  Of course, the Association of Inspectors General’s 
Green Book provides quality standards for OIG auditing and investigations, which include topics 
such as independence, planning, organization, staff qualifications, supervision, and sufficient 





peer reviews every three years helps insure that an OIG is producing quality work, but 
networking and candid conference presentations provide peer-to-peer coaching about the careful 
balancing of being helpful and at the same time being an independent monitor.  For instance, at 
the 2013 Association of Inspectors General annual conference, the IG from Massachusetts 
presented on his experience of embedding his staff in an agency for the first time, negotiating 
those relationships, and maintaining professional standards (Association of Inspectors General 
conference sessions, 2013).  A local IG explained the value of this type of networking: 
It’s huge.  [The Association of Inspectors General Conference] is the place where you are 
among your peers.  We all understand the seriousness of the job, the politics of the job, 
you can talk to people who have been there, done that.  All of us have had different 
experiences, and we share them.  It is a place where you can go and be confident that you 
know somebody understands your work.  (personal communication #35, November 5, 
2013)   
At these conferences, presenters convey a common message that this job is tough and to 
do it, you need to be tougher.  Toughness is required in large part due to the conflict and 
pushback from the entities who are being monitored.  Mary Schiavo, Former IG for the Federal 
Aviation Administration, exhorted attendees of the 2008 Association of Inspectors General 
spring conference to do the best job possible, but have an exit strategy in the form of an 
emergency bank account (Association of Inspectors General Conference Session, 2008).  Other 
speakers have asserted that if an agency or other entity pressures you to compromise your 
principals, you need to quit (Association of Inspectors General Conference Sessions, 2013).  In 





possible and making small strategic changes to strengthen the office’s reputation as objective, 
independent, and friendly.   
In sum, OIGs widely share among each other information about pushback and how to 
deal with it. In anticipation of pushback they develop a range of strategies to shore up their 
credibility and to develop external allies who may help protect the OIG in the face of challenges.  
Conclusion   
As this chapter has documented, after implementation, many OIGs eventually develop 
fairly positive relationships with the entities they oversee; however, in the early stages of 
implementation and with changes in personnel, contentious conflicts between OIGs and the 
entities they oversee occur.  These conflicts center on an OIG’s role in the accountability 
process, its powers, and credibility.   In these cases, individuals subject to OIG oversight who 
either do not understand its role, do not wish to be subject to oversight, or fear the OIG will not 
provide a fair report, fight the extent of an OIG’s jurisdiction, its authority, and its presence.  As 
a result IGs are thrust into an antagonistic position with those they oversee.  They are required to 
strategically defend the OIG or, at least, position the OIG to be more palatable to those being 
overseen.  They pursue the role of a “strong right hand” to management. 
As Daniel Carpenter (2001) observed with the U.S. Postal Service, OIGs gain power and 
influence to the extent that they are able to cultivate external allies and build their reputation as 
competent, relevant, and helpful.  This bureaucratic authority will also help OIGs deflect threats 
from opponents and allow them to pursue their mission.  In essence, this means that IGs must act 
politically in order to protect and promote their offices and accountability missions.  Doing so, 
however, places them in an awkward position.  Engaging in political maneuvering may erode 





monitoring.  Any damage to an OIG’s reputation or even a suggestion of lack of independence or 
bias may compromise the quality and reliability of the information reported by the OIG.  Even if 
an OIG is successful in cultivating alternative forums for its information, those forums will not 
be willing to value the information unless it is believed to be valid and truthful.  So while 
addressing the need to be political and strategic in order to impact the accountability process, 
OIGs also must constantly maintain independence.   
With these strategies, it is clear that OIGs are creatively entrepreneurial in defending their 
office and their efforts at oversight. These entrepreneurial efforts include trying to make the 
OIG’s work truly useful—like a helping hand—to the agency being overseen. Nonetheless, it is 
notable that there is little evidence that OIGs are willing to compromise their oversight role so as 
to buy off the opposition. Even—perhaps especially—in the face of determined opposition, OIG 
staffers are deeply committed to their role as an agency of independent oversight. They are 
guided in this role by the archetypal model that I have summarized in previous chapters. In this 
way the politics of OIG implementation is shaped by more than simply the self-interested 
defense of one’s agency: it is deeply shaped by the normative model of the Office of Inspector 








Conclusion: Are OIGs Empty Symbols or Engines of Accountability? 
 
This research has explored the phenomenon of the spread of the OIGs across the country 
and the dynamics that arise with this diffusion.  Yet the important question remains: what is the 
result of the increasing numbers of OIGs?  Given the opposition to OIGs that arises during the 
design and implementation phases, as described in chapters three and four, are OIGs ultimately 
reduced to ineffectiveness through the efforts of those they oversee?  Is the result that OIGs 
become empty symbols, appeasing the public’s demand for increased accountability but not 
actually assisting in achieving accountability?  Or have emerging OIGs helped improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of governmental programs and reduced the advent of fraud, waste, 
and abuse?  Although, as discussed further below, this dissertation does not directly examine 
OIG effectiveness (that is a topic for a future study), the present analysis does suggest that OIGs 
have helped the cause of accountability despite the challenges they face.  This chapter first 
summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and then explores the broader implications of 
these findings for the question of OIG effectiveness.  The chapter closes with a discussion of the 
limitations of this research and future research questions that emerge. 
Research Summary   
The proliferation of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) concept across state and local 
jurisdictions is at its base a neo-institutional story.   Neo-institutionalism suggests that 
institutions, rules, or norms spread from organization to organization as they become endorsed 
by a broad professional field as an acceptable way to do things, regardless of whether other 
options might be more effective in reaching the desired goal.  In this case, we find OIGs 
spreading far and wide across the county because the OIG has become generally accepted as a 





state and local levels, is fueled by the fact that government accountability has become a public 
“obsession” (Dubnick and O’Brien 2011).  OIGs are held up as a key method to combat fraud, 
waste and abuse, and to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and good government.   
Throughout the conceptualization, design and implementation phases, the power of the 
idea of an OIG is demonstrated.  The idea encourages OIG adoption; then, when expressed 
through the development of an archetype, it both attracts and alarms policy makers; and the idea 
propels those subject to OIG oversight to resist the oversight at the same time that it drives OIG 
officials to support the ideals of the OIG.  The idea of an OIG generates a push and pull in the 
name of accountability.  
In fact, data on the state level show that the rate of initial OIG adoption is not influenced 
by long-term levels of corruption, the size of a state’s bureaucracy, or a partisan dominance 
within a state.  Thus, responding to problems of corruption, protecting a state’s investment in its 
bureaucracy, or the temptation to use OIGs as tools of partisan competition are rationales that 
have little impact on the rate of OIG adoption on the state level.  Neither are states directly 
learning to adopt OIGs from their neighbors or the federal government, which has been thought 
to be a traditional method of diffusion.  In fact, OIG adoption is negatively influenced by 
neighboring states’ adoption of OIGs and the increasing numbers of OIGs on the federal level.   
Instead, the idea of an OIG is spreading based on the simple weight of the norm of 
accountability and the idea that OIGs are the answer to a wide range of problems that fall into a 
broad category of perceived accountability and performance deficits.  The OIG gains a place on a 
policy agenda (Kingdon, 1995) because the problem stream produces a clear definition of a 
policy problem, the need for accountability; the policy stream focuses on an OIG as the solution 





encourages political and policy makers to find a solution for accountability issues.  The 
triggering event that spurs an OIG adoption is often a specific major public corruption scandal.  
Typically, OIGs are promoted by a candidate for elected office who wishes to demonstrate to the 
public their commitment to issues of accountability or by an internal, professional bureaucrat 
who sees the adoption of an OIG as an important step to improve accountability and 
performance.   The strength of the norm of accountability is demonstrated by the fact that these 
OIGs have very few opponents at the initial stage when the idea is proposed and begins to move 
toward adoption.   
OIGs are adopted to demonstrate a legitimate commitment to government accountability 
despite the fact that their role in the accountability process, while important, is limited.   This 
role is restricted to collecting unbiased information about a governmental actor’s conduct and 
then reporting it to some authoritative forum, such as an agency head, a mayor, a governor, or 
the general public, often accompanied with recommendations for actions. These other actors then 
may review the OIG’s reports and call the actor to answer and explain his or her actions.  They 
may or may not impose consequences based on the explanation.  An OIG’s role in this process is 
limited in that if the official or agency being overseen decides not to respond to the OIG’s 
findings and recommendations, or if the authoritative forum chooses not to review or not to act 
on the OIG’s information, the official or agency will not actually be held accountable.   
The OIG’s limited role in this process is by design.  The role is not unlike the traditional 
roles that auditors or investigators have always had in government. Indeed, the specific duties 
most often assigned to OIGs are those of auditing and investigating. The role of the OIG is 
similar to that of fact finders used in arbitration proceedings.  OIGs collect information that has 





makers along with recommendations for action.  The information collected should be unbiased 
and reliable, and thus, actionable.   
To ensure the credibility of the information supplied by the OIG, the OIG must have (1) 
the appropriate authority to collect the information needed; and (2) clear independence of the 
OIG from the governmental actor being overseen so as not to be improperly influenced by the 
actor when collecting information.  Producing complete, objective information is essential for an 
OIG as a participant in the accountability process.   
OIG practitioners, who are well aware of the role an OIG plays in the accountability 
process, have developed a detailed archetype of an OIG that has these necessary attributes.  This 
archetype has four necessary elements: foundation in statute (as opposed to executive order or 
other discretionary form); the authority to perform both audits and investigations; the authority to 
compel access to the documents and the testimony needed to fully collect information; and 
structural and budgetary independence from the entity that it oversees.  If designed thus, the 
archetypal OIG will have the independence, legitimacy, permanence, powers, and structure that 
are necessary to perform its role without manipulation. It is important to emphasize that these 
features have emerged through a process of refinement and honing of administrative knowledge, 
and are summarized in several key model policies generated by the Association of Inspectors 
General. 
Yet the same expectations of heightened scrutiny and accountability that motivate 
adoption of an OIG become a source of concern in the design phase.  When designing a 
particular OIG, many government officials would like to maintain a check on it rather than grant 
it fundamental independence and broad investigative powers. These concerns arise from the fact 





be made public.  This fear is justified because, their only real power is to produce such egregious 
or alarming information about an actor’s conduct that the forum simply cannot ignore it.  Put 
another way, the OIG’s only tool to ensure government accountability is to shame or embarrass 
the actor.  Realistically, shame and embarrassment could lead directly to reductions in funding 
for the programs exhibiting problems, but this would depend on another actor taking those steps.  
Nevertheless, being able to publicize information that is potentially embarrassing is a powerful 
tool, and in many instances shocking information demands action to correct the problem.  For 
example, if an OIG can produce comprehensive and reliable information that someone has 
committed a significant fraud against the jurisdiction, a prosecutor will be more likely to charge 
the individual with a crime, or a supervisor will be more likely to take an administrative action, 
or a legislator may reduce funding.   
The potential for an OIG to embarrass and shame is precisely why OIGs are so 
threatening to those they oversee.  Officials under oversight feel this threat even if they have 
done nothing wrong.  These officials fear the unknown and seek to control it.     
As a consequence, while the idea of an OIG has great popularity and appeal, and this 
motivates adopting such a body in some form, when it comes to designing this form  the same 
idea can seem very threatening to policy makers and those subject to its jurisdiction. They tweak 
or radically revise the design, and the end result is often an office that does not match up with the 
archetype.  Some reasons for these changes are undoubtedly benign.  Sometimes a jurisdiction’s 
particular conditions and needs shape the OIG in unique ways.  However, it is more common that 
policy makers withdraw from the OIG key elements of the archetypal OIG’s authority or 
independence.  To minimize the potential threat of a new OIG, these policy makers deliberately 





Similar concerns about an OIG’s role arise during the implementation stage.  The 
trepidation experienced by those to be overseen is more intense because the OIG is no longer 
theoretical.  As the OIG begins its work, those who are to be overseen by the OIG chafe under 
the monitoring.  One method used to try to reduce the threat of an OIG is to challenge the scope 
of OIG’s jurisdiction.  Another is to challenge the OIG’s authority.  A third is to hinder an OIG’s 
access to necessary staff, equipment, and funding.  Opponents of the OIG also try to limit its 
influence by alleging that it is biased and therefore unable to provide reliable information for the 
accountability process. 
These challenges, while intense and difficult for OIG staff to respond to, are not 
inevitable.  If the individuals who are overseen by an OIG understand and accept the role, the 
relationship can be smoother.  Additionally, OIGs can take steps to build a more productive 
relationship, but this takes time.  OIG staff can pursue a number of strategies to protect their 
office’s role in the accountability process and build positive relationships with the entities that 
they oversee in order to reduce the conflict and protect the OIG’s ability to pursue its mission.   
Strategies employed by OIG staff are both formal and informal.  An example of a formal 
method is to pursue amendments to the OIG’s authorizing statute, ordinance, charter or other 
founding document to correct deviations from the archetype.  Another formal strategy is to take 
challenges to the OIG’s authority or jurisdiction to court for a judicial decision.  An example of 
an informal approach commonly employed to strengthen the office’s independence, which may 
be lacking, is to locate the physical site of the OIG at a distance from the management of the 
entity they oversee.  Another is to develop alternative outlets, or “forums,” for the information 
they produce to ensure it receives the proper attention.  Finally, OIG staff work to build a 





To pursue this last goal, OIG staff work closely with management, investigate or audit the 
programs that management is concerned about or otherwise use careful discretion in selecting 
topics to study, and work to avoid publically embarrassing the agency being overseen.   
At the same time, OIG staff must be vigilant in upholding professional standards and 
independence, because if they are seen as too “cozy” with the individuals who within the OIG’s 
jurisdiction, their findings and conclusions will be compromised.  Thus, OIG staff make great 
efforts to comply with laws, rules, ethical, and professional standards, which is considered 
essential if the OIG is going to review others’ compliance with the same.  In addition, OIGs try 
to produce work products that add value.  Training staff and joining professional organizations 
helps ensure that the OIG’s work quality is high.  Communications through the networks 
associated with these professional associations helps to improve training and to share 
information to help staff deal with the pushback from those being overseen.   
Balancing a reputation as helpful rather than threatening with independence and 
professionalism is very important.  If viewed as threatening, an OIG will have an antagonistic 
relationship with those it oversees and will struggle to gather the information it needs to perform 
its role.  On the other hand, it is vital that the work product of an OIG meets professional 
standards and is accurate, because if their work product comes to be considered shoddy or 
politically motivated, the OIG will lose all credibility.  Its ability to provide information to the 
accountability process will be called into question and ultimately ignored.  In the same vein, if an 
OIG’s staff is considered unethical or biased, their findings and recommendations will be 
discounted.  Thus, OIG staff must be helpful, but maintain distance.  They must support the 





but they must produce high quality information about the weaknesses in the activities of those 
who are overseen by the OIG.  This is no easy task. 
Although I am reasonably confident in the basis for the brief summary above, inevitably 
there are some limitations to my data. One is found in the statistical model presented in chapter 
two.  Although illuminating in some ways, it also yielded some counterintuitive and puzzling 
results. For example, despite an apparent regionalism evident in a visual inspection of a map of 
patterns of adoption of OIGs, the results of the event-history model suggest that adoption of an 
OIG by a state’s neighbors seems to decrease the likelihood that a state will adopt an OIG.  This 
is puzzling. It is possible that the model is missing one or more important variables.  For 
example, my interviews suggest that information about OIGs is shared from state to state via 
specialized networks. These networks may be organized less by geographic proximity than 
professional connections. Developing a measure of these networks would be difficult but, if 
accomplished, might add important missing information to the statistical model. On this question 
there is room for further work and refinement.  
Another limitation is that the perspectives of individuals subject to OIG oversight were 
not obtained due to time constraints and logistical issues.  Some conclusions about their motives 
were drawn from their actions.  A more complete picture of the character of opposition to OIGs 
during the design and implementation phases would require additional interviews with OIG 
opponents and those overseen by OIGs. Such interviews may also help identify missing variables 
in the statistical model presented in chapter two. 
Broader Implications: Accountability and a Politicized Bureaucracy 
To what extent can OIGs actually can contribute to accountability?  Does the pressure 





and empty symbolism?  Or, alternatively, are IGs and their staff able to establish a substantive 
role for their office in the accountability process?  
Murray Edelmen (1964) proposed that many public policies and even public agencies are 
created not so much to solve a problem as to convey the impression that elected officials are 
trying to solve it. Put another way, administrative agencies, such as OIGs, perform important 
expressive or symbolic functions.  They create an impression in the public that actions are being 
taken for the public good.  Although it might be argued that such symbolism is valuable in that it 
may reassure the public and confirm support for the values that are embraced (e.g., “fraud, waste, 
and abuse is wrong” or “corruption is wrong”), it is also true, as Edelman argued, that as a 
practical matter a merely symbolic expression may bring no change to the status quo.     
On first blush, it appears that the diffusion of OIGs may be just such a merely symbolic 
effort to pursue accountability.  Adopting an OIG may be used by an elected official to 
demonstrate that he or she is following through on his or her promises; however, the politician 
may not be as concerned with whether the OIG is actually effective.  Several of the key 
observations reported in this dissertation are consistent with this jaundiced interpretation. As we 
have seen, the idea of enacting an OIG most often arises in the political process and is endorsed 
by a politician wishing to promote an image of him- or herself as a reformer. Likewise, in many 
jurisdictions the initial OIG proposal is weakened or watered down during the design phase so 
that the resulting agency is bereft of key forms of independence and authority.  
Nevertheless, some other observations in this dissertation run counter to this “empty 
symbolism” interpretation. The OIG model is hardly an “empty” symbol if, as I have shown, it is 
widely seen as a key way to bring effective oversight to bureaucratic agencies. Although there is 





widespread support for this particular solution. This support is surely based in part on how the 
particular design features of OIGs are aimed at enabling this agency to match the expertise of the 
overseen agency with an equal expertise, and other design features give the OIG the 
independence and authority to do the job effectively. Although too often these effectiveness-
ensuring features are watered down in the design phase, as we have seen that is not the end of the 
story. The symbolic power of the OIG concept is also felt in the high level of dedication by OIG 
staff to pursuing the OIG’s mission and even to overcome these weaknesses in particular OIGs’ 
designs.  Nearly everywhere that I conducted interviews, these staff showed a strong 
commitment to meeting the professional ideals associated with the OIG idea. They emphasized 
how hard they work to meet the standards, training, professional certifications, and peer review 
that have emerged as the “nuts and bolts” of the OIG model. Likewise, staff use the OIG model 
as a way to recruit allies and public support for their mission. Although these efforts at recruiting 
allies are inherently political in nature, the politics are normative (motivated by March and 
Olsen’s “logics of appropriateness”) rather than horse-trading in nature. So, here too, the 
normative symbolism of the OIG model is revealed as potent rather than empty.  
In employing the normative symbolism of the OIG idea to marshal allies and public 
support, OIGs become what might be called “politicized bureaucracies.”  Unlike a typical 
agency, for OIGs it is not enough to do the job well.  The staff are also required to act 
strategically—even politically—to overcome determined opposition in highly politicized 
environments. Carpenter (2001) describes a similar dynamic in the U.S. Post Office’s efforts in 
the late 1800s to gain allies and strengthen its portfolio of services and thus its budget. What 
seems different and distinct in this dissertation’s analysis of OIG officials’ similar efforts to 





This is a case of bureaucratic politics in pursuit of a normative mission.  The OIG staff are 
influenced by the norm of accountability and thus pursue the model of the OIG as a way to give 
teeth to this norm.  Although they are tasked with a relatively straightforward mission of 
monitoring, they face considerable pushback in carrying out this mission and, in response to this 
pushback, they use the normative symbolism of the OIG model to defend their agency and gain 
political support for it. This is a bureaucratic politics of a particular type: a normatively mission-
centered bureaucratic politics.  
For instance, OIGs, when experiencing intense challenges, cannot maintain their 
monitoring role without external champions.  These external champions have two important 
roles.  The first is to support the presence and the work of the OIG.  For example, if leadership in 
the entity that is being overseen understands, supports and values the OIG’s monitoring, the OIG 
can operate with little conflict.  On the other hand, if the leadership in the entity that is being 
overseen resents the OIG or tries to undermine its authority, the OIG can hold out against these 
attacks and remain effective only for so long. At some point external attacks and resistance are 
likely to undermine an OIG’s capacity and influence.  Thus, when the governor of Massachusetts 
decided to defund the state OIG because he no longer desired oversight, the OIG would have 
disappeared had the legislature not come to its aid with funding.  When the county assessor 
rejected the Cook County OIG’s jurisdiction over his office, there was little the OIG could do 
until the jurisdiction was confirmed by the local district court.   
The second key supporting role of an external champion is to be the receiver of the OIG’s 
monitoring reports.  This external champion must be in the position to value the report and act on 
it.  Without a receptive audience, the OIG’s basic role becomes irrelevant.  To be sure, various 





uninterested in an OIG’s monitoring and tried to ignore the OIG’s reports, these reports may still 
gain a hearing if the governor, legislature, press, or the public step up and demand a response.   
For example, even though the Indiana OIG’s credibility was challenged by Democrats in the 
legislature and its work could have been discredited and ignored, local and state prosecutors 
found the information collected by the OIG worth pursuing in the courts, receiving convictions 
in multiple cases.  Thus, accountability was achieved in those cases. But if no external authority 
champions an OIG’s reports, they become irrelevant. 
In sum, when an OIG cultivates external allies who will have its back, so to speak, this 
becomes an essentially political act.  In turn, the OIG must produce professional work or risk 
losing this champion’s support.  Only with the OIG staff’s commitment to the mission and 
dedication to professionalism and appropriate political strategizing, such as cultivating an 
external champion, can the OIG meet the full potential of its intended role. 
Other bureaucracies may become politicized in a similar mission-centered way.  One 
example is a state’s vital statistics unit.  Their role is record keeping, but the unit has been thrust 
into many political issues of the day: surrogacy, same sex marriage, and abortion.  In order to 
keep accurate records, these units must negotiate highly political atmospheres, much like an 
OIG.  There are other possible examples: environmental protection agencies whose staff and 
external supporters face powerful political pushback yet are motivated to forge ahead by their 
commitment to the environmental-protection mission; public schools whose staff face political 
skepticism or even opposition yet remain motivated by the public-education mission; and so on. 
These examples suggest many significant questions for further research, focused particularly on 
how the politicization of an agency’s mission both draws out opposition and also motivates allies 





Two other observations on accountability arise from this research.  First, although strategic 
efforts to build allies are often essential, what is really required to achieve accountability is what 
I previously called the external forum that holds the overseen agency to account. OIGs may 
gather and present information, but they also need a forum that hears and acts on this 
information: a governor or mayor who pays attention, a legislature that listens, news media that 
reports the results, a public who cares.  This observation makes clear that many types of 
accountability mechanisms, such as open meeting laws, transparency measures, and performance 
budgeting are similar to OIGs in that they alone do not deliver accountability.  They provide 
information to the public decision making process, which is important, but, like OIGs, their 
contribution to government accountability ends there.  A separate forum is required to act on the 
information and call the governmental actors to explain or defend their decisions.  As in the case 
of OIGs, much effort is being put towards implementing these mechanisms of transparency and 
accountability.  These efforts to provide heightened government accountability can be easily 
undercut if there is no forum paying attention.  Second, a broader conclusion about government 
accountability can be drawn.  This research shows how adversarial relationships easily arise 
between overseers and the overseen.  Overseers are required to be critical and at times 
suspicious, while at the same time those being overseen resent having their flaws pointed out and 
made public.  They would prefer not be told what to do.  They would prefer to “steer,” rather 
than “row” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993).   Although tensions between the overseer and the 
overseen thus naturally arise, ideally the goals of the two should be aligned.  Each is ultimately 
interested in positive outcomes of government programs and appropriate spending of public 
funds.  If both entities could operate as partners who are invested in similar missions, perhaps the 





Although some natural resentment may be understandable when someone is monitoring your 
actions, in the public sector, public managers ought not have the luxury to complain.  Instead, 
their stance should be: “I always welcome the opportunity to do a better job for the public.”  At 
the same time, OIG staff should not be heavy-handed sentries.  They should understand that most 
pubic managers are well motivated.  If this shift in attitude could occur, the antagonism between 
public managers and OIG staff could be reduced.   
 It may be too much too hope for congenial relations between Offices of Inspector General 
and the agencies they oversee. After all, the model of an ideal OIG that has emerged in recent 
decades is of an oversight agency that has the independence and tools necessary to conduct 
thorough audits and investigations, identify problems with effectiveness and efficiency, root out 
waste, fraud, and abuse, and publicize the results. In many instances OIGs have performed these 
tasks admirably. OIGs have provided crucial independent reports on a wide range of issues. 
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Appendix A: State Rankings on Two Indicators of Corruption 
(States in which I conducted interviews are in bold) 
 
Average annual public integrity convictions 
(2002-2011) per 1000 state and local FTE 
   
Ranking State Average 
1 Kansas 2.044020836 
2 Oregon 2.161313894 
3 South Carolina 2.237245298 
4 New Hampshire 2.311543061 
5 Minnesota 2.364873331 
6 Nebraska 2.397753461 
7 Washington 2.412164186 
8 Idaho 2.805677291 
9 Utah 2.924181463 
10 Colorado 3.071091345 
11 Iowa 3.091914322 
12 Nevada 3.426111005 
13 North Carolina 3.617387934 
14 New Mexico 3.676378797 
15 California 3.691144264 
16 Wisconsin 3.96673846 
17 Indiana 4.138008814 
18 Wyoming 4.456912904 
19 Vermont 4.543705727 
20 Connecticut 4.649632722 
21 Maine 4.731373982 
22 New York 4.759696428 
23 Georgia 4.873777785 
24 Michigan 4.95125554 
25 Texas 5.35246332 
26 Rhode Island 5.698994158 
27 Missouri 5.839227188 
28 Arkansas 5.840518746 
29 Hawaii 6.198070627 
30 Massachusetts 6.412578856 
31 Arizona 6.61177554 





33 Florida 7.188741556 
34 West Virginia 7.489992204 
35 Illinois 7.675433605 
36 Ohio 7.715853782 
37 Tennessee 8.089634436 
38 New Jersey 8.522833346 
39 Alaska 8.687862811 
40 Pennsylvania 8.914181215 
41 Maryland 9.108005188 
42 Alabama 9.688 
43 Mississippi 9.929649585 
44 Virginia 10.21430118 
45 Montana 11.05469198 
46 Kentucky 12.5301795 
47 North Dakota 13.25021984 
48 South Dakota 14.49261047 
49 Louisiana 18.60076651 
50 Delaware 23.92205221 
 
 
Numerical equivalent of Standard and Poor’s 
State Bond Ratings, Averaged from 2001-2012 
   
Rank State Average Rating 
1 Delaware 25 
2 Georgia 25 
3 Maryland 25 
4 Missouri 25 
5 North Carolina 25 
6 Utah 25 
7 Virginia 25 
8 Minnesota 24.90909091 
9 Florida 24.72727273 
10 Iowa 24.45454545 
11 Indiana 24.27272727 
12 South Carolina 24.27272727 
13 Nebraska 24.18181818 
14 Kansas 24 





16 Ohio 24 
17 Vermont 24 
18 Washington 23.81818182 
19 Tennessee 23.63636364 
20 Wyoming 23.63636364 
21 Alaska 23.6 
22 Nevada 23.45454545 
23 Oklahoma 23.45454545 
24 Texas 23.36363636 
25 South Dakota 23.28571429 
26 Idaho 23.18181818 
27 New Hampshire 23.09090909 
28 Alabama 23 
29 Arkansas 23 
30 Connecticut 23 
31 Maine 23 
32 Mississippi 23 
33 New York 23 
34 Pennsylvania 23 
35 North Dakota 22.90909091 
36 Massachusetts 22.81818182 
37 Michigan 22.81818182 
38 Oregon 22.81818182 
39 New Jersey 22.72727273 
40 Rhode Island 22.72727273 
41 Colorado 22.54545455 
42 Hawaii 22.54545455 
43 Arizona 22.45454545 
44 Montana 22.45454545 
45 Wisconsin 22.45454545 
46 West Virginia 22.36363636 
47 Illinois 22.27272727 
48 Kentucky 22 
49 Louisiana 21.18181818 







Appendix B: State Rankings on Two Indicators of Size of Government 
(States in which I conducted interviews are in bold) 
 
State and Local Full Time Equivalent Employees 
per 1000 State Population (2011) 
   
Rank State FTE 
1 Nevada 41.97336929 
2 Arizona 43.31581696 
3 Michigan 46.23018985 
4 Pennsylvania 46.45148674 
5 California 46.48397778 
6 Florida 46.60406888 
7 Rhode Island 47.31846796 
8 Massachusetts 48.68861438 
9 Illinois 48.71462276 
10 Idaho 49.57081613 
11 Wisconsin 49.64628284 
12 Indiana 50.56113914 
13 Washington 50.71230936 
14 Oregon 50.95717587 
15 Tennessee 51.13836454 
16 Ohio 51.51126237 
17 Connecticut 51.72411386 
18 Minnesota 51.85897257 
19 Georgia 51.88640895 
20 Utah 52.38884263 
21 Maryland 52.67943988 
22 Missouri 52.7909617 
23 Colorado 52.79983802 
24 Hawaii 53.584859 
25 South Carolina 54.19139474 
26 Virginia 54.20013131 
27 New Hampshire 54.82728642 
28 Delaware 54.84409707 
29 New Jersey 55.33447717 
30 South Dakota 55.6388806 
31 West Virginia 55.89253645 





33 Kentucky 56.49779968 
34 Oklahoma 56.64157902 
35 Maine 56.74648468 
36 North Carolina 57.58511893 
37 Iowa 57.88703883 
38 Montana 57.97841913 
39 Alabama 59.29490249 
40 New Mexico 60.35085562 
41 New York 60.39913185 
42 Louisiana 61.55346334 
43 Vermont 63.29348324 
44 Mississippi 64.46003911 
45 Arkansas 64.53688062 
46 Nebraska 65.65250638 
47 North Dakota 65.86473509 
48 Kansas 68.55823168 
49 Alaska 75.74600328 
50 Wyoming 92.81221069 
 
 
State and Local Payroll (by $1000) per 1000 State 
Population (2011) 
   
Rank State Payroll 
1 Tennessee               2,050.85  
2 Idaho               2,077.46  
3 Arizona               2,100.18  
4 Florida               2,172.27  
5 Maine               2,173.22  
6 South Dakota               2,188.27  
7 Georgia               2,190.36  
8 Missouri               2,197.76  
9 Indiana               2,213.09  
10 Kentucky               2,223.31  
11 West Virginia               2,223.42  
12 Oklahoma               2,235.38  
13 South Carolina               2,272.36  
14 Utah               2,311.65  





16 Nevada               2,399.76  
17 Pennsylvania               2,411.23  
18 Mississippi               2,442.51  
19 North Carolina               2,470.75  
20 Alabama               2,477.42  
21 Montana               2,508.15  
22 Michigan               2,515.96  
23 Wisconsin               2,537.01  
24 
New 
Hampshire               2,537.51  
25 Texas               2,542.99  
26 Virginia               2,548.88  
27 Ohio               2,568.27  
28 New Mexico               2,574.37  
29 Louisiana               2,623.52  
30 Hawaii               2,679.94  
31 Oregon               2,688.67  
32 Illinois               2,731.75  
33 Colorado               2,736.71  
34 Delaware               2,773.27  
35 Minnesota               2,805.80  
36 Massachusetts               2,841.22  
37 Rhode Island               2,851.23  
38 Iowa               2,862.93  
39 Kansas               2,872.21  
40 North Dakota               2,934.52  
41 Vermont               2,991.04  
42 Nebraska               3,021.70  
43 Maryland               3,081.37  
44 Washington               3,138.40  
45 California               3,138.80  
46 Connecticut               3,229.66  
47 New Jersey               3,607.12  
48 New York               3,877.23  
49 Wyoming               4,422.56  







Appendix C: State Rankings on Two Measures of Political Culture or Partisanship 
(States in which I conducted interviews are in bold) 
 
Average Ranney Index (Ranney 1975)  
from 1975 to 2004 (Lindquist 2012) 
   
1 Idaho 0.2723667 
2 South Dakota 0.28405 
3 Utah 0.3102417 
4 Wyoming 0.3216417 
5 New Hampshire 0.3514 
6 Kansas 0.361775 
7 Arizona 0.3787167 
8 North Dakota 0.38035 
9 Nebraska 0.3937333 
10 Colorado 0.3958083 
11 Pennsylvania 0.4196 
12 Indiana 0.4267917 
13 Montana 0.442475 
14 Ohio 0.44365 
15 Alaska 0.448275 
16 New York 0.4836667 
17 Michigan 0.4852083 
18 Iowa 0.4973917 
19 Vermont 0.5212167 
20 New Jersey 0.5241667 
21 Delaware 0.537 
22 Illinois 0.5381833 
23 Nevada 0.5429083 
24 Oregon 0.5579333 
25 Wisconsin 0.5591833 
26 Maine 0.5740167 
27 Minnesota 0.5833333 
28 Washington 0.5899 
29 Florida 0.5914333 
30 Connecticut 0.5994833 
31 Virginia 0.6113 
32 Tennessee 0.6178667 





34 Texas 0.628825 
35 South Carolina 0.6497667 
36 New Mexico 0.6517417 
37 California 0.6564417 
38 Oklahoma 0.6816917 
39 North Carolina 0.695625 
40 Kentucky 0.7235917 
41 Massachusetts 0.7237333 
42 Maryland 0.7323083 
43 Georgia 0.7378083 
44 Rhode Island 0.7423167 
45 West Virginia 0.74455 
46 Louisiana 0.7466333 
47 Hawaii 0.7582583 
48 Arkansas 0.7756667 
49 Mississippi 0.7866583 
50 Alabama 0.7917833 
 
 
State Political Culture 
(Sharkansky 1969; Baker 1990) 
   
Rank State Political Culture 
1 Minnesota 1 
2 Washington 1.66 
3 Colorado 1.8 
4 Iowa 2 
5 Michigan 2 
6 North Dakota 2 
7 Oregon 2 
8 Utah 2 
9 Wisconsin 2 
10 Maine 2.33 
11 New Hampshire 2.33 
12 Vermont 2.33 
13 Idaho 2.5 
14 Connecticut 3 
15 Montana 3 





17 South Dakota 3 
18 California 3.55 
19 New York 3.62 
20 Kansas 3.66 
21 Massachusetts 3.66 
22 Nebraska 3.66 
23 New Jersey 4 
24 Wyoming 4 
25 Pennsylvania 4.28 
26 Illinois 4.72 
27 Nevada 5 
28 Ohio 5.16 
29 Arizona 5.66 
30 Alaska 6 
31 Indiana 6.33 
32 Delaware 7 
33 Maryland 7 
34 New Mexico 7 
35 Texas 7.11 
36 West Virginia 7.33 
37 Kentucky 7.4 
38 Missouri 7.66 
39 Florida 7.8 
40 Virginia 7.86 
41 Louisiana 8 
42 Hawaii 8.25 
43 Oklahoma 8.25 
44 North Carolina 8.5 
45 Tennessee 8.5 
46 Alabama 8.57 
47 South Carolina 8.75 
48 Georgia 8.8 
49 Arkansas 9 









Diagnostics of for the Event History Analysis/ Cox Proportional Hazards Model  
 
The Event History Analysis (EHA) model used here is:  
Rate of OIG adoption= f (convictions, state investment, partisan competition, % of  
                                     neighbors, federal OIGs) 
To perform the EHA, I used a Cox Proportional Hazards model, which is a statistical approach 
that neither requires parametric statistics nor a normal distribution of time to event, i.e. the 
number of years until the adoption of an OIG in a state. The model is also amenable to discrete 
periods of time, as is used here, each year being the period of time in question.   
As a preliminary step to test the appropriateness of this model, I checked potential 
multicollinearity in the model.  As recommended by Allison (2010), I used a linear regression 
with time until OIG adoption as the dependent variable, because the Cox regression does not 
provide collinearity diagnostics.  This diagnostic demonstrates that the variance inflation factors 
for each of the independent variables ranges from 1.13 to 2.00, well below 10, the level at which 
multicollinearity is a problem.   
A second step before running the model for purposes of interpretation is to examine 
whether any of the variables violate the assumption of proportionality of hazards, which is 
required for the Cox model.  Comparing the full model with a model made up of time dependent 
variables, I found that none of the variables violated this assumption at p < 0.01.  No other 
variable diagnostics were required. 
The final model, which has an overall p value of .0000, has a fairly good result to a 
goodness of fit test, comparing Cox-Snell residuals with the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard, as 
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